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Whither growth in central and eastern Europe?
Policy lessons for an integrated Europe
Pre-crisis economic forecasts predicted a bright future for the central, eastern
and south-eastern European region, not least because what can be termed
the European integration model of growth was thought to shield the region.
But while situations differ across countries, the crisis has hit this region hard.
Was the pre-crisis development model, which was to a large extent based on
integration with western Europe, the right model to opt for? Can and should
the integration model of growth be revived? Should it be repaired or reformed?
And if so, what are the required changes?
Bruegeland the Vienna Institute for International Economic Studiesgathered
reputed economists from various European countries to answer these ques-
tions. This volume is the summary report of their work. The experts did not
agree on everything, but they did all agree to the main conclusion of this
report: in spite of its shortcomings, the region’s development model should be
preserved. But it should be reformed, with major implications for policymaking
both at national and EU levels. 
Bruegel is a European think tank devoted to international economics. It is
supported by European governments and international corporations.
Bruegel’s aim is to contribute to the quality of economic policymaking in
Europe through open, fact-based and policy-relevant research, analysis and
discussion.
The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies(wiiw) is an indepen-
dent economic research institute with more than 35 years’ experience of ana-
lysing economic developments in central, eastern and south-eastern Europe.
Bruegel gratefully acknowledges the support of the German Marshall Fund of
the United Statesto research underpinning this publication.
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WHITHER GROWTH IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE?Foreword
Countries in central, eastern and south-eastern Europe (CESEE), both inside and out-
side the European Union, have been hit hard by the crisis. This came as a surprise to
most of us. Admittedly some countries were visibly heading for trouble, but economic
forecasts made just a few months before the collapse of Lehman Brothers in
September 2008 still foresaw a bright future for the region as a whole and currencies
of floating exchange-rate regime countries skyrocketed in the summer of 2008. And
while previous emerging markets crises were dominated by Asian and Latin American
countries, European integration was thought to shield the CESEE region. 
Actually European integration was thought to do more: to foster rapid and steady
catching-up through a globally unique combination of institutional anchoring, trade
integration and capital-markets integration. What could be termed the European ‘inte-
gration model of growth’ extended beyond the EU borders to neighbouring countries,
especially to the EU candidate and potential candidate countries in the Balkans. It
was widely hailed a success story.
But the recent global crisis, which primarily originated in the western world, hit emerg-
ing countries differently. Emerging Asia and Latin America were hit only temporarily,
starting to rebound as soon as world trade recovered from collapse. The opposite has
happened in CESEE countries. Even though the complete regional meltdown of the
CESEE region that many analysts foresaw in late 2008 and early 2009 has not hap-
pened, the region has in general been hit hard and the recovery so far has not been
remarkable, though there are significant differences between countries. 
These different developments in the CESEE countries raise questions about their pre-
crisis development model, which was to a large extent based on integration with west-
ern Europe. Can and should their integration model of growth be revived? Should it be
repaired or reformed? And if so, what are the required changes?
Bruegel and wiiw cooperated to form an expert group of economists from various
European countries to answer these questions. This volume is our summary report. Itx
results from a number of meetings in Brussels and Vienna and from extensive email
exchanges, not always consensual. Yet we all agree about the main conclusion of this
report: in view of the depth of integration in Europe, the development model of the
CESEE region, despite its shortcomings, should be preserved. But it should be
reformed, with major implications for policymaking both at national and EU levels. 
The report has benefited from comments from Mario Nuti and Karsten Staehr at a sem-
inar in Vienna in July 2010 organised by the Austrian Ministry of Finance. Maite de
Sola, Juan Ignacio Aldasoro and Lucia Granelli from Bruegel, and Beate Muck and
Monika Schwarzhappel from wiiw provided essential research and statistical assis-
tance, for which we are thankful. Bruegel gratefully acknowledges the financial sup-
port of the German Marshall Fund of the United States to research underpinning this
report. wiiw thanks the Austrian Ministry of Finance for financial support for this
report.
Last but not least, we would like to thank Zsolt Darvas from Bruegel and Vladimir
Gligorov from wiiw for significant personal input and relentless activism in the prepa-
ration of this report. Without them the report would not have seen the light of day.
Michael A. Landesmann
Scientific Director, wiiw
Jean Pisani-Ferry
Director, Bruegel
WHITHER GROWTH IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE?Executive summary
This report examines the impact of the economic crisis on the countries of central and
eastern Europe (CESEE) and draws out the main policy lessons. Until the crisis hit,
CESEE countries had been pursuing a distinctive model of growth and catch-up
through integration with the European Union, although not all countries had achieved
the same level of integration with the EU. The crisis was a major challenge for the poli-
cies pursued in many CESEE countries, and the region was hit by the crisis much
harder than other parts of the emerging world, and is also recovering more slowly.
In chapter 1, we compare the pre-crisis development model of the central, eastern and
south-eastern Europe (CESEE) region with similar countries in Asia and Latin America
and study the impact of the crisis. We highlight that the CESEE growth model was fun-
damentally different from models in other emerging country regions, but also that it
had two variants. The first, which characterised most central European countries, was
by and large appropriate and sustainable. But there is a second group of CESEE coun-
tries (we call it the Baltic-Balkan group) in which the same overall growth model led
to widespread misallocation of resources and unsustainable growth trajectories.
These countries are undergoing a much more painful recovery from the crisis.
In chapter 2 we scrutinise more closely the growth model of the region. We study the
short-run challenges and the medium- to longer-run issues, focusing on behavioural
adjustments occurring within the countries of the region in the wake of the crisis and
on changes in the external environment. We discuss policy issues to make the re-ori-
ented growth model sustainable and successful.
Chapters 3, 4 and 5 examine three key policy areas: exchange-rate policy, financial
stability and fiscal sustainability. We identify a strong role for exchange-rate policy
both in the unsustainable pre-crisis developments of a number of countries and in
their dramatic response to the crisis. However, concerning the other two main policy
areas, it is true more generally that even more conservative domestic financial regu-
lation and supervision and fiscal policy could not have crisis-proofed those CESEE
countries which, even before the crisis, had double-digit current-account deficits.Looking forward, improving supply side conditions and competitiveness will be a key
challenge for most countries in the region. Massive cross-border holdings in CESEE
banks pose significant challenges to financial regulation and we highlight a large
number of unresolved issues, while for fiscal sustainability we are cautiously opti-
mistic, but certainly more optimistic than most analysts who call for overly strict, and
hence pro-cyclical, fiscal policy.
In our concluding chapter 6, we raise policy issues for the CESEE countries and the EU.
The general conclusion is that the benefits of EU integration for countries that are
catching up are conditional on the quality of national policies and of the EU framework
itself. In both respects we point out past failings and suggest strategic improvements.
Reorienting the growth model in those countries that entered a shunt-line before the
crisis will be hard because of their legacies, but that there is no other path to follow in
order to make the EU’s eastern enlargement a lasting economic success story.
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WHITHER GROWTH IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE?1. Context and stylised facts
1.1 Introduction
The global financial and economic crisis has hit most countries of central, eastern
and south-eastern Europe (CESEE) harder than other countries in the world, and
post-crisis recovery is also generally slower for CESEE countries than in other emerg-
ing economies. This raises questions about the pre-crisis development model of the
region, which was a unique model that resulted in rapid economic growth.
Before the crisis, CESEE countries seemed to be catching up with their western
European counterparts rapidly and smoothly, following an extraordinarily deep
recession after the collapse of CESEE communist regimes, as shown by Figure 1.1 on
the next page. Most countries had entirely regained their initial pre-transition relative
income levels in comparison to the EU15, and others were en route to this goal
1.
The main focus of the development model of CESEE countries was EU integration. The
vision of EU integration and EU accession talks drove reform and still provide institu-
tional, legal and behavioural anchors for those CESEE countries that are not yet EU
members. As a consequence of this integration process, all CESEE countries have
achieved deep financial and trade integration with the EU, and have experienced sig-
nificant labour mobility to EU15 countries. Within this common framework, however,
there are substantial differences between CESEE countries. In a few, catching-up was
supported by a strong manufacturing sector and was accompanied by macroeco-
nomic stability. But many countries became increasingly vulnerable before the crisis.
In particular they experienced huge credit, housing and consumption booms, and
thus high current-account deficits and external-debt levels.
Pre-crisis, it was widely believed that these vulnerabilities would have to be correct-
ed at some point, but the correction experienced during the crisis was much faster
and deeper than expected. Indeed, the decline in output was greater than in other
1. Note that data quality for the pre-transition period is questionable.regions, which surprised many analysts. The magnitude of the revision was excep-
tionally high in the Baltic countries, where output in 2010 is set to be 30 or 40 per-
cent lower than the level forecast in late 2007. But with the notable exception of
Poland, those CESEE countries that had maintained pre-crisis macroeconomic stabil-
ity have also suffered substantial output declines.
Beyond the current shock, will the crisis have lasting economic effects on the region?
Several questions loom large:
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Source: authors’ calculation based on data from IMF World Economic Outlook April 2010 and EBRD. Note:
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WHITHER GROWTH IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE?• Should the region's pre-crisis growth and development model be fundamentally
reconsidered? 
• What should national authorities and the EU change in order to help the region
embark on a renewed process of economic catching-up? 
• What are the policy implications for exchange-rate policies, fiscal policies, and
financial regulation?
These and related questions form the core of this volume. However, answering these
questions requires an understanding of the major factors that contributed to conver-
gence in the pre-crisis period, including the main policies pursued in CESEE coun-
tries, and an understanding of the impact of the crisis on the region. We therefore first
discuss these issues by presenting stylised facts about the CESEE region's develop-
ment model, and the impact of the crisis.
1.2 Pre-crisis stylised facts
1.2.1 The core of the development model: deep integration with the EU
CESEE countries have pursued a distinctive model of development since the collapse
of communist regimes. Their approach has been based on integration with the EU
(European Commission, 2009b), including political integration, institutional devel-
opment, trade integration, financial integration and labour mobility
2. While these fac-
tors were also present to various extents in EU15 countries, it must be emphasised
that most CESEE countries have reached very high levels of integration. In particular:
• There were huge net capital inflows before the crisis (Figure 1.2), larger than in
any other emerging or developing region; 
• Most (in some countries all) of the banking systems were bought up by western
European banking groups; this is a unique feature of CESEE economies;
• Gross external assets and liabilities have increased rapidly, though they have on
average remained below levels observed in the EU15 (Figure 1.3);
• The ratio of foreign trade to GDP increased quickly and became, in general, much
higher in CESEE countries than in EU15 countries and other emerging/developing
country regions (Figure 1.3)
3.
5
2. It has to be emphasised that political integration with the EU set an unambiguous path to trade and financial inte-
gration, while restrictions on labour mobility were applied temporarily. In particular, the complete opening of the
capital account was to be achieved by the time of joining the EU and comprehensive financial integration could
not be questioned by new EU member states or by candidate countries currently under negotiations.
3. In emerging countries the lower price of non-tradables inflate the share of tradables in GDP. Hence, a higher share
WHITHER GROWTH IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE?6
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1.2.2 Capital inflows: larger than anywhere else in the world
Figure 1.2 shows that net private-capital inflows reached about 11 percent of the
GDP of the whole CESEE region by 2007. No other region in the world has experienced
such a massive inflow of capital in any year during the past three decades. Another,
and related, distinctive feature of the CESEE region's development model is current
account imbalances (Figure 1.4), though there are significant differences within the
region. The deficit remained broadly stable at around 4-5 percent of GDP for the CE5,
but increased to around 15 percent of GDP on average for the BB5 and WB6 (see Box
1.1 for our country groupings). 
Asia and Latin America were different: after the dramatic crises of the 1990s and
around the turn of the millennium, most Asian and Latin American countries (not just
our Asia-6 and Latam-8 groups) fundamentally changed their development strate-
gies. From being net capital importers, they – especially in Asia – became balanced,
of tradables to GDP in emerging countries does not necessarily imply higher openness, but certainly implies high-
er dependency on foreign trade.8
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or even substantial capital exporters
4. Net private capital inflows (Figure  1.3) com-
bined with current accounts close to balance (Latin America; see Figure 1.4) or in
significant surplus (Asia), led these economies to accumulate foreign-exchange
reserves, especially in US dollars. Indeed, the accumulation of foreign-exchange
reserves was a key policy objective of Asian countries in the aftermath of the 1997
crisis.
Capital flows into the CESEE took the form of FDI (including the buying-up of swathes
of the CESEE banking system), portfolio investments and loans. Figure 1.2 illustrates
the gradual and substantial increase (even as a share of the region's GDP) of net FDI
inflows. On average, FDI inflows to the CESEE region increased from practically zero
in 1989 to about five percent of GDP by 2006/2007. The value reached by
2006/2007 was higher than flows to Latin America and developing Asia in every year
in the past three decades. 
While the inflow of FDI was a key driver of economic growth in the CESEE region
5, the
composition of FDI was not always favourable. In particular, the share of manufactur-
ing, the key sector for developing export potential, was significant only in CE5, but
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Figure 1.4: Macroeconomic balances: current account and inflation (%), 1995-2010
Source: Authors’ calculations using data from IMF World Economic Outlook April 2010.
4. See, for example, Abiad, Leigh and Mody (2009).
5. See, for example, the econometric estimates in Darvas (2010c) and EBRD (2009) that support this claim.9
XXXX
9
BOX 1.1: THE COUNTRY GROUPS
While CESEE countries pursued development models with common features, it is
instructive to differentiate certain country groups to facilitate comparison of the
CESEE region with other regions. There are many different ways to define groups
within the region. We categorise countries based on EU membership on the one
hand (because EU and non-EU countries have rather different policy constraints)
and sustainability of their external balances on the other hand (because two high-
ly distinctive features can be observed within the region). Interestingly, countries
with similar features are also geographically close to each other. 
We therefore divide CESEE countries into three groups (abbreviations used in the
figures are in brackets):
1 Central European EU members (CE5): Czech Republic, Hungary
6, Poland,
Slovakia and Slovenia – the trade balance was stable or improving in these
countries;
2 Baltic and Balkan EU members (BB5): Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and
Romania – the trade balance was almost continuously worsening before the
crisis in these countries;
3 Western Balkan EU candidate countries (WB6): Albania, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Croatia, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro and
Serbia – the trade balance was also deteriorating before the crisis in these
countries. Kosovo (under UNSC Resolution 1244/99) is also a western Balkan
country, but we do not include it in our study due to lack of data.
4 We also include Ukraine in our study, though we do not group it with other coun-
tries. Ukraine is a European Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) coun-
try that from time to time has expressed the ambition of joining the EU, and the
EU considers Ukraine a priority partner country within the European
Neighbourhood Policy. Ukraine's EU links have played an important role in
reforms in Ukraine, which has also built strong economic links with the EU.
We shall compare the three main CESEE groups to other relevant country groups:
6. While Hungary belongs to this group of countries regarding its trade balance during the 2000s, it accumulated
(partly due to the already high starting position) a large external debt (of which, however, a significant part con-
stitutes inter-company loans related to FDI and loans from western European parent banks to their subsidiaries
and branches; see Figure 4.1).insignificant in other CESEE countries. We will enlarge on this in the next chapter. 
Other investment flows (mostly constituting cross-border loans) were more volatile,
but in the peak years before the crisis their magnitude even exceeded FDI inflows.
Again, inflows of other capital to CESEE countries have exceeded corresponding
inflows to Asia and Latin America for every year in each of the past three decades.  As
a consequence, total inflows to central and eastern Europe were exceptionally high
before the recent crisis. 
Capital export from poorer to richer countries is sometimes referred to as capital mov-
ing ‘uphill’. The CESEE region was different: capital moved ‘downhill’, mostly from rich
EU15 countries to poorer CESEE countries. The supply-side factors behind this were
good economic growth prospects and the low level of physical capital, the prospect of
eventual EU integration and the related improvement in the business climate, the
generally highly educated labour force and low level of wages, and the low level of
domestic credit offering the potential for substantial credit expansion. Capital inflows
indeed exploited the economic growth potential of these countries and total factor
productivity (TFP) increased rapidly before the crisis.
10
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1 EU15: the 15 members of the EU before 2004, though we have excluded
Luxembourg from the average due to its very small size and specialised econ-
omy. The EU15 serves as a natural benchmark, as this is the group that CESEE
countries aspire to catch up with.
2 Asia-6: Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Taiwan and Thailand;
3 Latin America 8 (Latam-8): Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Ecuador, Mexico,
Peru and Uruguay.
Note, with the Asian and Latin American groups above we have selected countries
that have reasonably liberalised and well-functioning market economies, broadly
similar income levels, and of a size comparable to CESEE countries
With the exception of Figure 1.2, which was taken from the IMF, we always use sim-
ple arithmetic averages, as our main goal is to compare ‘models’ of growth within
certain geographic regions and not to compare regional developments to each
other. This means, of course, that, for example, Estonia is treated the same as
Romania, or Ireland is treated the same as Germany.11
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1.2.3 Credit growth: the main source of vulnerabilities
Credit expansion was a crucial driver of economic growth in CESEE countries, but also
a key factor in their vulnerability. Financial crises are often preceded by rapid credit
growth in the private sector, and related strong real effective exchange-rate appreci-
ation and large current-account deficits. This was the case in Finland and Sweden
before the 1992 crisis, and in several east Asian countries (Malaysia, Thailand)
before the 1997 crisis (World Bank, 2007).
Indeed, parallel with foreign investment in the financial sector and inflows of other
capital, credit to the private sector increased rapidly before the crisis in the CESEE
region (Figure 1.5), but with substantial differences across countries. In the CE5
group, the evolution of the credit-to-GDP ratio was markedly less steep than in the
BB5
7. To the extent that foreign investment in real estate and financial services con-
tributed to the huge pre-crisis housing booms and excessive credit booms, one can-
not exclude the possibility of a misallocation of FDI.
The pre-crisis credit growth process in the region has been extensively studied in the
literature (see eg, Darvas and Szapáry (2008) for a survey and assessment). Both
demand and supply factors contributed to pre-crisis credit expansion. The demand for
credit was fuelled by the sharp decline in real interest rates (see the right panel of
Figure 1.6), which resulted from nominal interest-rate convergence and higher
inflation owing partly to the Balassa-Samuelson effect and partly to the economies
being overheated. This low borrowing cost environment was compounded in several
countries by the use of foreign currency. Low real interest, however, cannot be the
only factor for rapid credit growth because in Asian countries real interest rates were
quite low and credit growth was modest there. In CESEE countries, the initial low level
of credit (in contrast to Asia, for example, see the left panel of Figure 1.5) and of
indebtedness, combined with rapid output growth, the rise in income expectations
and high levels of confidence that were boosted by prospective and eventual EU
entry, also led economic agents to be more willing to take on debt. 
On the supply side, the post-privatisation development of the banking sector and the
predominance of foreign banks increased the lending capacity of banks. Whenever
domestic credit booms were financed from external borrowing, the supply of foreign
7. The most extreme case was Latvia, in which credit to the private sector stood at 16 per cent of GDP in 1999 and
rose to almost 100 per cent before the crisis in parallel with a very rapid increase in GDP. The further rise in the
credit-to-GDP ratio in 2009 compared to 2008 is the result of a four percent drop in credit outstanding and a 20
percent drop in nominal GDP.currency loans increased, because CESEE countries generally cannot borrow from
abroad in their domestic currencies. At the same time, increasing competition
between banks to expand their activity in the household sector once the corporate
sector was saturated, together with the narrowing of margins due to the fall in inter-
est rates, provided strong incentives for banks to lend to households, primarily in the
form of mortgage lending, in order to maintain profitability.
While the level of credit as a percentage of GDP remained well below the EU15 aver-
age even at the peak of the pre-crisis credit boom (Figure 1.5) and several empirical
studies suggested that the levelof credit was below equilibrium
8, the speedat which
the equilibrium level of credit is reached matters for macroeconomic stability. From
the perspective of inflationary pressure, it is not the level but the rate of growth of
credit that matters. Rapid credit growth can fuel consumption, can lead to sharp rises
in house prices
9, can feed inflation and wage growth, which can erode competitive-
ness, and can contribute to current-account deficits and the build-up of external debt.
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Figure 1.5: Credit to the private sector (% GDP, 1995-2009) and the relationship
between pre-crisis credit growth and current account balances
Source: Authors’ calculation based on IMF International Financial Statistics (credit) and April 2010
World Economic Outlook (current account balance and GDP). Note: See the explanation of the two-digit
country codes in the appendix at the end of this volume.
8. See, for example, Schadler et al (2005), Kiss et al (2006), Égert et al (2007) and World Bank (2007). These
studies typically found that the level of credit was either below or approached the estimated equilibrium level in
CESEE.
9.  Égert and Mihaljek (2007) report real house price increases of between 20 and 30 percent per year in Estonia
and Lithuania during 2000-2006. Housing price bubbles might further boost credit expansion by increasing theThe right panel of Figure 1.5 clearly indicates a close relationship between pre-crisis
credit growth and the current-account balance. When the counterpart of indebted-
ness is consumption and housing loans, it means that resources are diverted away
from investment in the tradable sector, which is bound to negatively affect competi-
tiveness and growth down the road. Furthermore, since higher inflation occurs
essentially in the non-tradable sector, the lowest real interest rates will prevail in that
sector, channelling resources away from the tradable sector. Thereby rapid credit
growth can itself further exaggerate the misallocation of capital
10.  
The right panel of Figure 1.4 shows that the downward trend in inflation reversed
especially in the BB5 countries (well beyond the impact of the rise in food and com-
modity prices in the few years before the crisis), and these countries also experi-
enced marked increases in unit labour costs (ULC), that is, wages increased much
faster than productivity during the boom years. This implies that these countries
have lost competitiveness.
1.2.4 Real exchange rates and real interest rates
In order to document real exchange-rate movements and to provide an assessment
of competitiveness, the left panel of Figure 1.6 shows the relative price level of GDP
compared to a weighted average of 22 industrialised countries
11. The relative price
level is proportional to the GDP deflator-based real effective exchange-rate index, but
has the advantage that it has a natural unit of measurement. The relative price level
is related to the relative GDP per capita and therefore we have plotted these two vari-
ables against each other. 
The CE5 group shows a unique pattern of economic catching-up and real apprecia-
tion, as the two indicators have gone broadly hand in hand. Real appreciation started
to speed up in 2008, when average annual real appreciation would have been even
higher without the sharp depreciation that was experienced after the collapse of
Lehman Brothers in September. The recent appreciation that took place since mid-
2009 has not reached excessive levels so far, though there are obviously differences
WHITHER GROWTH IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE?
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value of collateral and banks may be willing to lend to less creditworthy customers, exposing the banks to heavy
losses when the bubbles burst.
10.Similar phenomena were observed in fast growing euro-area countries, see eg Ahearne and Pisani-Ferry (2006)
and Ahearne, Delgado and von Weizsäcker (2008).
11.We have used all the 22 industrialised countries (as defined by the IMF), since the trade structures of countries
in different regions of the world differ and hence it would not have been appropriate to relate the price level only
to the EU15. We have deliberately not considered all trading partners, but only industrialised countries with which
emerging countries aim to converge.between the five countries included in this group, since Slovakia and Slovenia are
now members of the euro area and nominal appreciation has characterised only the
other three countries in more recent periods.
In the BB5 and WB6 groups, however, very rapid real appreciation occurred during the
2000s that far outpaced the expansion of GDP per capita. Hence, in the aftermath of
the crisis the relative price level in these countries has grown much more quickly
than their relative per-capita GDP, suggesting that they have ended up in a weak com-
petitive position – at least compared to the CE5 group.
The left panel of Figure 1.6 also offers an interesting comparison between CESEE
countries and the Asia-6 and Latam-8 groups. In Asia, real exchange rates fell after
the 1997 crisis and were typically kept at depreciated levels despite rapid economic
catching-up. The current account surpluses are indeed consistent with depreciated
exchange rates. As GDP growth was broadly similar in CESEE countries and in the
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Figure 1.6: Real exchange rates and real interest rates, 1995-2010
Source: Authors’ calculation using data from the IMF and Economist Intelligence Unit.
Note: The relative price level (=real exchange rate) is plotted against relative GDP per capita and both
variables are measured as a percent of the weighted average of 22 industrialised countries using coun-
try-specific weights derived from foreign trade. Real interest rate was calculated on the basis of 3-month
nominal interest rates (money market or treasury bill) and consumer price inflation. 2010 values were
calculated the following way: forecast for GDP per capita, PPP exchange rate and inflation are from the
IMF April 2010 WEO; nominal interest rate is from the March 2010 EIU forecast; nominal exchange rate
is actual data from 1 January till 18 June 2010 and the 18 June 2010 values are assumed to be
unchanged for the rest of the year.Asia-6 group, the Balassa-Samuelson effect itself does not explain these differences.
In Latin America, the crises of the late 1990s and early 2000s led to substantial vari-
ations in the relative price level, and GDP per capita convergence was negligible.
Consequently, real exchange-rate appreciation during the catching-up process is
another distinctive feature of the CESEE region’s development model. But once again
there is substantial variation within the region regarding the speed and the level of
real appreciation: the process seems to be sustainable in the CE5 group, but looks
excessive in the BB5 and WB6 groups.
The right panel of Figure 1.6 shows short-term money-market real interest-rate devel-
opments. As mentioned, nominal interest-rate convergence and higher inflation
pushed down real interest rates in CESEE countries, with, again, variation between
country groups: in CE5 countries the real interest rate has not declined to negative
territory, while in BB5 and some WB6 countries it has. Low real interest rates also
characterised Asia-6, but in Latam-8 real interest rates remained much higher.
1.2.5 The role of policies
The stylised facts described so far illustrate the distinctive features of the pre-crisis
development model of CESEE countries. Key common features of the model were
strong productivity growth, deep financial and trade integration, sizeable net capital
inflows (and corresponding current-account deficits), rapid domestic credit expan-
sion, significant real exchange-rate appreciation, and low real interest rates. But
while these features characterise all countries, those in the CE5 group had broadly
sustainable developments, while the BB5 and WB6 countries recorded extreme cred-
it growth, excessive real exchange-rate appreciation and a sharp fall in real interest
rates. 
European integration has certainly contributed to all of these developments, but, as
country performances differed within the CESEE region, a key question is whether
policies in those countries, such as exchange-rate and monetary policy, domestic
financial-market regulation and fiscal policy, have played a role.
First, exchange-rate regimeshave certainly played a role. Prior to the crisis CE5 coun-
tries maintained more or less flexible exchange rates (with the notable exceptions of
Slovenia and, only since mid-2008, Slovakia), while most BB5 and WB6 countries
opted for fixed rates or intensive exchange-rate management (with the notable
exceptions of Albania, Romania and Serbia). A fixed exchange-rate regime fuels
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15inflation in an economy that is catching-up. When a country is catching-up in terms
of GDP per capita (as was the case in all CESEE before the crisis), its price level also
increases. When the exchange rate is fixed, the price-level increase translates into
higher inflation. High inflation and the credible exchange-rate peg lead to low real
interest rates and also encourages borrowing in foreign currency. The vicious circle of
credit growth, house-price increases, excess demand, inflation, and low real interest
rates, led to unsustainable booms in several countries. 
By contrast, in countries with a floating exchange rate, the structural price-level con-
vergence can also be accommodated by nominal exchange-rate appreciation. This
happened in the Czech Republic, in Poland and (before fixing the conversion rate of
the Slovak koruna to the euro in the summer of 2008) in Slovakia. While the difficul-
ties of managing the convergence process under inflation targeting with floating
exchange rates should not be underestimated, it must be recognised that ‘floaters’
succeeded better than ‘fixers’ on the whole in maintaining macroeconomic stability
12.
Second, the role played by domestic financial regulation and supervision has been
significant, but has involved delicate trade-offs. Several CESEE countries applied
administrative and regulatory measures even before the crisis to slow down the
growth of credit and to limit unhedged foreign-currency loans. The World Bank
(2007) provides a list of the measures introduced. Administrative measures includ-
ed limits on the growth of foreign-currency loans or on the ratio of such loans to the
banks’ own capital. Regulatory measures typically aimed to increase the cost of bor-
rowing by imposing tighter rules on foreign-currency loans. These may include spe-
cial reserve requirements and lower interest rates paid on those reserves, tighter pro-
visioning and asset-qualification rules, stricter non-price requirements (eg higher
down payments, additional collateral), higher capital requirements or other meas-
ures applied to foreign-currency borrowings.
The problem with such measures is that if they are maintained for a long time they
distort markets and weaken competition. Furthermore, they can be evaded by
switching from domestic to direct borrowing from abroad, a technique made easier in
countries where foreign-owned banks play a dominant role. Administrative controls
can also lead to a redirecting of financing from bank to non-bank channels, such as
leasing, and they can encourage foreign banks to switch from subsidiaries to branch-
es, a channel less supervised by the local authorities. On the whole, the effectiveness
WHITHER GROWTH IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE?
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12.See Darvas and Szapáry (2008) for a detailed analysis of issues related to price-level convergence in the context
of euro adoption.of such measures is questionable in the long run and can best serve as a short-term
expedient to slow excessive credit expansion when the economy overheats.
Therefore, both the unfavourable experiences of those countries that applied regula-
tory measures, such as Estonia and Croatia, and the principal problems discussed
suggest that domestic financial regulation and supervision alone may have not been
the major cause of the huge credit booms.
Third, fiscal policieswere by and large as adequate as they realistically could be, but
there were a few important exceptions. Hungary was the key outlier by running very
large budget deficits after 2001, but the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia also ran
large conventional budget deficits in the early 2000s. However, since initial govern-
ment debt levels were reasonably low, even a 10 percentage-points of GDP average
rise in the early 2000s has not resulted in a worrisome level of government debt
(Figure 1.7). And credit growth was generally modest in CE5 economies, so there
was no need for a strong fiscal policy reaction. 
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Figure 1.7: General government balance and gross debt (% of GDP), 1995-2010
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook October 2009.In the BB5 countries, where credit growth had reached very high levels, budget
deficits were gradually eliminated and the debt-to-GDP ratio declined steadily
13.
Although fiscal policy was pro-cyclical in many CESEE countries (Darvas, 2010a)
and tax instruments were not used to dampen the boom (eg taxing property or cred-
it), fiscal policy was not the main culprit behind the build-up of vulnerabilities.In any
case, fiscal policy could counterbalance neither the strongly expansionary effect of
credit growth nor the savings shortfall corresponding to current-account deficits
amounting to 10-25 percent of GDP, which were prevalent in BB5 and WB6 countries.
Simply put, fiscal policy was unable to counterbalance private-sector excess.
1.3 The impact of the crisis
Until the third quarter of 2008, ie until the collapse of Lehman Brothers, no CESEE
countries were hit by the crisis (Figure 1.8). In Estonia and Latvia, GDP already start-
ed to fall in the first quarter of 2008, but this was mainly due to domestic reasons:
the bursting of the housing bubble and a reversal of the previously unsustainable
credit boom. 
The disruption of financial markets after the collapse of Lehman Brothers, the rapid
collapse in global trade and the bearish market sentiment, sent most of the world's
economies into a slide. The CESEE region was particularly hard hit: in fact it was the
hardest hit (along with former Soviet countries). The economic outlook was revised
downward many times (Darvas, 2009b) and GDP fell substantially in several CESEE
countries.
In four Asia-6 economies (Korea, Malaysia, Taiwan and Thailand) the recession had a
V-shape, and these countries quickly returned to pre-Lehman GDP levels. In the other
two, Indonesia and the Philippines, there was no recession at all. In Latin America the
recession was generally mild and the recovery seems swift. This contrasts with both
the depth of the output fall and the shape of the subsequent recovery in the CESEE
countries. Poland has avoided a recession, but in other CESEE countries the speed of
recovery was either modest and significantly less than that observed in Asia-6 and
Latam-8 countries, or recovery had not yet started by the first quarter of 2010. As a
consequence, output is still significantly below its pre-crisis level. 
This provokes two questions. First, why have CESEE countries been in general more
seriously affected than countries in other regions, even though their financial sectors
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13.Yet part of the decline in debt-to-GDP ratio was the consequence of above-potential growth.WHITHER GROWTH IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE?
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Figure 1.8: Quarterly GDP developments (2008Q3=100), 2005Q1-2010Q2
Source: Eurostat (EU countries and Croatia), OECD (Korea and Mexico), national statistical offices
(Serbia, Ukraine, Indonesia, Malaysia, Taiwan, Thailand, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru)
and IMF (the Philippines). Note: Seasonally adjusted real GDP series are shown. We used the Census
X12 method to adjust series that were available only in an unadjusted form (Croatia, Serbia, Malaysia,
the Philippines, Argentina, Peru) Quarterly data is not available for other western Balkan countries list-
ed in Box 1.1.had not been contaminated by ‘toxic assets’? Second, why has CESEE performance
during the crisis been so diversified? Why have Baltic countries recorded a down-
ward revision of forecast 2010 GDP of more than 30 percent, while in Poland it was
only about seven percent? 
In answer to the first question, the standard explanation emphasises trade and finan-
cial integration channels. First, the fall in foreign demand for their exports is sup-
posed to be one major reason for output recession. Figure 1.3 showed that CESEE
countries are in general much more open than the EU15 and other emerging regions.
A second possible answer is the sudden stopping, or even reversal, of the massive
foreign-capital inflows that fuelled the expansion of domestic credit in CESEE coun-
tries. Figure 1.2 has indicated that net private capital inflows dropped from about 11
percent of GDP in 2007 to practically zero by 2009 in central and eastern Europe. The
magnitude of this fall in capital inflows was greater (as a percentage of GDP) than in
Latin America at the time of the debt crisis in the early 1980s (where it fell from
about five percent of GDP to minus three percent) and in developing Asia after 1997
(where it fell from about six percent of GDP to minus one percent). Such a huge fall in
capital inflows necessitated strong adjustment in domestic demand. 
In answer to the second question, the differentiated outcomes observed among
CESEE countries suggest that they are not a homogenous bloc and that different fac-
tors must have been at work in different countries. Indeed, while some CESEE coun-
tries have suffered from 'imported' external shocks originating in the US and western
Europe, others fell victim to the risky aspects of financial-market integration and, in
parts, their own imprudent domestic policies, leading especially to excessive bank
lending and external account vulnerabilities, as we have discussed
14.
Which was most important: the trade or the financial integration channel? The
hypothesis that reduced exports were the major factor behind the recessions in
CESEE countries is not supported by statistical data. Domestic demand correlates
better than export performance to falls in output, and the export intensity (the ratio
of exports to GDP) has not been correlated with the falls in output.
The financial integration channel seems a more probable explanation for most CESEE
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14.Berglöf et al(2009) use cross-country regressions to study the determinants of the impact of the crisis and con-
sider a wide variety of possible explanatory variables, such as pre-crisis credit growth, the stock of FDI, foreign
bank ownership, external debt, corruption perception (as a proxy for institutions) and also the simultaneous fall
in exports and lending, plus a dummy for hard pegs. They found that more than half of the cross-country variation
in output decline in response to the crisis can be explained by a small group of macroeconomic vulnerabilities.countries. The sudden deterioration of financial assets (mostly asset-based securi-
ties, ABS) in developed countries, and in particular in those western European coun-
tries where most of the CESEE banks are headquartered, forced banks to restrict
credit expansion and accumulate liquidity. The resulting credit crunch hit the real
sector, prompting output declines. It could therefore be assumed that the output
losses should be higher in countries with higher credit intensity. However, no such
correlation can be detected using the cross-section of countries listed in Box 1.1: on
the contrary, the countries with high ratios of bank loans to GDP (eg most EU15 and
Asia-6 countries) seem to have weathered the financial storm better than countries
with lower credit-to-GDP ratios. 
But there are two other important distinctions between CESEE and EU15/Asia-6
countries. First, as we have shown (Figure 1.5), the growth of credit was much faster
in most CESEE than in the EU15 and Asia-6 . Second, credit expansion in CESEE coun-
tries has been mostly financed by capital inflows from abroad, rather than domestic
deposits, in contrast to EU15 countries and non-European emerging countries. 
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Figure 1.9: Pre-crisis credit growth and GDP growth in 2009
Source: Authors’ calculations using data from the IMF. Note: See the explanation of the two-digit country
codes in the appendix at the end of this volume.We have shown in the right panel of Figure 1.5 that current-account deficits were
related to the speed of credit growth, while Figure 1.9 suggests that pre-crisis credit
expansion was in turn correlated with GDP declines during the crisis
15.
1.4 Summary
The development model pursued by CESEE countries had many special features com-
pared to other emerging economies. The CESEE model was based on deep political,
institutional, financial and trade integration with the EU, which was also accompa-
nied by substantial labour mobility into EU15 countries. Other emerging country
regions did not have an anchor similar to the role the EU played for CESEE countries.
Economic growth was boosted by TFP increases, which were faster (before the crisis)
than in any other region, except CIS countries and China. Economic growth in the
CESEE region relied on net private-capital inflows, which have reached higher levels
than elsewhere. In the aftermath of the dramatic crises in Asia and Latin America in
the late 1990s and early 2000s, the CESEE region was the only emerging region of
the world that had persistent current-account deficits. Economic catching-up was
accompanied by real exchange-rate appreciations, again a unique feature of the
CESEE development model, and real interest rates fell. 
In fact, the CESEE development model had two important variants within the region.
In the CE5 group, growth was accompanied by small and even improving trade bal-
ances, as a reflection of reindustrialisation after the collapse that followed the fall of
communist regimes. In the second group, comprising BB5 and WB6 countries, the
trade balance deteriorated continuously before the crisis. As a consequence, current-
account balances were reasonably small (around five percent of GDP) and stable in
the CE5 group, but deteriorated sharply to double-digit levels in the second group.
This second group is also characterised by fast-rising external debt. Also, house
prices rose much faster, real exchange-rate appreciation was also more rapid, while
real interest rates fell to lower levels than in CE5 countries, and inflation also rose
considerably before the crisis. All of these factors suggest that economic growth in
this second group of countries was to a considerable extent fuelled by unsustainable
booms. Indeed, there was extremely rapid growth of credit to the private sector in this
second group, and the composition of FDI was also biased in favour of banking, real
estate and other domestic sectors.
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15.Berglöf et al (2009) also find a statistically significant relationship between pre-crisis credit growth and output
decline in response to the crisis. They also find evidence that foreign bank ownership has cushioned capital out-
flows during the crisis.What factors have contributed to these diverging developments? The speed of credit
growth seems to correlate well with unsustainable developments and hence the key
question is what are the underlying causes of fast credit growth, particularly in the
BB5 and WB6 countries? Certainly the fixed exchange rate in many countries was a
contributing factor, since price-level convergence could occur only through higher
inflation (as opposed to nominal exchange-rate appreciation). However, other
domestic policies, such as fiscal policy or banking regulation, did not play a signifi-
cant role. Instead, deep integration with the EU has predisposed CESEE countries to
large capital inflows. It is fair to conclude, not just with the benefit of hindsight, that
the lending practices of mostly foreign-owned banks were not always prudent. 
When the crisis started, it first hit western banks forcing them to accumulate liquidi-
ty to cover losses from non-performing assets, and to build up reserves. This led to
sudden interruptions, and even reversals, of bank-linked parts of capital inflows to
the emerging markets, including most of the CESEE region. This was accompanied by
outflow of other categories of capital as other financial investors became more risk-
averse and decided to reduce their exposure in CESEE countries and fly to 'safe
havens'. The resulting credit crunch was strong enough to depress economic activity
and pitch most CESEE economies into recession. The impact was exacerbated by the
subsequent export and investment declines, the latter resulting from increased over-
all uncertainty about future growth prospects. As the crisis unfolded, the credit
crunch was replaced by falling demand for credit, caused by increased uncertainty
and lowered expectations with respect to future growth prospects (Ghosh, 2009).
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2.1 Introduction
Chapter 1 has shown that the prospects of integration with the European Union drove
reform and transition processes in CESEE countries, and even in some neighbouring
countries and regions despite their much more limited EU membership prospects.
The promise of EU membership was an important focus for both the general public
and for policymakers, prompting them to initiate institutional change, follow certain
concepts in economic policy design and put in place economic and other behaviour-
al changes. The result was a growth model based on integration with the EU15 that
supported sustained a catch-up in productivity and income levels (see Figure 2.1),
although this was interrupted in some CESEE countries by secondary transition
crises in the 1990s
1.
The financial and economic crisis that erupted in full after the collapse of Lehman
Brothers in September 2008 interrupted the steady progress of the CESEE
economies. This chapter concentrates on the prospects for a resumption of growth,
and considers the type of growth model that can be envisaged for the region. The
challenge when discussing a post-crisis or ‘redirected' growth model is two-fold: first,
we must make sure we understand whether or not the conditions for growth in CESEE
countries have changed as a consequence of the crisis and, if so, over what time hori-
zon. For the purposes of our analysis we distinguish quite carefully the short-run
challenges (ie how to get growth going again) from those in the medium to longer run
(ie a horizon beyond the next three to four years). The short-run and medium/long-
run challenges will be related to expected behavioural adjustments occurring within
the countries of the region in the wake of the crisis and to changes in the external
environment. With respect to the medium- and longer-run, we have endeavoured to
capture the differences between the countries of the region, as different countries
and country groups followed different paths pre-crisis and face different challenges
1. ‘Secondary transition crisis’ refer here to fundamental policy adjustments that took place in most transition
economies either following unsuccessful first-round privatisation programmes, reform stalemates or premature
attempts to peg exchange rates at unsustainable levels.25
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in its wake. These issues will occupy us in sections 2.2 to 2.4. In the final section 2.5,
we discuss policy issues that will be much further developed in subsequent chapters.
2.2 A post-crisis growth model in the making
2.2.1 Characteristics of the pre-crisis growth model
To define the CESEE countries’ post-crisis growth model, we must first delineate what
characterised the pre-crisis model, in order to understand which features are likely to
change because of either the changed characteristics and reactions of market partic-
ipants, or because of the different constraints on policymakers leading to changes in
their policies. 
The pre-crisis growth model was accompanied and, in part, shaped by the effort to
rapidly achieve EU candidate and then membership status. The choice of a model for
catching up with the EU was a consequence of this. CESEE countries pursued a very
high degree of liberalisation in external (and internal) economic relations. Trade was
liberalised, there was a commitment to free international capital movement (in all its
forms) and financial markets were opened up to foreign financial institutions.
Foreign banks attained dominant market positions in most countries of the region.
Liberalisation and openness in external economic relations coincided with a classic
process of convergence, ie CEE economies embarked on a growth path with rates
substantially above those of their western neighbours, even though such catching-
up processes were at times (eg in the Czech Republic and Slovakia in the late 1990s,
Poland in the early years of the 2000s, Hungary after that) interrupted by policy mis-
takes (such as pegging the exchange rate too early, mistakes in monetary policy or
profligate fiscal spending) or by misalignments of wages and productivity.
Over the period 2002-08 (see Figure 2.1) all CESEE economies experienced signifi-
cantly higher growth than western European countries. Underlying this growth per-
formance was the room that any lower-income, lower-productivity economy has to
benefit from technology transfer (to be interpreted in a wider sense, including prod-
uct-quality upgrading, the adoption of better organisational structures, and improve-
ments in institutions and behavioural practices), which is the main driver behind
convergence processes. Comparative growth-accounting exercises (see, for exam-
ple, World Bank, 2008) show that growth in total factor productivity (TFP) was the
dominant factor explaining overall growth (see Box 2.1). In the case of the CESEE
countries the speed of technology transfer was reinforced by the anchoring of their26
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Figure 2.1: Growth – GDP at constant prices
Average annual growth rates, 1995-2002 and 2002-2008, in %
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook, October 2010, EBRD and wiiw Annual Database incorporating
national statistics, Eurostat. Note: the horizontal lines refer to group averages; blue line: unweighted
averages; red line: GDP-weighted averages. Growth in 1995-2002 was 22 percent in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, but for readability the axis is cut off at nine percent.
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economies to EU pre-accession and accession arrangements. This anchoring sup-
ported the rapid and substantial influx of foreign investors, who acted as a major con-
duit for that transfer. Low relative unit labour costs combined with a relatively high
human capital endowment made the region attractive to foreign investors. This led to
rapid technology transfer, access to high-income markets and the possibility of inte-
grating into cross-border production networks. Some of the CESEE countries (in par-
ticular, the five central European countries, CE5
2) experienced a period of re-industri-
alisation – rapid growth of industrial production and industrial exports – after the
earlier period of de-industrialisation at the beginning of the transition period.
Furthermore, the CE5 economies showed evidence of significant qualitative upgrad-
ing of their industrial and export structures (see Landesmann and Stehrer, 2009, and
the annex for evidence for this; see also Fabrizio, Leigh and Mody, 2007)
3.
The south-eastern European economies of the former Yugoslavia (excluding
Slovenia), Albania, Bulgaria and Romania, on the other hand, went through a longer
period of economic and political turbulence and hence they embarked on a process
of renewed growth with a considerable time-lag compared to the CE5 countries. They
struggled with the long-term impact of a much more protracted period of industrial
production decline (see Figure 2.2), which opened up a sustained gap in trade bal-
ances. This had grave consequences in terms of their vulnerability to external
shocks, to which we shall return below. The Baltic countries experienced phenomenal
growth from the second half of the 1990s onwards, and, in line with many of the
south-eastern European countries, adopted various versions of fixed exchange-rate
regimes. This was often done because of lack of trust in domestic monetary authori-
ties, and to avoid the large exchange-rate fluctuations that can characterise shallow
foreign-exchange markets. By fixing the exchange rate, these countries may also
have wanted to speed up financial and monetary integration with the euro area. Their
exchange-rate regime choices in turn contributed strongly to sustaining and accen-
tuating the problem of deteriorating trade balances.
2. The Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. See chapter 1 for country groups.
3. There were also other factors at work in the more successful ‘growth models’ of the CE5: changes in educational
structures and hence the skill structure of the ’future’ labour force (for this see Applica and wiiw, 2009); and a
change in sectoral and regional economic structures which meant difficult adaptation processes, but this result-
ed in more forward-looking patterns of sectoral and regional growth (see eg Roemisch, 2007).28
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2.2.2 Sustainability of growth in central and eastern Europe – differentiation
between economies
Economic catch-up in CESEE countries was not just about a burst of high growth.
There were also examples of real improvements in conditions for long-run sustainabil-
ity with respect to both external accounts and fiscal conditions. Regarding external
accounts, the CE5 economies saw improvements in trade accounts during the past
decade even in a period when these economies experienced positive growth differen-
tials relative to their main trading partners (see Figure 2.3); current-account deficits
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Figure 2.2: Industrial production, cumulative change
Source: IMF International Financial Statistics, World Bank World Development Indicators and wiiw Annual
Database incorporating national statistics, Eurostat. Note: the starting year for Ukraine is 1990. Asia-5
= Asia-6 (see Box 1.1) without Taiwan.29
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BOX 2.1: THE IMPORTANCE OF TOTAL FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY IN THE CESEE REGION
Total factor productivity (TFP) was the dominant component among growth deter-
minants in CESEE countries before the crisis, as shown by Figure B2.1
4. The figure
suggests that TFP growth was faster in CESEE countries from 1999-2005 than in
any other region of the world, except China and the CIS
5. Whether or not such high
TFP growth can be expected to resume after the crisis is a crucial question.
Veugelers (2010) concludes that CESEE countries have limited potential for
knowledge-based TFP growth.
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Figure B2.1: Total factor productivity (TFP) developments
Source: Figures 5A and 5B from World Bank (2008), p. 11. Note: CIS = Commonwealth of Independent
States; CIS-low = low-income CIS countries; CIS-mid = middle-income CIS countries LAC = Latin
America and the Caribbean; SEE = south eastern Europe.
4. TFP is measured as the 'residual' part of total output growth not explained by capital and labour. Its measurement
is even shakier for CESEE and other transition countries than for advanced economies due to the lack of reliable
capital-stock data. Furthermore, TFP can also capture cyclical movements in output.
5. Iradian (2007) reaches a very similar conclusion.30
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were mostly due to negative entries in the income accounts, which reflected the prof-
its made by international investors
6. This was combined with qualitative upgrading in
the CE5 export structures, as discussed earlier. Hence, the CE5 economies were
robustly moving towards sustainability of external accounts and the main worry was
periodic strong upward pressure on the exchange rate through strong capital inflows.
In some countries, the relative movements of productivity and labour costs also had
a negative impact on competitiveness and external accounts in specific periods.
On the other hand, as Figure 2.3 also shows, in a range of economies, especially in
south-eastern Europe and the Baltics, the evidence did not point towards external
sustainability. Trade accounts continued to deteriorate and transfers were insuffi-
cient to compensate for this. As a result these countries witnessed – before the cri-
sis – at times dramatically worsening current accounts. These economies suffer
from persistent weaknesses in their tradable sectors. The underlying issue is the dra-
matic fall in industrial production in the early phase of transition, from which these
economies have still not properly recovered (see Figure 2.2). Over-valued exchange
rates are particularly problematic (see Holzner, 2006; Égert and Halpern, 2006;
Brender and Pisani, 2010). Over-valuation results from exchange-rate regime choic-
es and associated monetary policies. In some countries this was exacerbated by the
importance of remittances and the importance of the tourism sector, both of which
hinder the development of a sufficiently large and differentiated export sector.
From this point of view, the crucial issue for the sustainable catch-up of CESEE
economies is to support conditions for the successful development of the tradable sec-
tor, in order to achieve convergence without incurring current-account vulnerabilities. 
The conditions for an adapted growth model in the wake of the crisis should therefore
take account of the rather different situations found in the two groups of economies:
(i) the relatively successful CE5 economies and (ii) the Baltic and the south-eastern
European economies, which were on an unsustainable path of external disequilibri-
um even before the crisis
7. Both types of economy will have to adjust to changes
brought about by the crisis, but the magnitude of the challenge is quite different in
each case. Before discussing these adjustments let us however point to further dif-
ferences between the two groups of economy.
6. Not only repatriated profits but also profits which are retained and reinvested by foreign firms in the host econo-
my appear as negative entries in the income accounts.
7. The principal issue in the CIS economies is a lack of trade and production diversification and a lock-in of the polit-
ical-economic structures that are linked with this phenomenon; however, we shall not pursue this issue further
here (see Landesmann, 2008).31
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Figure 2.3: Composition of the current account of the balance of payments, 1994-
2010 (in % GDP)
Source: IMF International Financial Statistics and IMF WEO October 2010. Note: For 2010 only the cur-
rent account balance is available from IMF WEO October 2010. MED-3: Greece, Spain and Portugal. Asia-
5: Asia-6 (see Box 1.1) without Taiwan.
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Figure 2.4 shows the composition of the main components of the net foreign assets
of the different CESEE economies from 2006-08. We see here a three-part differenti-
ation:
• Economies that have an overwhelming share of net foreign assets in the form of
foreign direct investment, and a very low share in the form of net credit (Czech
Republic, Poland, Slovakia).
• Economies with a high share of net foreign debt in the form of foreign direct
investment but also with a high share of net foreign credit (Hungary, Bulgaria,
Romania, Estonia, Albania).
• Economies with an overwhelming share of foreign debt in the form of net credit
and a relatively low share of foreign direct investment (other Baltic states,
Bosnia).
Slovenia is a special case, having positive net portfolio holdings but also significant
net borrowing and low FDI. Hence a significant group of economies (those with high
stocks of financial borrowings) were very vulnerable to a change in financial risk
assessment and to a stopping of net credit flows. 
Figure 2.5 reveals further differences regarding the allocation of foreign direct invest-
ment across different sectors of the economy. What we see is that the CE5
economies except Slovenia have a share of FDI stock in manufacturing – a sector
with a high trade share – that is above or close to 40 percent; in most of the Baltic
and south-eastern European economies it is substantially below that. On the other
hand, FDI shares are particularly high in financial intermediation and in real estate in
a number of the south-eastern European and Baltic economies. Hence there is a sig-
nificant difference in the role that FDI played in the different groups of economies in
supporting the build-up of industrial capacities and in its focus on tradable versus
non-tradable sectors. This supports the notion that the activity of foreign investors in
the Baltics and the south-eastern European economies contributed much less
towards the build-up of a competitive and sufficiently sized tradable sector than it did
in the CE5.
Finally, we want to point to differences in the sizes and characteristics of savings-
investment gaps in the CE5 and the south-eastern European and Baltic economies.
As Figure 2.6 shows, these are most striking in relation to private sector savings-
investment short-falls, which had to be covered through foreign borrowing. Roughly
the same grouping of economies emerges in this respect, ie the characteristics of the
CE5 countries are different from those of the south-eastern European and Baltic33
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Figure 2.4: Net foreign assets, 2008, in % of GDP
Source: wiiw Annual Database incorporating national statistics, Eurostat.
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Figure 2.6: Savings and investment, gross, in % of GDP
Source: wiiw Annual Database incorporating national statistics, Eurostat. Note: Notice that scales vary
across figures.
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countries (lack of data means we were unable to examine all of the CESEE
economies). Hence strong growth of net credit inflows and large savings-investment
gaps of the private sector in Baltic and south-eastern European economies before the
crisis point to problems with the effectiveness of monetary policy and capital market
regulation, an issue that is taken up in greater detail in chapter 4.
In summary, the analysis indicates that it would be wrong to speak of uniform prob-
lems with the growth model across the entire range of CESEE economies. Thus sug-
gestions regarding the redesign of the growth model must take such differences into
account.
The CE5 economies have built up a reasonably competitive trading sector. This was
reflected in manageable current accounts and continued interest on the part of for-
eign investors in investing in export capacities, with the added benefit that the com-
position of capital inflows reflected this interest. 
In contrast, we have presented evidence of the weaknesses of the tradable sectors in
all other CESEE economies. Nonetheless these economies also achieved very high
growth rates pre-crisis. But this growth performance stood on shaky legs and cannot
simply be recommenced in this form following a recovery from the crisis. Future
growth in CESEE countries is unlikely to be supported by the extent of current-
account deficits and the inflow of credits that were seen in these economies before
the crisis. Most of these economies went through a serious adjustment in current-
account developments during the crisis, which reflected sharp drops in GDP and the
sudden stopping of international financial flows
8. Hence, the crucial question is
whether or not there are adjustment processes at work that will allow the resumption
of growth without incurring severe external imbalances in the future (for a discus-
sion of this issue in relation to the Baltic states, see Darvas, 2009a).
2.3 Adapting the growth model to changed internal and external conditions
In the following we discuss two sets of factors that will shape the growth model in the
CESEE region. These are:
• Internal behavioural adjustments in the CESEE countries and new constraints on
policy, and
• Changed external circumstances.
8. See, for example, the IMF's April 2010 World Economic Outlook.36
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2.4.1 Internal behavioural adjustments
i) Financial market developments
As chapter 1 discussed, the CESEE region was the beneficiary of very large capital
inflows, much higher (in relation to GDP) than was the case for other emerging mar-
ket economies globally. In a sub-set of CESEE economies there was also evidence of
very fast credit growth leading to substantial private-sector debt (see Figure 1.6,
chapter 1). An important fall-out of the crisis was that net capital imports slowed
down or stopped, credit became much more difficult to obtain, and the private sector
started to embark on a process of deleveraging. The crisis revealed significant earlier
miscalculations in risk perceptions in relation to asset values, in the evaluation of
the balance-sheet positions of some of the important actors in financial markets and
of the default risks of households and businesses under changed circumstances; an
important element of such risks relates to exchange rates. Finally, given these
changed risk perceptions, the evaluation of sovereign public-sector debt also
changed.
One evaluation of the outcome of the current crisis is that risk perceptions are not
going to revert to pre-crisis levels. If risk perceptions are going to remain at a higher
level over a medium-run horizon, this means that credit conditions will remain tighter
than before the crisis. This relates to both lending behaviour within the countries and
in relation to the outside world. In addition, the crisis worsened the balance-sheet
positions of banks and of households; this also leads to more cautious lending and
borrowing behaviour. Hence one of the most important outcomes of the crisis will be
that transition and catch-up economies have to adjust to more difficult financing con-
ditions, concerning both finance from domestic financial institutions and from the
outside world. Economists will, however, find it hard to predict how long higher risk
perceptions are going to last.
ii) The household sector
The household sector has experienced and will further experience a deterioration of
its debt and/or financing position. There is considerable variation across the CESEE
economies. In some economies the levels (and/or rates of increase) of household
debt were high or very high in the build-up to the crisis (the Baltics, Croatia, Hungary,
Romania) and this indeed has been one important reason for the vehemence of the
transmission of the global financial crisis to this region. In three other economies
(Albania, Poland and Serbia) levels of household debt might not have been as high,37
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but depreciation of the national currencies led to a jump in household indebtedness
in the cases where loans were taken out in foreign currencies, though depreciation
largely proved to be temporary. The implication of these financial constraints is that
households will have to rely more on own income sources and might be forced to
repay their loans implying higher savings rates. Other households will likely also
undergo a process of voluntary deleveraging, ie attempts to reduce the level of their
debt as lower than expected income flows imply a lower longer-run wealth position of
households. All this points to a rise in household savings rates in CESEE economies
over the medium term. 
iii) Fiscal positions
Fiscal positions have worsened and will significantly worsen in the aftermath of the
crisis: lower incomes reduce tax revenues and the economic recession increases
public-expenditure commitments. Furthermore, some of the public debt is in foreign
currency and hence the largely temporary depreciation of currencies affected public
debt/GDP ratios. In a number of countries there was also an increase in debt to inter-
national financial institutions (IMF agreements). Hence, although most CESEE
economies (with the major exception of Hungary) went into the crisis with rather low
public-debt levels and governments could feel confident that in a climate of high
growth and relatively low interest rates this debt could easily be serviced, the out-
come of the crisis has significantly changed this perspective. While sustainability of
fiscal positions did not seem a problem in a period of high growth, when the countries
experienced trend appreciations of their currencies and low interest rates, the out-
look changed.
The room for manoeuvre for fiscal policy is discussed in chapter 5 of this report, espe-
cially with regard to the scope in CESEE countries for counter-cyclical fiscal policy. At
this stage we want to mention two possible policy scenarios in so far as they affect
medium- and long-run growth.
In principle it is possible to have both a positive or a negative view on the effect of fis-
cal policy on economic growth. The positive view would be that the tighter fiscal con-
straints experienced as a result of the crisis would lead to a streamlining of public
expenditure programmes. This could lead to reform of a host of social expenditure
programmes in such a way that they become more targeted and the efficiency of
administrative procedures is improved. Furthermore, governments could use the
opportunity to redirect resources towards growth-enhancing spending programmes.
A negative view would be that pressures on public spending would lead to a relative38
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neglect of public investment in favour of defending existing government programmes
rather than their reform. 
2.4.2 Changed external circumstances
The following three factors are particularly relevant in this respect:
i) Drop in the trend growth path of the main European export markets
The expected longer-term impact of the crisis on potential growth paths is not only
relevant for the CESEE region, but also for the main export markets served by the
region's countries, namely western Europe
9. This will be a growth-dampening factor
for CESEE countries.
ii) Reforms in the financial architecture at national, European and global levels
The experience of the crisis has shown that CESEE countries were very vulnerable to
the instabilities of and shocks felt by the global financial markets. In the final analy-
sis, these were the causes of the rather dramatic and unexpected interruption of
growth in CESEE economies. 
Changes in the financial architecture will likely be directed towards strengthening the
capital-base of any future credit expansion, and empowering regulatory authorities
to monitor the stability of financial (particularly banking) institutions. In all these
areas, the growth prospects of the CESEE region could benefit, because in the past
there were signs of overheated and misdirected expansion of credit (particularly
when borrowing led to unsustainable bubbles) and lack of effective instruments that
could be administered by domestic regulatory authorities, particularly with respect
to cross-border financial market transactions. Any agreement on regulatory reform to
tackle these issues of cross-border financial market integration might be beneficial
for the characteristics of financial intermediation in the CESEE region. These issues
are discussed at length in chapter 4.
iii) New and differentiated positions vis-a-vis EMU membership
The experience of the crisis, in particular the fact that serious external-account
9. See various publications analysing the impact of the crisis on potential output: Böwer and Turrini (2010),
European Commission (2009a), Fouceri and Mourourgane (2009).39
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imbalances and processes of credit expansion made CESEE economies prone to con-
tagion effects, led to a feeling that non-euro area CESEE countries are indeed very
vulnerable to financial market shocks. This perception had a number of contrary
effects: within the euro system, it strengthened the sentiment that any quick
enlargement of the Eurogroup would increase the financial instability of the group as
a whole
10. But the events have increased the desire of some would-be members (the
Baltic states, some Balkan economies) to join as quickly as possible in order to
obtain the support in terms of financial and monetary stability which full euro-area
membership supplies. Lastly, the different experiences of countries with various
fixed or pegged exchange-rate regimes compared to those with flexible regimes dur-
ing the crisis have also strengthened the view of some (mostly flexible regime) coun-
tries that giving up their own currency too soon deprives the economy of an impor-
tant instrument to absorb shocks. Hence, as a result of the crisis, CESEE countries
that are EU members are likely to take significantly different approaches to their obli-
gation to adopt the euro, in the context of a likely stricter application of rules for EMU
entry
11.
2.4 Policy suggestions to support a ‘reoriented’ growth model
The main pre-crisis assets of the CESEE countries remain and will continue to be rel-
evant and provide grounds for optimism about growth prospects in the region. These
assets are CESEE countries' EU membership, or their pre-accession status or simple
proximity to the EU, and all that these imply in terms of institution-building and mar-
ket access, and their relatively high level of human capital endowment and scope for
catching up in productivity terms. However, some of the severe structural weakness-
es of CESEE countries have not disappeared. Policy mistakes that were made in the
run-up to the crisis – in financial, monetary and fiscal policy – will have to be correct-
ed in order to improve the sustainability of their growth. Unfortunately such correc-
tions will have to take place in an environment of worsened external and internal con-
ditions (see the discussion in section 2.4, above). 
Several policy suggestions emerge from the preceding analysis, taking into account
the major differences between the different sub-groups of economies.
10.This position was further significantly strengthened by the strains which the post-crisis developments in the IPSG
countries – Ireland, Portugal, Spain and particularly Greece – generated within the euro-bloc.
11.Such a stricter regime can eg be applied by scrutinising countries much more carefully before they are allowed
to enter ERM-II, membership of which is a pre-condition for EMU entry.40
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i) Adjustment to reduced net capital imports
Lower net capital imports (especially the net credit component) can be addressed in
two ways:
• Reduce the private sector savings-investment gap and – in due course as public
finances deteriorate – through longer-run fiscal consolidation.
• Make a sustained attempt to improve the current-account situation by making
improvements to the competitiveness of the tradable sector.
It is clear from our analysis that adjusting to lower net capital imports will be most dif-
ficult for those economies that relied most heavily on such flows and in which the
current accounts and savings-investment gaps were in serious disequilibrium.
Adjustment means tackling the underlying factors that led to sustained external
imbalances: in a number of cases (the Baltic states and many Balkan economies)
this means dealing with the issue of seriously misaligned real exchange rates, which
is particularly difficult to deal with in pegged or fixed exchange-rate regimes where
there is no possibility or willingness to switch to more flexible regimes. We discuss
this issue extensively in chapter 3 of this report. Even under flexible exchange-rate
conditions, difficult phases of misaligned real exchange rates have emerged as a
result of two factors: overly strong pressure on nominal exchange-rate appreciations,
which are connected with financial-market behaviour and for which better arrange-
ments should result from financial-market reforms; and wage-productivity dynamics
that require improved arrangements for labour-market bargaining systems. The issue
of savings-investment imbalances is, of course, also closely linked to the savings
behaviour of households, as discussed above, and the difficulty of conducting mone-
tary policy in economies with highly integrated cross-border financial markets. This
issue is taken up in chapter 4.
In the coming years, CESEE countries will receive increased flows from the EU budg-
et as they either become full recipients of Structural Funds and other EU policy pro-
grammes or, in the case of other economies, changes in pre-accession or candidate
status might lead to an increase in such flows. This will be a counter-weight to the
more difficult situation with respect to private-sector capital inflows. This report
makes in a number of its chapters suggestions of how the timing, characteristics and
scale of such transfers can assist the adjustment processes in the different CESEE
economies.41
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ii) Adjust to higher household savings rates but use these savings in the most
growth-enhancing manner
A likely outcome of the crisis will be a medium-term increase in the household sav-
ings rates in CESEE economies. Such an increase is to be welcomed for the longer run
as, in many cases, savings rates were rather low in CESEE economies by internation-
al standards, and low savings rates were the cause of severe imbalances in a number
of economies. However, an upward adjustment of household savings rates will ceteris
paribus lead to a medium-run problem of dampened domestic demand. This can be
compensated for through increased fiscal stimulus and/or a drive to support the trad-
able sector and hence net exports. Hence the issue of adjusting to higher medium-
run domestic household savings rates is linked to the discussion on the role of fiscal
policy in CESEE in the course of the economic crisis and in its aftermath (see chap-
ter 5).
Furthermore, a sustained re-launch of growth in CESEE countries will require a more
efficient use of savings than in the past. Policy instruments (credit support for SMEs,
credit facilities to support skill acquisition, re-training and new technology adoption;
controls on mortgage lending) could be used to make sure that savings flow in the
direction that supports sustained growth and tackles the main weaknesses in exter-
nal accounts (see also point iv below).
iii) Support the re-launch of the stalled credit system but ensure it operates accord-
ing to improved regulatory mechanisms
As in the more advanced western economies it is vital for a sustained recovery that
the credit system functions properly again. Hence there is an essential short-run
challenge to reduce credit constraints to support the resumption of economic activi-
ty in an environment in which the private sector suffers from debt overhang. The
expected deleveraging process in a situation in which the balance sheets of national
and international banks are weak and the authority for bank restructuring is split
across national borders is a major challenge for monetary-policy authorities at
national and European levels. There is also the longer-run task of putting in place
improved regulatory mechanisms for the overseeing of credit growth and credit allo-
cation. Both these issues are crucial for the prospects of recovery and the avoidance
of the recurrence of misallocations and imbalances, which characterised the situa-
tion in a number of economies before the crisis. Given the past experience, it will in
this context also be important to support a shift in banks’ lending policies so that
they lend more to the enterprise sector and less to the household sector. 42
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iv) Aim to achieve sustainable fiscal balances, in part by redirecting public expendi-
ture in a growth-enhancing direction
The crisis has led to serious increases in public debt in CESEE countries, although
public-debt levels remain significantly lower than the average in western Europe.
Nonetheless, given that it is more difficult post-crisis to finance this debt, attention
to sustainability is important. This must however be balanced with the need for fiscal-
stimulus programmes in the shorter run to compensate for rising savings rates in the
household sector and difficult export conditions. Improvements in the structure of
expenditure programmes and especially a redirection towards growth-enhancing
items (such as education and infrastructure) are certainly called for.
v) Policies to underpin growth
Given the importance of strengthening the tradable sector in many CESEE economies,
a whole range of human capital, technology, industrial and regional policies should
be employed. These have particular relevance for economies that have so far not
been able to reverse the early deep process of de-industrialisation, and where invest-
ment patterns favoured the expansion of non-tradable rather than tradable sectors. In
these economies the above-mentioned policies may to some extent compensate for
a reduced FDI inflow, which was the main agent of industrial structure upgrading in
the more successful CE5 economies before the crisis. Such policies have to be
designed to prepare the ground to make the region attractive when foreign invest-
ment resumes and cross-border production integration can and should proceed
again. The various EU regional and other policy programmes should be used in a com-
plementary fashion to support such policies. Design of such policies and the timing
of spending should be coordinated with the European Commission in such a way that
they support a timely re-launch of growth and underpin a sustainable growth trajec-
tory. Governance mechanisms to ensure that programmes are used efficiently need
to be put into place or strengthened.
Finally, CESEE countries have – in most cases – to cope with an even worse demo-
graphic prospect in terms of ageing than most western European countries. Policies
directed at increasing the utilisation of the available labour force (activity and
employment rates) and improving its quality through human-capital enhancing poli-
cies, will have to be a main item on the policy agenda. In addition, CESEE countries
that have for a long time been net-emigrant countries, will have to learn the art of suc-
cessful (and human-capital enhancing) migration policy.Annex: Evidence for upgrading the export structures of CESEE countries and for
cross-border production integration with the ‘EU North’
In the following we present evidence for ‘qualitative upgrading’ of the export struc-
tures of CESEE countries in comparison with other emerging market economies. The
methodology is more extensively explained in Landesmann and Stehrer (2009).
Figure A2.1 shows relative export unit values of export flows from different groups of
emerging market economies into EU15 markets. The information on relative export
prices has been obtained from very detailed (8-digit CN) product-level data and then
aggregated for groups of industries depending upon the product compositions of the
different countries' exports. The zero line in Figure A2.1 gives the average prices for
exports to EU15 markets and, hence, values above/below that line mean that a coun-
try (or country group) sells its exports at above/below average unit prices in EU15
markets. The industry groupings selected for Figure A2.1 and then also for Figure
A2.2 refer to ‘lower tech’ and ‘medium-higher tech’ industries whereby the classifica-
tion on these industries can be obtained from Landesmann and Stehrer (2009) .
The results show that CE5 economies have seen a remarkable increase over the peri-
od 1995-97 to 2005-07 (we took three-year averages) in the prices at which they
sell their products to EU15 markets, and that this increase was particularly impres-
sive for the ‘medium-high tech’ group of industries. For the Baltic states and Bulgaria
and Romania (the BB5 group, see chapter 1) the increase was more moderate and
more significant in the ‘low tech’ group of industries. Notice also that China still com-
petes mostly on price.
In Figure A2.2 the information on changes in relative export prices over the period
1995-07 to 2005-07 is supplemented with information on changes in market shares
in EU15 markets. Here we see that both the BB5 and CE5 economy groups have
increased their market shares substantially in EU15 markets, but that the increase
in market shares and in relative export prices is particularly remarkable for the CE5
economies in the ‘medium-high tech’ industries.
The other evidence we want to present with regard to characteristics of export struc-
tures of CESEE economies is contained in Table A2.1, which shows some features of
the cross-border ‘production integration’ or outsourcing between the ‘EU North’
(where the ‘EU North’ is defined as the EU15 excluding Greece, Portugal and Spain)
and the two groups of lower-income EU economies: the ‘EU South’ (Greece, Portugal,
Spain) and the mainly eastern European countries that joined the EU in 2004 and
2007 (the EU10).
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WHITHER GROWTH IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE?Figure A2.1: Relative export prices by industrial groupings into EU15 markets
(low tech and medium/high tech groupings)
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Figure A2.2: Price and quality competition in EU15 markets, 1995-98 to 2005-07
by country groups
Source for both figures: Own calculations on the basis of COMEXT data.
Definition: NMS=CE5 + BB5 (see Box 1 in chapter 1). Tigers 1: Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea,
Taiwan; Tigers 2: Thailand, Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, Vietnam.
Landesmann and Stehrer (2009), furthermore, use trade statistics that classify
products by types of use: ‘primary inputs’, ‘processed inputs’, ‘parts’ and ‘final prod-
ucts’. This analysis allows them to reveal features of cross-border production integra-
tion or ‘outsourcing’ between the EU15 and the CE5.  They further differentiate the
industries which produce these products into low tech, medium tech, medium-high
tech and high tech, again differentiated by research and development intensity.The results presented in their paper show that trade shares (in EU15 imports) of the
CE5 have increased substantially across all product groupings, but that they have
increased most in parts production (where the increase over the period 1995 to
2005 was fourfold while the overall increase in import shares was twofold). This
increase was by far strongest in the supplies of parts production from medium-high
tech industries. In line with other studies this shows, first, a strong expansion of
cross-border production integration between the CE5 and Western Europe and, sec-
ond, that within this form of economic integration there is also evidence of dynamic
up-grading in the positions of CE5 producers. 
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the path to euro adoption
3.1 Introduction
The choice of exchange rate regime is one of the key policy choices for those CESEE
countries that are not yet part of the euro area. The pros and cons of alternative
strategies for individual countries should be evaluated in the light of the progress
made in catching-up with euro area countries economically, and in view of the growth
strategy adopted and the policy instruments at the disposal of governments
1. This
chapter addresses three issues in this regard:
i) The choice of exchange rate regime prior to euro adoption;
ii) The EU’s policy on euro area enlargement and participation in the ERM II mecha-
nism;
ii) The EU’s policies for stability and growth before, during and after accession to the
euro area, with special emphasis on the  Stability and Growth Pact (SGP).
Exchange rate policies have greatly affected how countries have fared in both the
boom and bust phases of the current crisis. In particular, fixed exchange rates
2seem
on average to have amplified the excesses and imbalances in the boom, and con-
tributed to more severe declines in the bust. 
The crisis clearly demonstrated the important role of cross-border financial flows in
creating booms and the associated vulnerabilities in the bust. A part of the private
sector capital flows to CESEE countries was motivated by the promise of rapid growth
1. Many authors have discussed the convergence process and associated risks, see for example Vamvakidis
(2008), Darvas and Szapáry (2008), and Fabrizio, Leigh and Mody (2009). 
2. There are significant differences between the versions of fixed exchange rate regimes. Flexible exchange rate
regimes also differ in terms of how much flexibility is really allowed before the authorities intervene.
Nevertheless, we put these nuances aside here in order to sharpen the choice between the fixed and flexible
exchange rate regimes.47
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that comes with economic convergence and the comparative advantages associated
with relatively low wages and prices. But these persistent inflows were also encour-
aged by fixed exchange-rate strategies that led private actors to underprice risk.
Private capital funded a too-rapid credit expansion, which led in several cases to
booming real estate prices
3 and excessive wage inflation, ultimately contributing to
declining competitiveness, massive current-account deficits, and the substantial
build-up of foreign debt (see chapters 1 and 2)
4.
New strategies to deal with exchange-rate issues and, more generally, with macro-
economic and financial stability are needed both at the EU and domestic policy lev-
els. This could require revisions to the Maastricht criteria and the SGP rules, as well as
a stronger framework for dealing with capital flows and financial stability. 
3.2 Experiences with exchange-rate regimes
3.2.1 The polarisation of CESEE exchange-rate regimes
Before considering the fundamental issues related to exchange-rate regime choice
and the path to euro adoption, we briefly summarise the exchange-rate regimes of
CESEE countries (Table 3.1 on the next page) since the mid 1990s.
Table 3.1, which indicates a wide diversity of exchange-rate regimes, both across
countries and over time, illustrates well two important insights from research into
exchange-rate policy. The first is Jeff Frankel’s famous statement that ‘no single cur-
rency regime is right for all countries or at all times’ (Frankel, 1999). Indeed,
exchange-rate regimes are endogenous outcomes of macroeconomic developments
and policy preferences and hence it is not always easy to pin down the reasons
behind policy makers’ choices. Even countries with similar circumstances often
opted for different regimes, eg the Czech Republic (float) and Slovakia (euro),
Romania (float) and Bulgaria (currency boards), or Serbia and Albania (float) and
the other four western Balkan countries (various kinds of fixed exchange rates)
5.
The second insight is what became known as the ‘hollowing-out’ of intermediate
exchange-rate regimes such as managed floating and fixed-but-adjustable exchange
3. The boom in real estate in Europe is described in, for example, Hilbers et al (2008).
4. Rahman (2008) describes the ‘EU-phoria’ associated with large current-account deficits in countries that joined
the EU in 2004 and 2007.
5. Yet some authors argue that the floating regimes of Serbia and Albania are managed floats, though as Figure 3.1
shows, the exchange rates of these countries fluctuated considerably during the crisis.48
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rates (Fischer, 2001). Indeed there has been a polarisation with the adoption by sev-
eral countries of a fixed exchange-rate strategy, several others have moved towards
hard pegs or euro-isation. Polarisation, first observed at global level in the 1990s,
applies perfectly to Europe where fixed exchange rates are typically adhered to with
the aim of maintaining a regime that is thought to be more conducive to credible
macro-economic policies and favourable to early euro adoption. 
It also needs to be recalled that the exchange-rate regime choices of countries in the
region, including various types of fixing exchange rates, were often supported by
their EU partners. Even the controversial decisions of Kosovo and Montenegro to
euro-ise were less unilateral than frequently presented. There have been only two
occasions when European partners explicitly distanced themselves from the plans of
individual countries: Lithuania’s euro application in 2006
6 was not supported  and
Bulgaria was denied entry to the ERM-II after its EU admission in 2007.
3.2.2 The build-up of vulnerabilities in the boom
The pre-crisis boom phase affected both fixers and floaters. Capital inflows were over-
whelming and both categories of countries experienced real exchange-rate apprecia-
tion. However, significant differences between them could be observed in financial
stock developments and the composition of capital flows. 
As discussed in chapters 1 and 2, capital flows to the BB5 and WB6 countries were
heavily biased towards the financial and real-estate sectors. Although some of this
was in the form of FDI, much was in loans that contributed to a rapid and significant
build-up of foreign debt. Capital flows to the CE5 countries on the other hand were
more in the form of FDI to the manufacturing sector. This prevented the build-up of
balance-sheet vulnerabilities and instead contributed to the strengthening of the
competitiveness of the tradable sector. Fixed exchange rates contributed significant-
ly to making foreign loans (rather than FDI) the dominant form of inflowing capital,
especially for the banking and real-estate sectors. Fixed currencies were associated
with significantly negative real interest rates for domestic borrowers, coupled with
the impression that exchange rates would not adjust to deal with this imbalance. This
became a self-reinforcing cycle with the monetary expansion leading to even higher
domestic inflation and more negative real interest rates from the perspective of local
6. Lithuania’s euro aspiration was not rejected primarily because of the 0.1 percentage point higher inflation than
the inflation reference value, but largely because of concerns over inflation sustainability. The Lithuanian author-
ities themselves forecast a rapid increase in inflation at the time of the 2006 assessment.50
WHITHER GROWTH IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE?
borrowers. Since credit was supplied by foreign banks – which did not have to rely on
raising funds on local markets – supply was more or less unlimited as long as nomi-
nal interest rates were attractive.
With negative real interest rates associated with foreign borrowing, it should be no
surprise that lending to the private sector increased rapidly in most fixed exchange
rate countries (Table 3.2), such as Bulgaria, Estonia and Latvia
7. Inflows lasted for
several years before the crisis and, as a result, private-sector external debt built up
much faster in these countries than in, for example, Albania, the Czech Republic,
Poland and Slovakia
8, four floating exchange rate countries. With substantial nega-
tive real interest rates, investors looked for real assets to hedge against inflation and,
unsurprisingly, the expansion of credit was highly correlated with the pre-crisis boom
in property prices. Domestic interest rates were closer to domestic inflation rates, so
the incentives to borrow in domestic currency were not as great as borrowing in for-
eign currency.
Table 3.2 suggests that fixed exchange-rate regimes contributed to the build-up of
macroeconomic imbalances and to distortions in the allocation of capital, especially
among EU members. Strikingly enough, fixers even experienced higher inflation on
average. The correlation between exchange-rate regimes and developments in the
net foreign-asset position was however not perfect. There are even a couple of fixed
exchange rate countries in which foreign debt has not yet reached worrisome levels.
Data suggest that countries closer to joining the euro, or committed to joining it as
soon as possible, such as Bulgaria and Croatia, experienced a greater build-up of for-
eign debt than countries with weaker prospects of EU/euro-area admission. But here
again there are exceptions, such as Serbia, a floating-rate country with weak EU
admission prospects, which inherited a large external debt (above 100 percent of
GDP) from the fixed exchange-rate period. This first declined during the floating
exchange-rate period (to 59 percent of GDP by 2004), but subsequently increased
again (to 71 percent in 2008 and even higher afterwards).
3.2.3 Crisis shock and crisis responses
When the global financial crisis hit, the credibility of exchange-rate pegs came under
fire as investors and consumers lost confidence in countries with high debt levels
7. Rosenberg and Tirpák (2008) analyse the determinants of foreign-currency borrowing in the new member states.
8. Slovakia had a floating exchange rate before joining the ERM-II in 2005, but even within ERM-II period the curren-
cy behaved like a floating rate till the summer of 2008, when the conversion rate was announced. During the
ERM-II period, the Slovak koruna appreciated by about 25 percent against the euro.51
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(especially in BB5, Croatia and Serbia) and particularly in those with banking sector
vulnerabilities. As global trade collapsed and many countries with floating exchange
rates saw their currencies falling substantially against the euro (see Figure 3.1),
similarly to some floaters in Latin America and Asia, fixers lost competitiveness vis-
à-vis floaters. Furthermore, confidence in fixed exchange-rate regimes was affected.
The collapse in confidence in the fixers with big current-account deficits triggered
declines and, in some cases, reversals of capital inflows, and huge current-account
deficits decreased or turned into surpluses within a very short time. Collapsing
imports were associated with rapid declines in investment and consumption in the
private sector, the impact of which went far beyond the first-round effects of lost
imports
9. The real slump was exacerbated by a credit crunch and sharp cuts in gov-
ernment expenditure in response to falling revenues and the unavailability of private
deficit financing. As a result, some of the fixed exchange-rate countries, notably the
Baltic countries and Ukraine, suffered major swings in real GDP growth – beyond
those experienced in recent history in most crisis episodes around the world. In the
Baltic countries this was linked in no small part to the decision to keep the exchange-
rate policy unchanged, and to focus on so-called ‘internal’ devaluations, ie domestic
price and wage cuts
10. The initial drop in GDP was even higher in Ukraine, a country
that moved from a dollar peg to a floating rate regime in late 2008, than in the Baltics.
But the Ukrainian economy began to recover already in the second quarter of 2009,
while in the Baltic countries, recovery had not yet started by the first quarter of 2010
(Figure 1.8). In addition, fixed exchange-rate countries face uncertainty, and their
current regimes lack credibility because they hamper investment and increase pre-
cautionary savings at a time when there are few external or fiscal drivers of growth.
When the crisis hit and confidence vanished, there was an intense debate about cur-
rency devaluation versus internal devaluation. There was also a serious disagree-
ment between the EU and the IMF on this issue about Latvia, a country that received
emergency funding both from the EU and the IMF
11. According to IMF (2008), the
9. Becker (2008) discussed the risks of rapid current-account reversals in connection with the adjustment pro-
grammes in the Baltic countries.
10.Becker (2009a) criticises the IMF-supported adjustment programme for Latvia. Several authors, eg Becker
(2009b), Yeyati (2009) and Weisbrot and Ray (2010) detail the problems with internal devaluations in general
and with Latvia’s case in particular.
11.The IMF proposed devaluation, or at least allowing the exchange rate to depreciate to the weakest possible posi-
tion within the ERM-II band (Latvia unilaterally maintained a +/- 1 percent wide band within the official +/- 15 per-
cent ERM-II exchange rate band), and also suggested that an accelerated euro-area entry process would boost
confidence in the new exchange-rate level. But the EU was in favour of maintaining the prevailing practice and
ruled out accelerated euro-area entry (IMF, 2008).53
WHITHER GROWTH IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE?
Figure 3.1: Nominal exchange rate against the euro or the dollar (1 Jan 2007 =
100), 1 Jan 2007 to 27 Sept 2010
Source: Datastream. Note: Values over 100 indicate appreciation relative to January 2007. The scaling
of the first two panels is identical, but the other panels have different scales. CESEE countries with fixed
exchange rates are not shown.
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Figure 3.2: Average monthly nominal wages in the Baltic countries, 2000Q1-2010Q2
Source: Central statistical office of the three countries. Note: Seasonally adjusted series are shown (we
used the Census X12 method).55
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main advantage of devaluation/widening of the exchange-rate band is that it should
eventually deliver more rapid economic recovery, due to more rapid improvements in
competitiveness. However, growth would be depressed in the short run by balance-
sheet effects (since both households and the corporate sector had large unhedged
foreign-currency liabilities). Devaluation would incur bank restructuring costs
upfront and new bank lending would fall, slowing economic activity and creating neg-
ative feedback loops, including renewed currency pressures. Also, possible regional
contagion to other fixed exchange-rate countries, in particular to neighbouring
Estonia and Lithuania, would have made it difficult for foreign parent banks to sup-
port their subsidiaries. But Becker (2009) has also highlighted that currency deval-
uation and internal devaluation eventually lead to the same debt/income ratio (cur-
rency devaluation increases the domestic currency value of foreign currency debt,
while internal devaluation decreases domestic income). The key differences
between the two options are timing (since a currency devaluation is immediate,
while internal devaluation takes a long time) and magnitude (currency devaluation
may lead to overshooting, while internal devaluation may not bring adequate adjust-
ment). Indeed, in the three Baltic countries public sector average nominal wages
have fallen considerably, but the adjustment in the private sector, which is much
more important from the perspective of international competitiveness, is slow
(Figure 3.2). At the same time, the rise in the unemployment rate was huge, suggest-
ing that the labour market adjustment was mainly felt through job losses, rather than
through changes to the average wage, which is unfavourable.
Developments were less dramatic in the Balkans, but followed more or less the same
path. Romania and Serbia, countries with flexible exchange rates, let their currencies
depreciate and went for stand-by agreements with the IMF (with EU participation,
though its contribution was rather minor in the case of Serbia, which is not an EU
member state). Bosnia and Herzegovina, a currency-board country, supported its
adjustment policies with a stand-by agreement with the IMF. Other countries with
fixed exchange rates also chose to rely on fiscal-policy adjustment. A difference, how-
ever, is that central banks in the Balkans suffer from low credibility. The attraction of
flexible exchange-rate regimes remains therefore limited.
On the whole, flexible exchange rates proved to be shock absorbers. However, devel-
opments within the floaters’ group differed depending on vulnerabilities and the con-
sequent policy reaction to the crisis. In Albania, the Czech Republic and Poland, the
real exchange-rate depreciation was not counteracted by interest-rate hikes and fis-
cal tightening, while it was in Hungary, Romania and Serbia. Again, these differences
reflect pre-crisis vulnerabilities: stronger economies could let market adjustments56
WHITHER GROWTH IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE?
2
2
0
2
0
0
1
8
0
1
6
0
1
4
0
1
2
0
1
0
0
8
0
2
2
0
2
0
0
1
8
0
1
6
0
1
4
0
1
2
0
1
0
0
8
0
9
6
9
8
0
0
0
2
0
4
0
6
0
8
1
0
2
4
0
2
0
0
1
6
0
1
2
0
8
0
2
4
0
2
0
0
1
6
0
1
2
0
8
0
9
6
9
8
0
0
0
2
0
4
0
6
0
8
1
0
2
4
0
2
0
0
1
6
0
1
2
0
8
0
4
0
2
4
0
2
0
0
1
6
0
1
2
0
8
0
4
0
9
6
9
8
0
0
0
2
0
4
0
6
0
8
1
0
1
2
0
1
0
0
8
0
6
0
4
0
1
2
0
1
0
0
8
0
6
0
4
0
9
6
9
8
0
0
0
2
0
4
0
6
0
8
1
0
2
0
0
1
6
0
1
2
0
8
0
4
0
2
0
0
1
6
0
1
2
0
8
0
4
0
9
6
9
8
0
0
0
2
0
4
0
6
0
8
1
0
1
2
0
1
0
0
8
0
6
0
4
0
1
2
0
1
0
0
8
0
6
0
4
0
9
6
9
8
0
0
0
2
0
4
0
6
0
8
1
0
C
z
e
c
h
 
R
e
p
u
b
l
i
c
P
o
l
a
n
d
S
l
o
v
e
n
i
a
H
u
n
g
a
r
y
S
l
o
v
a
k
i
a
B
u
l
g
a
r
i
a
L
a
t
v
i
a
R
o
m
a
n
i
a
E
s
t
o
n
i
a
L
i
t
h
u
a
n
i
a
A
l
b
a
n
i
a
M
a
c
e
d
o
n
i
a
 
(
F
Y
R
)
U
k
r
a
i
n
e
C
r
o
a
t
i
a
S
e
r
b
i
a
A
r
g
e
n
t
i
n
a
C
h
i
l
e
B
r
a
z
i
l
C
o
l
o
m
b
i
a
I
n
d
o
n
e
s
i
a
M
a
l
a
y
s
i
a
T
h
a
i
l
a
n
d
K
o
r
e
a
P
h
i
l
i
p
p
i
n
e
s
T
a
i
w
a
n
E
c
u
a
d
o
r
P
e
r
u
M
e
x
i
c
o
U
r
u
g
u
a
y
F
i
g
u
r
e
 
3
.
3
:
 
R
e
a
l
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
i
v
e
 
e
x
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
r
a
t
e
s
 
b
a
s
e
d
 
o
n
 
c
o
n
s
u
m
e
r
 
p
r
i
c
e
s
 
(
J
a
n
u
a
r
y
 
1
9
9
5
=
1
0
0
)
,
 
J
a
n
u
a
r
y
 
1
9
9
5
 
-
 
O
c
t
o
b
e
r
 
2
0
1
0
S
o
u
r
c
e
:
 
A
u
t
h
o
r
s
'
 
c
a
l
c
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
 
u
s
i
n
g
 
d
a
t
a
 
f
r
o
m
 
t
h
e
 
I
M
F
 
I
n
t
e
r
n
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
F
i
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
 
S
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
s
 
(
U
S
D
 
e
x
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
r
a
t
e
s
 
a
n
d
 
c
o
n
s
u
m
e
r
 
p
r
i
c
e
s
)
,
 
D
a
t
a
s
t
r
e
a
m
 
(
U
S
D
 
e
x
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
r
a
t
e
s
 
f
o
r
 
p
e
r
i
o
d
s
t
h
a
t
 
a
r
e
 
m
i
s
s
i
n
g
 
f
r
o
m
 
t
h
e
 
I
M
F
 
d
a
t
a
b
a
s
e
)
,
 
N
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
S
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
s
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
T
a
i
w
a
n
 
P
r
o
v
i
n
c
e
 
o
f
 
C
h
i
n
a
 
(
U
S
D
 
e
x
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
r
a
t
e
 
a
n
d
 
c
o
n
s
u
m
e
r
 
p
r
i
c
e
 
i
n
d
e
x
 
f
o
r
 
T
a
i
w
a
n
)
.
 
N
o
t
e
:
 
t
h
e
 
r
e
a
l
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
i
v
e
e
x
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
r
a
t
e
 
i
s
 
c
a
l
c
u
l
a
t
e
d
 
a
g
a
i
n
s
t
 
1
4
3
 
t
r
a
d
i
n
g
 
p
a
r
t
n
e
r
s
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
w
o
r
l
d
,
 
w
h
i
c
h
 
c
o
v
e
r
,
 
o
n
 
a
v
e
r
a
g
e
,
 
9
8
.
8
 
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
 
o
f
 
f
o
r
e
i
g
n
 
t
r
a
d
e
.
 
W
e
i
g
h
t
s
 
a
r
e
 
d
e
r
i
v
e
d
 
o
n
 
t
h
e
 
b
a
s
i
s
 
o
f
 
B
a
y
o
u
m
i
,
 
L
e
e
a
n
d
 
J
a
e
w
o
o
 
(
2
0
0
6
)
.
 
T
h
e
 
v
e
r
t
i
c
a
l
 
d
a
s
h
e
d
 
l
i
n
e
 
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
s
 
S
e
p
t
e
m
b
e
r
 
2
0
0
8
.
 
C
o
n
s
u
m
e
r
 
p
r
i
c
e
s
 
a
r
e
 
a
v
a
i
l
a
b
l
e
 
t
i
l
l
 
J
u
l
y
 
2
0
1
0
 
i
n
 
m
o
s
t
 
c
a
s
e
s
:
 
w
e
 
h
a
v
e
 
p
r
o
j
e
c
t
e
d
 
t
h
e
 
c
o
n
s
u
m
e
r
 
p
r
i
c
e
s
i
n
d
e
x
 
t
i
l
l
 
O
c
t
o
b
e
r
 
2
0
1
0
 
b
y
 
a
s
s
u
m
i
n
g
 
t
h
a
t
 
1
2
-
m
o
n
t
h
 
i
n
f
l
a
t
i
o
n
 
r
a
t
e
 
d
o
e
s
 
n
o
t
 
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
b
e
t
w
e
e
n
 
t
h
e
 
l
a
t
e
s
t
 
a
v
a
i
l
a
b
l
e
 
o
b
s
e
r
v
a
t
i
o
n
 
a
n
d
 
O
c
t
o
b
e
r
 
2
0
1
0
.57
WHITHER GROWTH IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE?
take place unhindered and even support recovery with discretionary fiscal stimulus
and interest rate policy (Darvas, 2010a). Also, capital flows resumed faster – the
Polish central bank even intervened on the foreign-exchange market in April 2010 to
slow down the appreciation of the zloty. 
However, as IMF-led financing programmes for Hungary, Romania and Serbia
advanced and global market sentiment improved, interest rates fell in these three
countries as well and exchange rates appreciated.
In the case of Ukraine, a country that moved from a dollar peg to a float in response
to the crisis within the framework of an IMF programme, the depreciation was sub-
stantial, but the exchange rate became broadly stable after the sharp initial adjust-
ment (Figure 3.1). IMF/EU financing programmes, interventions in foreign-exchange
markets, the Vienna Initiative (discussed in chapter 4), and the improvement in glob-
al economic outlook and market sentiment did contribute to exchange rate stabilisa-
tion, even in the CESEE region in some cases. Excessive depreciations could, of
course, have negative effects on public and private balance-sheets and this may con-
tinue to be the case in Ukraine, where the exchange-rate stabilised at a much depre-
ciated level. In general, however, exchange rate adjustments have dampened the
impact of the crisis and whenever depreciation remains a lasting phenomenon, it can
be expected to support faster and stronger recovery.
3.3 Exchange-rate policy and the path to the euro
Good exchange-rate management is not a silver bullet that will ensure a stable and
prosperous economy for a country, and the choice of exchange-rate regime is not a
trivial issue. The choice entails important trade-offs between potentially conflicting
goals; eg the importance of a nominal anchor and stability versus independent mon-
etary policy to deal with inflation and business-cycle fluctuations. The choice of a
regime also has implications for a country's capacity to adjust to competitiveness
pressures (‘internal adjustment’ versus currency devaluation). Finally, an inappro-
priate exchange-rate policy may reduce the effectiveness of other economic policies
and may distort investment incentives, thereby affecting sectoral developments and
ultimately potential output growth. For all these reasons unsuitable exchange-rate
policies entail high costs – as amply demonstrated by history, including the experi-
ences of CESEE countries.
In a recent paper Ghosh, Ostry and Tsangarides (2010) provide an overview of the
issues surrounding exchange-rate regime choice. Their general conclusion is that a58
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careful examination of both de facto and de jure classifications of exchange-rate
regimes leads to a more nuanced view of the pros and cons of alternative regimes
12.
All regimes have advantages and disadvantages in terms of economic outcomes. A
few specific points are worth highlighting in this discussion. First, pegged exchange
rates tend to lead to higher growth, but only if the currency does not become overval-
ued and competitiveness is lost. Pegs can also be good for trade and capital flows.
However, there are three major problems with fixed rates: they constrain other macro-
economic policies (beyond the ‘impossible trinity’ of fixed exchange rates, free capi-
tal flows, and independent monetary policy) and may lead to pro-cyclical fiscal poli-
cy; they make countries more susceptible to financial crises (sudden stops, debt and
banking crises); and they make external adjustment more abrupt with greater costs
to the real economy. 
Are these findings relevant for EU countries given that the EU treaty stipulates that all
member countries (except Denmark and the UK, which negotiated exemptions)
should join the euro-zone once they meet the convergence (Maastricht) criteria (Box
3.1)? The answer is clearly yes, since the transition process from an independent
currency to euro membership can be long and difficult and has to be managed well.
Key issues are, first, what the appropriate macroeconomic framework should be,
including what exchange-rate regime to use, to ensure a successful transition to the
euro, and, second, are the current convergence criteria sufficient or even useful in
this regard in light of the recent boom and bust among most of the euro outsiders?
3.3.1 Exchange-rate regime choice for catch-up economies
All CESEE members of the EU are obliged to join the euro area when they fulfil the con-
vergence criteria. The literature is abundant with research papers and policy docu-
ments about the merits and drawbacks of joining the common currency. The
European Commission offers the following quotes on ‘Why the euro’
13:
‘The euro was created because a single currency offers many advan-
tages and benefits over the previous situation where each Member State had
its own currency. Not only are fluctuation risks and exchange costs eliminat-
ed and the single market strengthened, but the euro also means closer co-
operation among Member States for a stable currency and economy to the
benefit of us all.’ 
12.The key conclusions are summarised in Ghosh and Ostry (2009).
13.http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/the_euro/the_euro6476_en.htm.59
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BOX 3.1: CONVERGENCE (‘MAASTRICHT’) CRITERIA
The Maastricht criteria set the path to euro accession and are supposed to ensure
that a country is ready to join the euro. The criteria require:
1 The achievement of a high degree of price stability, measured as at most 1.5
percentage points higher consumer price inflation than that of the average of
the three best performing member states; 
2 The sustainability of the government financial position, as reflected by the lack
of an excessive deficit procedure, which, in turn depends on the fulfilment of
two criteria:
2a The budget deficit should not be higher than three percent of GDP, or the
deviation from this value should not be significant, should be temporary,
and should be caused by exceptional circumstances, 
2b Government debt should not be higher than 60 percent of GDP, unless ‘the
ratio is sufficiently diminishing and approaching the reference value at a
satisfactory pace’; 
3 Observance of the normal fluctuation margins provided for by the exchange-
rate mechanism of the European Monetary System, for at least two years, with-
out devaluing against the euro, and 
4 The long term interest rate should not be higher by 2 percentage points than
the that of the average of the three best-performing member states in terms of
price stability. 
The first and the fourth criteria are benchmarked on the ‘three best-performing
member states of the EU in terms of price stability’, which have been interpreted in
special ways. The treaty does not specify how to determine the ‘three best per-
formers’. Up to 2009 this been defined as the three EU countries having the lowest
non-negative inflation rates. However, in the 2010 the Convergence Reports
excluded only one country with a negative inflation rate, but not the others.
The exact interpretation of the third criterion is also not specified in the treaty. In
practice it has been interpreted in an asymmetric way: exchange-rate depreciation
is considered as the violation of this criterion, but exchange-rate appreciation is
not. A country receiving international balance-of-payments support was also
assessed to have violated this criterion even if the exchange rate has not depreci-
ated (Latvia), because such support was the reflection of ‘severe tensions’ and60
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The Commission ends with a strong statement on the role of the euro:
‘The euro, a symbol of European identity, is one of the strongest tangi-
ble symbols of European integration and the shared values of Europe, the
European nations and Europeans themselves’.
There is little doubt that the euro offers many benefits along the lines of the
Commission’s own declarations and this implies that keeping countries out of the
euro area, when it would be beneficial overall that they join the EMU, carries a cost.
There are also potential downsides associated with the adoption of euro, including:
the loss of independent monetary policy, which makes it more difficult to deal with
non-synchronous business cycle/asymmetric shocks; the need for inflation to rise
above the euro-area average for the real appreciation implied by the Balassa-
Samuelson to take place, which in turns may imply that the real interest rate falls
below equilibrium; no exchange rate to restore international competitiveness in case
of excessive real appreciation; limited ability to inflate away domestic debt; and no
domestic control over lender-of-last-resort issues
14. For these reasons it is important
has likely contributed to the avoidance of exchange-rate depreciation.
The first and fourth criteria are examined using the average of the most recent 12-
month data at the time of the assessment reports; the second criteria are consid-
ered for the most recent calendar years; while the third one considers a two-year
long period. In addition to analysis of past data, the convergence reports also take
into consideration the sustainability of convergence; though neither the treaty, nor
its protocol, define how to assess that. In practice, forecasts are considered up to
the end of the year in which the assessment is made.
In addition to these criteria, the assessment reports by the ECB and the European
Commission ‘also take account of the results of the integration of markets, the sit-
uation and development of the balances of payments on current account and an
examination of the development of unit labour costs and other price indices’.
Further, ‘these reports shall include an examination of the compatibility between
the national legislation of each of these Member States, including the statutes of
its national central bank, and Articles 130 and 131 and the Statute of the ESCB and
of the ECB’.
Source: Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and convergence reports of the European
Commission.61
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to set out criteria for assessing the net benefit of euro-area entry and to clarify which
supporting policies will be needed to safeguard stability and the sustainability of par-
ticipation in the monetary union once a country has joined the euro.    
The one issue that receives the most attention is the loss of independent monetary
policy once the euro replaces a domestic currency. This can be a problem if a coun-
try’s business cycle is not synchronised with the average euro-area cycle that deter-
mines the euro area’s monetary stance. Lack of synchronisation could amplify a
slump or boom depending on where the country’s business cycle is relative to the
rest of the euro-area countries. However, business cycle synchronisation may be
endogenous to the exchange-rate choice, and in particular, euro accession may lead
to more synchronised cycles
15.
An issue of relevance for many CESEE countries is the relevance of the Balassa-
Samuelson argument for real appreciation as an economy develops and the income
level converges to richer (euro-area) countries. If there were indeed a need for a real
appreciation of CESEE’s exchange rates, this would imply that with a fixed exchange
rate, be it the euro or a fixed domestic currency, the adjustment would have to come
through inflation being higher in the CESEE than in the rest of the euro area. To the
extent that this real appreciation reflects catching up and productivity growth, it is
not a problem for competitiveness and should not motivate any policy actions to try
to offset this higher inflation rate
16. There are also studies that suggest that this
effect is relatively modest, in the order of 0.4 to 2.4 percent per annum (Égert,
2007), which would imply negligible effects on the euro area’s aggregate inflation
rate and would therefore not be a cause for concern among policymakers in the ECB.
However, even if inflation is a pure reflection of the Balassa-Samuelson effect, it
pushes down the real interest rate and can and in fact did lead to higher domestic
demand and consequently further inflationary pressures. Indeed, during the pre-cri-
sis boom, inflation differentials were far beyond productivity growth in a number of
CESEE economies. Not surprisingly, this problem was greatest among the countries
with fixed exchange rates, because in floating exchange rate countries the real appre-
ciation can also be accommodated by nominal exchange-rate appreciation. Unit
labour costs (ULC) thus increased significantly in fixed exchange-rate regime coun-
14.See a comprehensive discussion of these issues for example in Darvas and Szapáry (2008).
15.See Larsson, Gaco and Sikström (2009) for a recent discussion of business cycle synchronisation.
16.Breuss (2003) concluded that Balassa-Samuelson effects should not preclude countries in the region from join-
ing the EMU since the effects are likely to be small and where they reflect productivity gains do not require a pol-
icy response.62
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tries, with the construction sectors in Estonia and Latvia having witnessed tripling
and quadrupling of ULC in less than a decade (see Figure 3.4), but ULC has also
increased sharply in the manufacturing sector in Estonia and Latvia. Yet again a float-
ing exchange rate is not a panacea, since ULC has also increased rapidly in Romania.
But floaters on average performed better. Manufacturing ULC declined in Poland and
Slovakia and was relatively steady in the Czech Republic. Figure 3.4 also depicts ULC
developments in Germany, the main trading partner of CESEE countries, and in
Ireland, a country that also experienced a housing boom before the crisis. The
German ‘internal devaluation’ is clearly visible. In Ireland, while total economy ULC
has increased considerably, ULC in the manufacturing sector has fallen somewhat
(Darvas, 2010b). Consequently, unlike the Irish economy, many CESEE countries
also suffered from a loss of competitiveness in this sector
17.
The crisis has demonstrated that it is important that euro outsiders with significant
trade with the euro area should not allow their currencies to appreciate in real terms
too much against the euro. If the catch-up country with a fixed exchange-rate regime
is unable to prevent excessive real appreciation, it will sooner or later face a painful
policy dilemma whether to devalue the currency or to deflate wages and prices.
Ukraine moved to a floating rate, but all other countries that had various kinds of fixed
exchange-rate regimes and high current-account deficits before the crisis kept their
pegs and opted for ‘internal devaluations’. The latter option may not prove to be suf-
ficient in some countries and could still lead to disorderly exchange-rate collapses, or
a long period of stagnant economic growth, perhaps after the crisis-induced negative
output gap corrects (Darvas, 2009a).
Different measures could be applied to protect the currencies of non-euro area CESEE
countries from excessive real appreciation. One important driver of appreciation has
been the housing bubble fuelled by domestic credit expansion, which entailed rapid
wage and price inflation. This cannot be addressed with standard monetary tighten-
ing under a fixed-rate regime and capital mobility. Alternative measures to control
credit expansion will probably need to be coordinated at the EU level given the signif-
icance of cross-border financial flows. However, domestic policymakers could poten-
tially use taxes to reduce demand for credit in specific sectors prone to speculative
bubbles, such as real estate. 
All exchange-rate regimes have pros and cons, but being a euro outsider with a fixed
exchange rate is a bad middle ground for catch-up economies; countries do not enjoy
17.Allard (2009) looks at competitiveness in CEE countries after EU accession.64
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the shelter, stability and reduced transaction costs of euro membership, nor do they
reap the benefits of independent monetary policy or an exchange rate that can
adjust. In some cases, eg in the Balkans, fixed exchange rates are preferred because
the monetary and fiscal policies lack credibility
18. Therefore, enhanced efforts to
improve policy credibility, at least to the degree that the floating exchange-rate
Albania and Serbia enjoy, are badly needed in order to widen the spectrum of possi-
ble exchange-rate management practices.
3.3.2 The crisis in the euro area and implications for the EU and euro outsiders
The crisis in the euro area that erupted in 2010 brought to the fore policy issues that
had been known and were addressed in EU treaties and economic legislation, but it
has also brought out other issues that received significantly less attention in the
past
19. These include:
• Market perceptions of public-debt unsustainability and the pricing of sovereign
default, and crisis resolution for fiscally irresponsible countries;
• The build-up of excessive imbalances, competitiveness crises and the lack of suf-
ficiently binding mechanisms for economic-policy coordination;
• Divergences arising from asset prices and private-sector debt accumulation; 
• The discrepancy between banking-sector integration and the weaknesses of the
EU framework for regulation, supervision, and crisis resolution;
• Public-finance vulnerabilities arising from contingent liabilities.
Fiscal policy is the issue that is directly addressed by the Stability and Growth Pact,
which in turn is an element of the Maastricht criteria (Box 3.1). Putting constraints on
fiscal policy makes sense in a currency union since it affects inflationary pressures
that have implications for real exchange rates, competitiveness and public-debt sus-
tainability. The size of fiscal deficits (and the related evolution of public debt) is
something domestic policymakers can (supposedly) determine using appropriate
policy actions, so it also makes sense in terms of implementation and accountabili-
ty. Furthermore, the limited fiscal union (as reflected by the EU budget), the lack of a
cyclical fiscal redistribution mechanism within the EU, the pre-crisis lack of an EU
18.For countries in the Balkans early euro adoption is not a feasible option. The exceptions being unilateral euro-isa-
tion by Montenegro and Kosovo, but the ECB and the EC have repeatedly ruled out the acceptance of similar
moves by other countries. 
19.Furthermore, the persistent but more ’silent crisis’ of enduring low economic growth rates inside the euro area in
eg Italy and Portugal, which is most likely the result of joining the euro area at overvalued exchange rates and
inability to adjust inside, has also important implications for potential euro newcomers.65
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instrument to support euro-area countries facing problems in financing fiscal
deficits
20, and the inability to inflate the public debt, all call for strict limits on nation-
al public finances. However, if domestic policymakers do not take this seriously and
even choose to misreport their fiscal operations, as has been the case with Greece,
the EU has only limited mechanisms for responding. The euro-area crisis therefore
brings out the old wisdom that prudent fiscal policy is needed to support a fixed
exchange rate and to ensure fiscal sustainability more generally.
In contrast to fiscal policy—which has received ample attention and is at the heart of
the treaties regulating both entry into and membership of the euro—policies that
affect the private sector have received little attention. Nevertheless, problems in the
private sector (notably in Ireland and Spain) with cheap credit and credit expansion,
real-estate and construction booms with corresponding wage increases and labour
moving into the sector, created vulnerabilities in the economy that also affected the
public sector. When financial flows halted, the bubble burst which resulted not only in
weak financial institutions but also a real economic slump with unemployment and
rapidly deteriorating fiscal balances.
Private-sector behaviour does not only affect long-run fiscal sustainability through
its impact on the real economy and on fiscal balances. It also has an effect on public
debt dynamics through the bailouts the government undertakes to rescue private-
sector financial institutions. These contingent liabilities have in many countries con-
tributed significantly to increases in public debt-related worries about fiscal sustain-
ability.
For euro outsiders the crisis in the euro area has shown that removing the option of
adjusting a nominal exchange rate may be very costly in terms of fiscal adjustment,
if, before the crisis, it was not accompanied by efforts to limit excessive demand in
the private sector, even if fiscal policy is broadly in order. However, limiting excess
demand in the private sector is not easy to achieve for national governments that
have surrendered their power over monetary policy in an environment with free cap-
ital mobility. Interestingly, housing and credit booms in Ireland and Spain and in fixed
exchange-rate CESEE countries have been remarkably similar, suggesting that the
fall in real interest rates as the result of exchange-rate fixity, financial integration and
economic catch-up matters both inside and outside the euro area.
20. The agony of the Greek fiscal problems in first half of 2010 and the difficulties in putting together an external
financing problem  call firmly for institutional changes in euro-area governance and institutions that can help to
avoid the emergence of such situations, but also help to resolve them without creating moral hazard. 66
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Euro outsiders should therefore be careful before fixing the exchange rate and should
allow as much flexibility as possible on the way to euro adoption, but in any case
should introduce measures preventing the emergence of unsustainable credit
booms. As we shall discuss in more detail in the chapter on financial stability, host-
country authorities may not be effective in this effort in an integrated Europe. 
The crisis in the euro area, in particular the competitiveness problems of Spain,
Portugal and Italy and the inability of these countries to adjust their competitiveness
inside the euro area
21(in contrast to eg Finland, Germany, Ireland and Austria, where
manufacturing ULC was falling, see Darvas, 2010b), raises a crucial question: should
the criteria for the optimal currency area (OCA) be fulfilled ex ante, ie before a coun-
try enters the euro area, or is it sufficient to expect that they will be fulfilled ex post,
ie euro admission will create structural changes in the economy that will make the
country suitable for the monetary union, even if it had not been before? While the lit-
erature on OCA emphasises several factors, such as the synchronisation of business
cycles, the role of asymmetric shocks, product and labour-market flexibility and
trade and financial integration, a crucial issue relates to the sustainability of the cur-
rent account and the ability of the country to adjust to competitiveness pressures
(Box 3.2). The inability of Mediterranean countries to adjust to competitiveness pres-
sures inside the euro area suggests that it would be better for euro newcomers if (i)
OCA criteria are satisfied ex ante and (ii) there are policy instruments to guide the
eventual need to adjust real exchange-rate divergences ex post.
3.4 Policy lessons and proposals at national and EU level
It is by now obvious that the pre-crisis boom was driven by too-rapid credit expansion
linked to foreign capital inflows that fuelled wage and price increases in several
CESEE countries. These factors led to imbalances that were forcibly corrected within
a short period of time in response to the crisis. In the medium and long run, however,
policy adjustments will have to be made in order to ensure the stability of the mone-
tary union. This has implications for various policies and institutions both at nation-
al and EU levels, but the Maastricht criteria should also be adapted.
3.4.1 Maastricht criteria
At some stage, all EU member states, except for Denmark and the UK who have treaty-
based ‘opt-outs’, are supposed to join the euro, guided by the criteria set out in the
21.Blanchard (2007) discusses the problems of adjustment within the euro.67
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Maastricht agreement (Box 3.1). Several communications from the ECB have
stressed that all countries that want to adopt the euro should fulfil the Maastricht cri-
teria, because this is based on equal treatment, stability of the euro, and is in the
countries’ own interest
22. There are however several problems with these criteria.
A first problem with the Maastricht criteria is that they do not address many of the
important issues that have been discussed above: there is nothing in them that
directly ensures that an applicant country satisfies the criteria for optimum curren-
cy areas or that Balassa-Samuelson effects will not be destabilising, ie that higher
inflation implied by economic catching-up and exchange-rate fixity and the conse-
quent fall in real interest rate will not create destabilising credit booms. 
It could be argued that the Maastricht criteria address some of the potential problems
BOX 3.2: OCA AND SUSTAINABILITY
The conjunction of pre-accession and pre-euro adoption criteria (Copenhagen and
Maastricht criteria) together with the EMU monetary policy and Stability and
Growth Pact rules does not ensure that the nominal and the real exchange rates
will not be misaligned either ex ante or ex post. In other words, countries adopting
the euro may not satisfy the Optimal Currency Area criteria and the euro-area gov-
ernance structure may not be suited to maintaining the optimality of the currency
union. A useful indicator of misalignment or lack of optimality is the development
of external balances in terms of the sustainability of the current account, which
should be assessed not just at the point of euro adoption, but also during the
whole preceding period, and even after a country enters the euro area. Indeed, the
Maastricht criteria require the assessment of the current account (Box 3.1), but
this has not received sufficient attention. Better methodologies for assessing the
sustainability of the current account and net foreign-asset positions should be
developed.
The reason why the set of all existing criteria do not ensure that foreign-debt devel-
opments will be sustainable is the fact that they do not exclude the emergence of
private-debt bubbles.  The risk to those developing is especially high if a country
adopts a fixed exchange rate with euro adoption as the only exit option. That sug-
gests that in the process of euro adoption flexibility of the exchange rate should be
preserved as long as sustainability of the external balances is not ensured.
22.See for example Stark (2008) and Tumpel-Gugerell (2009).68
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in an indirect way. Darvas, Rose and Szapáry (2007) have shown that there is an
indirect relationship between the Maastricht deficit criterion and business-cycle syn-
chronisation, since the Maastricht criteria limits idiosyncratic fiscal shocks.
Furthermore, the simultaneous requirement of low inflation and exchange-rate stabil-
ity can rule out countries with unsustainable current-account positions: both inside
and outside the euro area, unsustainable current account developments were accom-
panied by high inflation. It could also be argued that the EU membership process, ie
the Copenhagen criteria, by itself makes countries part of an optimal currency area. 
However, although there are certainly elements in both the Maastricht and the EU
membership process that mean countries will be more likely to fit into a common cur-
rency area, they are by no means sufficient. Furthermore, they can be circumvented.
Slovakia was able to join the euro by letting its currency appreciate by 25 percent in
the final two years before the assessment. This is formally allowed by the Maastricht
criteria, but raises a question about the sustainability of convergence as such a mas-
sive nominal appreciation was in fact needed to counterbalance inflation induced by
the Balassa-Samuelson effect. And since the inflation criterion is assessed only for
one year, countries might be tempted to resort to techniques to squeeze in temporar-
ily under the reference value. Indeed, considering the first eleven countries that
joined the euro area in 1999, all of them met the inflation criterion in 1997 and 1998,
but six of them failed to meet it in 2000 and similarly large violations occurred in later
years as we shall discuss later (Darvas, 2010d).
Rules for dealing with asynchronous business cycles and Balassa-Samuelson effects
would be either hard to design or politically infeasible; first, it is not known how to
synchronise business cycles; and second, having criteria not properly considering
the Balassa-Samuelson effects would preclude any low-income, catch-up economy
from adopting the euro. Ironically, the criteria can be regarded as a de facto equiva-
lent to a criterion on income levels, which is not consistent with the principle of equal
treatment. 
A second problem with the Maastricht criteria is that they do not ensure that labour
and product markets are flexible enough to cope with adjustment in competitiveness
when needed. True, improvements in the flexibility of labour and product markets are
in the interests of all countries, irrespective of whether or not they want to join a mon-
etary union. They are however of special macroeconomic relevance once a country
has joined the euro and, in this respect, the new member states whose labour and
product markets are often more flexible have an advantage that is not sufficiently
recognised.69
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A third problem is that with free capital mobility there is little fiscal policy can do to
control inflation and interest rates. Outsiders who want to join the club cannot control
their countries' path towards euro adoption, which makes them vulnerable to global
economic developments and mood swings on capital markets. To some extent the
inconsistent goals regarding inflation, exchange rates and interest rates could be
viewed as an attempt to keep out countries that need real appreciation. However, this
is a very indirect and inefficient way of dealing with this issue and has clearly led to
poor domestic policies in the run-up to the crisis and then also when dealing with the
crisis. For example, in some fixed exchange-rate EU member states the overriding
goal of euro-area entry was an important reason for the maintenance of the fixed
exchange-rate regime.
A fourth problem is that the EU's expansion from 15 to 27 members has made the cri-
teria tougher for new EMU entrants to meet (Lewis and and Staehr, 2010), because
two criteria are benchmarked on the three best-performing EU member states: the
three best performers among 27 countries are expected to generate a lower average
than the three best performers among 15 countries, according to the current inter-
pretation of the ‘three best performers’ (see later). The current interpretation of the
treaty is thus contrary to the principle of equal treatment. Furthermore, a number of
current members did not fulfil all of the criteria when they entered and, what is more,
violated several criteria after their entry. Today and for many years to come several
euro-area members will continue to miss the fiscal targets. Darvas (2010d) has also
demonstrated that, on average between 1916 and 2009, one third of US metropolitan
areas would fail to qualify to be members of the US monetary union by applying the
currently used inflation criterion to the US. Furthermore, the interest-rate criterion
became an extremely volatile measure (fluctuating between six and 12 percent from
one month to the other) because of the adopted interpretation of ‘three best perform-
ers in terms of price stability’. Such volatility is highly undesirable, because even if
the interest rate of an applicant country will remain stable, luck will be a factor in
whether this country meets the interest rate criterion or not.
More generally, one lesson from the crisis is that stricter rules should not apply to
euro outsiders at the time of joining, but rather to insiders after they have joined. It is
mostly after a country has joined the euro area that its policies can create problems
for other euro-area members. Therefore, much more attention should be paid to
strengthening the SGP, whereas the interpretation of the Maastricht criteria should
ensure equal treatment of all EU countries in the accession process. Furthermore,
prudent fiscal policy is only one of a number of necessary conditions for stability. It
is not by itself sufficient. Financial regulation, cross-border capital flows, cross-bor-70
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der bank ownership, and monitoring of balance-sheets in the private sector have to
become part of the policy framework governing the euro area. 
There is therefore a need to reform the inflation criterion for entry. Inflation and the
interest rate are benchmarked against the ‘three best-performing member states of
the EU in terms of price stability’, which has been interpreted as the three EU coun-
tries with the lowest non-negative inflation rates up to 2009. In the 2010 conver-
gence report, the interpretation of the three best-performing countries was changed,
but in a manner that did not only bring ambiguity and arbitrariness to the interpreta-
tion of this criterion, but also became inconsistent with the ECB’s (previous) view of
price stability, which excludes price decline (deflation)
23. All the three ‘best perform-
ers’ had negative inflation rates (Portugal -0.8 percent, Estonia -0,7 percent, and
Belgium -0.1%), but Ireland, with an inflation rate of -2.3 percent, was excluded on the
account that its inflation rate ‘deviates from the euro-area average by a wide margin,
and which could hence not reasonably be regarded as a best performer in terms of
price stability’ (European Commission, 2010, p 37). Since the euro-area average
inflation rate was 0.3 percent at the time of the 2010 assessment, a 2.6 percentage
point deviation from the eruo-area average should be considered as a ‘large’ devia-
tion, while a 1.1 percentage point deviation (ie the deviation of Portugal) should not. 
The arbitrariness and ambiguity caused by this reinterpretation of the concept of
three ‘best performers’ further calls for giving the concept of three ‘best performers’
an economically meaningful interpretation. A reasonable alternative would be to con-
sider the three countries whose inflation rates are closest to the euro-area average
inflation (Darvas and Szapáry, 2008; Darvas, 2010d).  
Short of a formal treaty change, there are two ways to implement changes to the
Maastricht criteria. First, the interpretation of the ‘three best performs’ solely
depends on the decision of the European Commission and the ECB and nothing would
prevent these institutions from adopting an economically meaningful interpretation.
Second, as long as there is a unanimous decision of the Council, the protocol of the
current treaty (which describes the measurement of all four criteria) can, and in fact
ought to be, changed (Darvas, 2010d)
24.
23.See ECB: ‘The definition of price stability’, available at:
http://www.ecb.int/mopo/strategy/pricestab/html/index.en.html
24.Furthermore, there is an additional unresolved issue: the conditions for joining ERM-II. Without ERM-II member-
ship a country cannot join the euro area, even if it has a stable exchange rate and meets all other criteria. There
should be clear and transparent criteria for joining ERM-II.71
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3.4.2 National policies
The policy choices for countries with fixed exchange rates are very different from
countries with floating rates. Although some floating-rate countries may also benefit
from the stability that the euro would offer, as long they need to adjust their real
exchange rates, the preferred policy for floaters is to stick to the current regime and
focus on fiscal, monetary and structural policies as tools to ensure stability, compet-
itiveness and flexibility. Before applying for EMU membership, these countries
should ensure that they have set their current accounts on a sustainable path, which
will likely be difficult since exchange-rate appreciation prior to euro-area entry is a
one-way bet for investors (for all previous admissions to the euro area, the conver-
sion rate was set very close to the prevailing market exchange rate).
For countries with fixed exchange rates the best policies are dictated by country spe-
cific factors related to expected euro adoption and the ability to use other policies to
revive the economy. There are three options available.
The first is to correct the exchange rate just before euro adoption. This would have
been the wise option for Estonia, which will join the euro area in 2011 and where the
pace of ‘internal adjustment’ is disappointingly slow. Unfortunately, such an adjust-
ment was not implemented, but the previous central parity became the conversion
rate. The huge pre-crisis current-account deficit has suddenly turned to surplus, but
it was a forced adjustment and improvements in competitiveness are badly needed
(Darvas, 2009a). The problem with this option is that there is no guarantee that this
one-step devaluation will correct the problems that have led to the fixed exchange
rate being misaligned in the first place, and therefore misalignments may emerge
inside the euro area as well.
The second option is to foster the internal adjustment of the real exchange rate ahead
of the moment of actual euro adoption while keeping a fixed link with the euro. This
may be easier to justify than it would be once a country has entered EMU. This may
be the policy that Bulgaria will follow, because it has a good record of income and
wage controls and of running fiscal surpluses. 
The third option is to move to a more flexible exchange-rate regime to correct for
imbalances and misalignments, but equally importantly to prevent similar
imbalances emerging in the future as well. This policy is advisable for those countries
in which the ‘internal devaluation’ progresses slowly. However, devaluation and the
fixing of the exchange rate at a devalued level carry a serious risk of loss of credibili-72
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ty and the consequent balance-sheet effect in highly euro-ised countries will be dif-
ficult to manage (see our discussion on external versus internal devaluation in
Section 3.2.3). 
None of these options is necessarily going to be enough to ensure that a country will
join the euro at the moment when it has satisfied not only the Maastricht criteria but
also the criteria for optimal currency areas. In light of the inability of Mediterranean
countries to adjust to competitiveness pressures inside the eurozone, CESEE coun-
tries seeking euro admission should ensure that they do not fall into the same trap.
They should apply for euro-area membership only if their historical record clearly indi-
cates that they are able to carry out internal adjustment. 
3.4.3 Crisis management
The initial phases of the crisis highlighted two weaknesses with the existing EU
framework to deal with (short-term) stabilisation issues. First, the lack of sufficient
funds committed in the EU to provide financial assistance to prop up confidence in
countries that were facing difficult adjustment programmes. Second, the lack of
instruments to efficiently deal with misaligned real exchange rates in countries with
fixed exchange rates, including euro-area members. The crisis has also demonstrat-
ed the more structural issue of cross-border banking and the lack of a common
framework to deal with cross-border banking regulation, supervision and bailouts.
This issue is closely linked to both funding for adjustment programmes and
exchange-rate adjustments that may have a serious impact on the balance-sheet of
financial institutions that then need to be supported by public funds.
As the crisis evolved (but after significant and costly delays), the EU adjusted some
of its policies in an appropriate direction. The first step in the right direction was to
increase the limit of the EU medium-term financial assistance facility for non-euro-
area EU countries from €12 billion to €50 billion (in two steps)
25 and to involve the
IMF in the adjustment programmes of three non-euro member states (Latvia,
Hungary and Romania). The main advantage of involving the IMF was not in terms of
funding of the programmes (although useful) but in terms of having a credible out-
side partner with ample technical expertise for dealing with economic adjustment
programmes in crisis times. 
25.See Darvas (2009b) for the list and assessment of several other actions taken by EU institutions to support cri-
sis-hit CESEE countries.73
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It was much harder for the EU institutions to let the IMF be involved in Greece, a euro-
area country. However, as the crisis there evolved, it became apparent that the alter-
natives to IMF involvement were not less painful or more attractive. With the risk of
the crisis spreading to a wider set of (larger) euro-area countries, the EU member
states also agreed on rather substantial increases in the funding available to assist
euro-area countries in trouble: the bulk of the new funding commitments, €500bn, is
from euro-area governments and from the EU, which is topped up with another €250
from the IMF. 
Looking forward, the EU should strive to design a more robust, transparent and pre-
dictable set of instruments and policies to deal with economic crises. The instru-
ments could include an extended version of the medium-term financial assistance
facility that more closely corresponds to the IMF’s precautionary facilities with ex-
ante conditions to pre-qualify for assistance. Within the EU, the ex-ante conditions
could be aligned with existing criteria such as Maastricht and SGP to make the frame-
work internally consistent. 
3.4.4 The case for EU surveillance
Interactions between countries inside and outside the euro area – the ‘ins’ and ‘outs’
– are robust
26. The ‘outs’, which are generally small and open economies that are
highly integrated with ‘ins’ (chapter 1) are impacted by economic developments and
policies in the ‘ins’. But the ‘ins’ also face several potential costs from the policy
choices of the ‘outs’, including: competitive devaluations by ‘outs’ that have flexible
exchange rates; less stability in trade relations with ‘outs’; possibly increased migra-
tion flows from ‘outs’ to ‘ins’ at a time when unemployment is already high; and a
diminishing of the EU as a role model that drives economic and political reforms in
and around it.
Ultimately, exchange-rate policies promoted by both the EU and individual member
states should focus on four objectives: fostering economic integration, achieving low
inflation, preventing financial instability and avoiding distortions in competitiveness.
These objectives are related, because low-inflation countries (both outside and
inside the euro area) have generally not experienced unsustainable booms and loss
of competitiveness. Promoting the correct financial incentives to avoid the build-up
26.The term ‘outs’ is used to describe countries that are not part of the euro area and primarily refers to current EU
members. However, several aspects of the argument also apply to candidate countries that are strongly econom-
ically integrated with the EU.74
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of unsustainable balance-sheets in both the private and public sectors is always
important. The policies that need to support this may however differ before and after
entering the euro. In particular, when preparing for euro-area membership, flexible
exchange rates could help achieve an external balance with less distorted financial
incentives. Within the euro area, stricter application of fiscal sustainability criteria
should be combined with improved macro-prudential regulation of private sector
financial flows to avoid unsustainable debt dynamics. In light of the crisis, the exist-
ing criteria may also need to be complemented by more coordinated fiscal policy as
well as income and labour-market policies. These responsibilities fall squarely on the
EU and will require serious reforms to financial regulation and how the SGP is
designed and implemented. Finally, a framework to deal with supervision and
bailouts related to cross-border financial flows should be developed.
The design of policies to ensure that countries can adjust within the euro area is also
of utmost importance. Alternative instruments (monitoring of the build up of bubbles,
early-warning systems on real exchange-rate developments, income and wage poli-
cies, and labour-market flexibility) should be designed, and the responsibility for
monitoring and implementation should be distributed between the EU and national
levels.
3.5 Summary
The global trend of polarisation of exchange-rate regimes, ie the adoption of either
hard pegs or flexible exchange-rate systems and the disappearance of intermediate
regimes, also characterises CESEE countries. Some countries in the region with rea-
sonably similar situations opted for completely different exchange-rate strategies.
The exchange-rate regime choice in itself is not a panacea, since there are both good
and bad examples with both fixed and flexible exchange rates. But both the pre-crisis
period and the crisis have shown that it is more difficult to be successful in a catch-
up economy when the exchange rate is fixed.
Cross-border financial flows resulted in the build-up of vulnerabilities that greatly
influenced the cost of the crisis in countries with all kinds of exchange-rate regimes.
But these flows and associated imbalances were more pronounced in countries with
fixed exchange rates. Fixed exchange-rate countries tended to experience higher cur-
rent-account imbalances and external debt, the share of loans was larger and the
share of FDI was lower in total capital inflows, the composition of FDI inflows was
biased in favour of finance and real estate-related activities, credit growth was faster,
inflation was higher, unit labour costs rose faster, and real interest rates were lower75
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than in floating exchange rate countries, on average. These characteristics and vul-
nerabilities contributed to sharper contractions in real growth and a larger rise in
unemployment during the crisis in fixed exchange-rate countries than in countries
with flexible exchange-rate regimes.
The key reason behind these differing developments between fixed and floating
exchange-rate countries is most likely related to the price level catch-up process,
which accompanies economic catch-up. When price level catch-up translates into
higher inflation because of the fixity of the exchange rate (as opposed to floating
exchange-rate countries, in which the price level catch-up can potentially be accom-
modated by nominal exchange-rate appreciation as well), higher inflation could lead
to lower real interest rates, which can fuel unsustainable credit booms and distort the
allocation of capital and labour. The importance of low inflation is also underlined by
those three floating exchange-rate countries, Hungary, Romania and Serbia, that had
higher inflation rates before the crisis than other floaters and had to rely on IMF/EU
emergency financing during the crisis.
Current-account deficits have suddenly corrected and inflation fell everywhere in
response to the crisis, as capital inflows stopped or even reversed. But the large stock
of private debt and the weak competitive position of several fixed exchange-rate
countries will act as a drag on economic growth. There was only one CESEE country,
Ukraine, which has moved from a fixed exchange-rate regime to a floating regime in
response to the crisis, while other fixed exchange-rate countries in the region are try-
ing to improve their competitiveness through an ‘internal devaluation’, ie domestic
price and wage cuts. While public-sector wages have been cut considerably in some
countries, so far the speed of adjustment is slow in the private sector. 
Looking forward, national exchange-rate strategies should take into account the
problems with fixing the exchange rate too early in the catch-up phase and being
stuck with an overvalued exchange rate and large stock of private debt. More gener-
ally, economic policy before entering the euro should be guided by standard welfare
arguments and not dictated by a specific exchange-rate goal except perhaps in the
very short run ahead of the euro accession evaluation. A strategy to deal with poten-
tially volatile capital flows and private-sector imbalances should be in place before
the exchange rate is fixed in anticipation of joining the euro. 
A strong case can be made for EU surveillance. When the fixity of the exchange rate
contributes to the build-up of private-sector vulnerabilities and/or hinders appropri-
ate adjustment, the EU and ECB should discourage exchange-rate regimes and poli-76
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cies that have euro adoption as the only exit strategy even though euro adoption is a
long way off. The ERM II mechanism should be structured in such a way as to allow
for more flexibility. This should ensure that euro adoption emerges as the preferred
policy because of the gradual fulfilment of criteria for optimal currency areas (OCA).
Permanent currency union needs to be justified in terms of trade, production, and
financial integration. Flexible labour and product markets are also inevitable. These
characteristics will make flexible exchange rates an unnecessary cost rather than an
instrument to achieve policy or structural targets.
The Maastricht criteria have some indirect relation to OCA criteria, because, for exam-
ple, the countries more troubled both inside and outside the EMU are those that had
higher inflation before the crisis. But they do not address fundamental issues related
to capital flows, and are less relevant in a world with free and substantial capital
flows. They are also internally inconsistent, a problem that is magnified by the effect
that the catch-up of CESEE countries has on capital flows, price-level adjustments
and volatility. The adopted interpretations of the ‘three best-performing member
states in terms of price stability’ are misguided and the 2010 reinterpretation also
contradicts the ECB’s definition of price stability. Almost a century of US regional
inflation data demonstrate that the adopted interpretations would rule out several US
states from being part of the US monetary area, which is a warning signal. A good
solution would be to relate all numerical criteria to the average of the euro area and
simultaneously to extend the compliance period from the currently considered one
year to the average of two or three years, which would also entail a better considera-
tion of OCA criteria. Also, more emphasis should be put on the assessment of current-
account sustainability, which is anyway required by the Treaty to be part of the con-
vergence assessment. 
Revision of the Maastricht criteria has to be complemented with better EU surveil-
lance and crisis-management tools, as well as stricter rules governing euro-area
members. These measures should also ensure equal treatment of euro-area insiders
and outsiders.4. Financial stability
4.1 Introduction
As discussed in the previous chapters, the crisis hit the countries of central and east-
ern Europe very hard, but to varying degrees. Financial integration was a major chan-
nel for the transmission of shocks, but the relative importance of the trade and finan-
cial channels remains a matter for discussion (EBRD, 2009), and the impact of
shocks certainly varies from country to country. In some countries the credit crunch
was very severe, liquidity shortages were acute at the height of the crisis and the
spectre of solvency problems emerged, especially where external imbalances had
grown quite rapidly in the past decade. Under these circumstances, financial stabili-
ty has become a fundamental concern of policymakers throughout the region.
Yet the worst problems of past crises, such as a meltdown of financial systems and
uncontrolled currency depreciations, have largely been avoided. This is a phenome-
non that intrigues those observers who anticipated the worst outcomes. 
This chapter focuses on the features of the deep financial integration that distin-
guishes CESEE countries from other emerging-country regions, and analyses the
state of CESEE banking systems. The implications of cross-border operations and the
intricate relationship between host- and home-country regulators and supervisors
are examined. The chapter then considers four core policy issues regarding the finan-
cial systems in CESEE countries:
1. The prospects for lending against the backdrop of the deleveraging that banks are
undergoing;
2. Crisis resolution in the context of cross-border bank ownership;
3. Tools to manage liquidity and potential solvency risks;
4. Policy tools for enhancing financial stability and avoiding boom-bust cycles
caused by lending.78
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4.2 The impact of the crisis
Following the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, financial stability in
the CESEE countries suddenly became an issue. As it became evident that the region
had been hit hard by the global crisis, even harder than other regions of the world,
many market analysts envisaged massive capital outflows and a breakdown of the
financial systems of several CESEE countries. In contrast, much less concern was
raised about financial stability in Asia and Latin America, two regions that were char-
acterised by several previous financial crises. 
Yet financial meltdown was avoided. What made the CESEE region special? How was
a complete regional collapse avoided? And in what shape has the crisis left the finan-
cial systems of these countries?
4.2.1 Financial systems
As documented in Chapter 1, the CESEE region experienced in 2008-09 a much
sharper reversal of capital flows than Latin America or Asia (see Figure 1.2): capital
inflows decreased by about 10 percent of GDP on average between 2007 and 2009.
Figure 4.1 shows that the slowdown of capital inflows from the 2007 peak values
was remarkable in most countries, and there were even capital outflows from
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Ukraine in 2009.
Why were CESEE countries affected more severely? The fact that most of these coun-
tries are small and open, and hence typically have fewer domestic resources with
which to head off crises and could be more sensitive to changes in investors’ senti-
ment, cannot be the main reason, as there are many small countries all around the
world where the crisis had less of an impact.
The more plausible reason for the special worries about CESEE countries lies in the
deep financial integration of these countries within and with the EU, and in their relat-
ed reliance on net capital inflows. Financial integration and, in the case of EU mem-
bers, the logic of the single market, predisposed CESEE countries to growing external
imbalances. The reliance on net external funding created a systemic risk in non-euro
area member countries because of potentially devastating chains of corporate
defaults and the related currency risk for the economy as a whole. 
Figure 4.2 presents data on the 2008 public and private debt in the CESEE countries
and several EU and non-EU comparators. It is apparent that with the possible excep-79
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tion of Hungary, public debt in these countries was not especially high by interna-
tional standards. Total private debt was also comparatively low in Poland, the Czech
Republic and Slovakia, but high – taking into account relative development levels –
in the other countries, especially in Latvia, Hungary, Bulgaria and Estonia. This rela-
tively high level of debt proved to be a weakness in the crisis, especially when loans
had been denominated in foreign currencies.
Turning to external debt, Figure 4.3 presents indicators of gross and net external lia-
bilities, again for 2008. High external debt carries a roll-over risk, even though this is
arguably smaller for within-company and within-banking group loans. Also, external
debt is typically denominated in foreign currencies, which carries a currency risk. In
addition to gross external debt, we also report net external loan and debt liabilities,
which allows a better assessment of external vulnerability
1. Differences within the
region are evident: central European countries had reasonably low liabilities, again
with the exception of Hungary, while the Baltics and Croatia were heavily indebted
externally, especially when compared to Asia-6 and Latam-8. So by common stan-
dards they could be considered vulnerable ex ante.
These observations are consistent with those made in Chapters 1 and 2 of this report:
only three central European countries – the Czech Republic, Poland, and Slovakia –
avoided falling victim to rapidly rising domestic debt and only four (the same three
plus Slovenia) avoided the external-debt trap. All other countries experienced for-
eign-financed credit booms and the resulting accumulation of private (or, in the case
of Hungary, private and public) debt. In the highly indebted countries, in a financial-
ly integrated environment, neither monetary and fiscal policies nor financial regula-
tion were able to prevent the build-up of imbalances.
A particular feature of CESEE financial integration into the EU has been the dominant
ownership of foreign (mostly EU15) banking groups (Figure 4.4). During the crisis,
parent banks in the EU15 had to face serious liquidity and capital pressures and, at
the time of acute market turbulences after the collapse of Lehman Brothers, it was
1. Gross external debt is frequently used as a measure of vulnerability. However, in the case of some countries (eg
Bulgaria, Hungary) a large part of it is related to FDI (inter-company lending), which is certainly less of a concern
for financial stability. Also, whenever the external debt of domestic banks was taken from their parent banks
abroad, the roll-over risk is less than in other lending relations. A better measure of external indebtedness is net
external loan and debt liabilities (ie the net ‘other investment’ and net portfolio debt investment from the inter-
national investment position statistics; FDI and portfolio equity investment constitute a different kind of risk,
and financial derivatives is minor in the case of CESEE countries). This indicator is plotted as the second column
of Figure 4.3 and indicates that indebtedness of CESEE countries is still generally higher than in the EU15, Asia-
6 and Latam-8, but the difference is smaller than in the case of gross external debt.82
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not at all clear how these parent banks would manage their subsidiaries and branch-
es in CESEE countries. In the heat of the crisis, subsidiaries had difficulties access-
ing liquidity and the first bank rescue attempts by EU-15 governments were targeted
at the home-country operations of the banking groups, thereby weakening the sub-
sidiaries further. This contributed to uncertainty over the prospects of foreign sub-
sidiaries. Later, however, the Ecofin Council issued a declaration that packages must
also support subsidiaries.
Other factors that disadvantaged non-euro area CESEE countries were restricted
access to euro liquidity and the ECB’s collateral policy. Before the crisis, banks in the
region (including subsidiaries and branches of western European banks) relied heav-
ily on the euro-area money markets. But the near-paralysis of the euro-area inter-
bank money market after the collapse of Lehman Brothers meant that (especially
non-foreign bank owned) commercial banks in central and eastern Europe were
largely cut off from euro liquidity. The more the ECB (rightly) moved into new territo-
ry to remedy the shortage of liquidity in the euro area, the more it was inadvertently
putting the region’s banks – at least those without access to a parent bank’s liquidi-
ty – at a disadvantage, while making their government bonds unattractive. The latter
impact came from the ECB’s collateral policy: it has expanded the set of securities
0
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Figure 4.4: Foreign bank ownership, 1998-2005 (assets owned by foreign banks as
% of banking system assets)
Source: Chart 6b from Berglöf et al (2009).84
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eligible for refinancing operations to lower-quality as well as US dollar, British pound
and Japanese yen securities (issued in the euro area), but has not expanded the set
of eligible securities to securities denominated in non-euro EU currencies. As the ECB
practically replaced euro-area money markets, demand  increased for eligible securi-
ties and decreased for those that were not eligible. The ECB did not offer euro-swap
facilities to any CESEE central bank, though it had offered them to Denmark and
Sweden and had similar swap agreements with many other central banks
2.
The possibility of contagion, ie intra-regional spillovers, was also among the major
fears for CESEE countries
3. Indeed, past regional financial crises had shown that a cri-
sis can spread through contagion even to less vulnerable countries. 
Finally, considering the EU as a whole, massive cross-border operations of banks
have highlighted that even though the EU is a single market, national choices remain
important. The EU does not have tools to handle cross-border banking crisis manage-
ment, and there are no schemes for burden sharing in case of a default.
4.2.2 How a regional collapse was avoided
There are four main explanations for CESEE countries' avoidance of financial melt-
down.
First, prior to the crisis, the region's financial sectors were relatively sound, in com-
parison to, for example, the Asian countries in the 1990s (see EBRD, 2009). In the
CESEE countries, throughout the crisis, the accusations of cronyism that were com-
monplace at the time of the Asian crisis were remarkably absent. 
Second, there were forceful multilateral responses. Medium-term financial assis-
tance conditional on fiscal consolidation and on the implementation of comprehen-
sive economic reform programmes played crucial roles. Programmes were led by the
IMF, but for Hungary, Latvia and Romania the EU also participated both financially
and substantively
4. Two western Balkan countries, Serbia and Bosnia and
2. As hinted by Vallee (2010), and confirmed by the Annual Report of the Hungarian central bank published in May
2010, the earlier euro-repo was partially converted into a swap in January 2010, ie more than a year after the
collapse of Lehman Brothers, but this agreement has been kept secret. A similar secret agreement may have
been concluded with Poland as well around the same time.
3. Árvai et al (2009) study financial interlinkages and identify the likely pressure points and potential spillover
effects and propagation channels of a regional shock originating from a given country.
4. In the programmes there has also been World Bank, EBRD and EIB assistance, and, for Latvia, bilateral support
from seven European countries.85
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Herzegovina, also relied on IMF programmes
5. Other multilateral support included the
frontloading of disbursement from EU structural and cohesion funds as well as the
expansion of European Investment Bank and European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development activities (for more details see Darvas, 2009b).
Third, in view of the dominant presence of foreign banks in the region, important roles
have been played by: a European Bank for Reconstruction and Development co-ordi-
nation initiative aimed at ensuring a rollover of the western European banks’ claims
on the region (‘The Vienna Initiative’)
6; ECB support for parent banks; and the EU’s
political commitment that bank-rescue packages would have to support subsidiaries.
Fourth, but not least, the swift rescue of parent banks by EU15 governments greatly
contributed to stability. Without it, crisis management measures specifically target-
ed at the region would have not been effective. In the case of a failure of a parent
bank with an important market share in a CESEE country, that country – even if it
was among the less vulnerable – would have suffered much more
7.
For these reasons, no significant CESEE government intervention was needed
beyond the upgrading of deposit insurance schemes. In most CESEE countries nei-
ther capital injections nor liquidity support have been needed; the key exceptions are
some of the countries under an IMF-led programme (Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Hungary, Latvia, and Ukraine; see Darvas, 2010a).
4.2.3 The state of the banking system
In order to assess vulnerability to further shocks, stress tests for banks have been
conducted across the region. The examination of the effects of mutually reinforcing
negative dynamics points to resilience under severe, but plausible, macroeconomic
scenarios (see the summary in ECB, 2009). Yet the overall assessment of the ECB at
the end of 2009 was still cautious: ‘Looking ahead, the macroeconomic outlook in the
non-euro area EU countries has improved somewhat..., although there is still an
5. Among the neighbourhood countries Armenia, Belarus, Georgia and Ukraine requested IMF support.
6. The ‘Vienna Initiative’ is a multilateral effort to secure financial-sector stability in those CESEE countries with sub-
stantial foreign bank ownership. It stipulates coordination between all relevant stakeholders, including interna-
tional banking groups, home- and host-country authorities, international financial institutions and the EU, with
the aim of developing a common understanding on key issues. It aims to secure the commitments by both inter-
national banking groups and home- and host-country authorities, and to coordinate fair burden-sharing (see Box
1.4 in EBRD, 2009).
7. In this regard, the agony created by the Greek sovereign risk in early 2010 and its potential impact on Greek banks
carries a significant risk to those western Balkan countries in which Greek banks have a substantial interest.86
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unusually high degree of uncertainty. Rising unemployment, lower incomes and cor-
porate defaults are likely to lead to a further increase in loan delinquencies and a fur-
ther deterioration of bank loan portfolios’ (ECB, 2009, p. 29).
The share of non-performing loans (Figure 4.5) has indeed risen in many countries,
though end-2009 levels, even in the worst-hit countries, were still well below the lev-
els reached in several Asian countries in the late 1990s (30-40 percent in some of
these countries). Also, in many CESEE countries current levels are still below histor-
ical records. Yet the share of non-performing loans is a lagging indicator. Also, as it
does not include all rescheduled debt, it may not give a full picture of bad loans. 
Bank returns on assets and equity have declined, but remained positive in 2009 in
most CESEE countries, with the notable exceptions of Ukraine, the Baltic countries,
and Montenegro (Table 4.1)
8. On average, return on assets and equity continued to
remain above the average returns in EU15 countries, but below the average value of
Latin American countries. Capital adequacy ratios have even increased in most coun-
tries due to, in many cases, parent-bank support and, in a few cases, CESEE govern-
ments have also injected capital, as mentioned earlier.
4.3 Cross-border bank ownership and financial stability
The substantial exposure to the CESEE region of banking groups headquartered in
older members of the EU (Table 4.2) has, inevitably, become a source of both home-
and host-country concern. One reason for this is potential losses in sharp economic
downturns. This especially applies to countries such as Austria, Belgium and Sweden
whose banking sectors' exposure to the CESEE region is significant from a macro eco-
nomic point of view. Another concern, from the host-country perspective, is the fear
of a possible disorderly disinvestment of these banking groups from certain CESEE
countries. The increased exposure of a bank to a particular geographic area also rais-
es micro-prudential regulation and supervision issues.
This crisis has illustrated that the distribution of responsibilities between home and
host country and the non-existence of detailed burden-sharing arrangements in the
event of a crisis is a major handicap for the single market
9. Under current arrange-
8. However, looking at the past decade, the cumulative profits are still highly positive in these countries as well.
9. As the de Larosiere report (2009) says, ‘The absence of a sound framework for crisis management and resolu-
tion (with sufficiently clear principles on burden sharing, customers’ protection, assets transferability and wind-
ing up) complicates the introduction of an effective and efficient supervisory system to avoid financial crises in
the first place’ (p76).87
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Table 4.2 Exposure to CESEE (per cent of home country GDP), September 2009
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Czech Republic 16.9 10.9 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.6 0.0 0.1 0.4 1.3 0.0
Hungary 10.3 3.0 0.1 0.0 1.3 0.7 0.2 0.2 1.0 0.5 0.1
Poland 3.8 4.9 2.1 0.0 2.0 4.6 6.6 1.8 1.7 0.9 0.5
Slovak Republic 8.2 2.0 0.0 0.0 0.9 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.0
Slovenia 2.8 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.4 0.1 0.0
CE-5 total 42.0 22.3 2.3 0.1 5.3 6.2 6.9 2.1 3.6 2.0 0.7
Bulgaria 1.6 0.5 0.0 3.1 0.4 0.1 1.4 0.1 0.2 0.0
Estonia 0.1 0.0 6.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1
Latvia 0.2 0.0 5.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1
Lithuania 0.1 0.0 5.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.2
Romania 11.1 0.2 0.0 5.7 0.6 1.3 0.3 1.3 0.1 0.6 0.0
BB-5 total 12.9 0.7 17.8 8.8 1.1 1.3 0.3 2.7 0.5 0.8 0.5
Albania 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Bosnia & Herzegovina 1.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0
Croatia 6.8 0.1 0.0 0.0 1.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.3 0.0
Macedonia 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Montenegro 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Serbia 1.6 0.0 0.0 1.4 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.0
Western Balkan total 9.6 0.1 0.0 2.6 2.1 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.8 0.4 0.0
Ukraine 2.6 0.0 0.8 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.0 1.1 0.1 0.3 0.0
Total for all 17 countries 67.1 23.1 20.9 11.6 8.6 7.9 7.2 6.4 5.0 4.4 1.2
Total for all 17 countries
in EUR billions
172 73 56 26 123 42 10 21 110 79 2
Source:BIS (bank exposure) and IMF (GDP).
Note: All entries are expressed as per cent of home-country GDP except data in the last row, which are
expressed in EUR billions. Home countries are ordered according to their CESEE exposure as a per cent
of GDP. Exposure to CESEE is between 7 and 4 billion euros in Japan, Spain, US and UK, which is below
one per cent of the GDP of these countries.90
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ments, responsibility for the stability of financial institutionsbelongs to the supervi-
sor of the country where they are headquartered, whereas responsibility for the sta-
bility of the financial system belongs to the supervisor of the host country. More
specifically, for a CESEE country whose financial system is dominated by western
European banks, institutional supervision belongs to the various western European
supervisors, whereas the local supervisor has responsibility for the local financial
system. To correct this far-from-ideal allocation of responsibilities
10, ex ante coopera-
tion among supervisors takes place in committees, and memoranda of understand-
ing have been agreed to guide action in crisis situations, but incentives to share
information are weak and provisions for cooperation in crisis management are little
more than declarations of good intent. As to crisis resolution, there are no ex ante
burden-sharing arrangements. The management of the near-bankruptcies of Fortis
and Dexia in 2008 illustrated how much solutions depend on the ability of govern-
ments to quickly agree on ad-hoc arrangements
11.
Summing up, the financial crisis has shown that cooperation between home- and
host-country authorities deteriorates in crisis situations because of:
• The complex distribution of tasks between home- and host-country authorities; 
•A  l a c k  o f  ex-anteburden-sharing agreements; 
• The limited powers of host-country authorities to protect markets. 
This crisis has reinforced the idea that a common rulebook, more integrated supervi-
sion, and a common framework for crisis resolution are needed to match the degree
of market integration in financial services. 
On the other hand, the burden-sharing issue prompts national governments and
supervisors to think more along national lines, in view of their accountability toward
national taxpayers. A clear lesson from the crisis in this respect is that there are no
European taxpayers, only national ones. 
How this contradiction will be addressed and whether or not it will be resolved is cru-
cial for the future of European integration. Central and eastern Europe in this respect
is by no means peripheral, it is on the contrary where the tension between the two
equally defensible principles of single-market integration and national budgetary
10.This separation of responsabilities leads to an underestimation of systemic risks and complicates, inter alia, the
task of working out burden-sharing arrangements and calculating their fiscal implications.
11.Pisani-Ferry and Sapir (2010) provide a detailed account of the management of the banking crisis in the EU.91
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responsibility is the most acute. It is therefore the place where solutions are to be
worked out and implemented.   
Before the crisis, the lead supervisor concept (which was promoted by leading finan-
cial groups) was resisted by small countries on both political and financial stability
grounds. These countries feared that losing a final say over the deliberations of the
supervisory colleges, because of their host-country status, would cripple their capac-
ity to intervene during a crisis. Because foreign groups, operating multi-jurisdiction-
ally, could be tempted to reallocate capital in a way that might create havoc locally,
what would seem optimal for a financial group might be quite suboptimal for a host
country. If problems emerge, there may be a divergence of interest with ‘the home
supervisor wishing to see maximum transferability of liquidity to offset the emer-
gence of group-wide liquidity problems, while host supervisors wish to ring-fence liq-
uidity at national level precisely because they have growing concerns about the
whole group position’ (The Turner Review, 2009, p. 99). And, as the Turner Review
stresses, even well-capitalised local bank subsidiaries are likely to face liquidity
crises if the whole group is seen to be in trouble. In view of the powerful contagion
effects that are likely to operate in the event of a crisis, the trouble could extend to
whole banking systems. 
Initiatives since the crisis have indicated that policymakers are aware of the problem
and want to find solutions. The De Larosière group report, and the decision of the
Ecofin meeting of 9 June 2009 (Council of the European Union, 2009) to strengthen
micro-prudential supervision, aimed to turn the Lamfalussy Level 3 Committees into
‘European Authorities’
12 and to create the ESRB (European Systemic Risk Board) in
charge of macro prudential supervision. These are important steps which have given
an impetus to the creation of a European system of regulation and supervision. 
In the same way, the Vienna Initiative of 2008-2009, which was made necessary by
the concern that foreign (parent) banks present in the CEESE region would be
12. The Lamfalussy Level 3 Committees are: the Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR), the
Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS) and the Committee of European Insurance and Occupational
Pensions Supervisors (CEIOPS). Council of the European Union (2009) concluded that: ‘The Council RECOM-
MENDS that a European System of Financial Supervisors be established as an operational European network with
shared and mutually reinforcing responsibilities. At EU level, the current EU committees of supervisors (CEBS,
CEIOPS and CESR) should be transformed into European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) with a legal personality
under Community law: a European Banking Authority (EBA), a European Insurance and Occupational Pensions
Authority (EIOPA), and a European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA). National supervisors should remain
responsible for day-to-day supervision of individual firms. A steering committee of the ESAs should be set up to
reinforce mutual understanding, cooperation and consistent supervisory approaches, in particular in relation to
financial conglomerates, and to coordinate the necessary information sharing between the ESAs and the ESRB’.92
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inclined to transfer liquidity and capital back home at a time when credit markets
were collapsing, can be hailed as a success. But a satisfactory ad-hoc solution in a
crisis is no substitute for a more permanent response. 
Reform of the financial regulatory and supervisory architecture is therefore unfin-
ished. We return to the issue below. 
4.4 Policy options
Different countries in the CESEE region face largely different issues regarding their
financial systems. This partly relates to cross-country differences in indebtedness
as Figures 4.2 and 4.3 have indicated.
• For most CESEE countries, where the private sector has become highly indebted
and medium-term growth prospects have substantially weakened, a long process
of deleveraging is likely. The crucial issue for these countries is how to stop this
necessary process from holding back growth in the years to come.
• In a few central European countries with reasonably low private-sector indebted-
ness (the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia), controlling the expansion of
credit may come to the fore much earlier than elsewhere.
• In all countries, liquidity and perhaps solvency risks may come to the fore again
should market sentiment worsen again for any reason.
• Last but not least, crisis resolution remains an issue since in CESEE countries for-
eign bank ownership is significant.
We discuss these four issues in turn.
4.4.1 Deleveraging and the issue of credit resumption
Banks, households and non-financial corporations all around the world are respond-
ing to the crisis by deleveraging. Unfortunately recent data are not available for all
aspects of the deleveraging process; only data for credit aggregates are available.
What do the data show so far about credit aggregates of CESEE countries? 
Credit aggregates are impacted by exchange-rate movements in countries with a
floating exchange rate and a significant share of foreign-currency loans. Figure 4.6
shows the level of credit (measured in domestic currency unit) normalised as
September 2008 = 100 (ie the starting point is the date of the collapse of Lehman
Brothers). The rapid increase in the market value of credit outstanding to the private93
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Figure 4.6 Credit to the private sector (measured in domestic currency unit,
September 2008 = 100)
Source: IMF International Financial Statistics. Note: the scale of the two panels is different.
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sector immediately after the collapse of Lehman Brothers in some countries is large-
ly due to valuation effects as the domestic-currency value of foreign-currency loans
rose sharply as exchange rates depreciated. For Hungary, where the central bank
publishes net lending data adjusted for exchange-rate changes, it is possible to dis-
entangle the valuation effect from net credit generation. Data show net lending col-
lapsed and quickly turned negative soon after September 2008.
Credit aggregates were not impacted by exchange-rate changes in countries with
fixed exchange rates and were very mildly impacted in the Czech Republic, where the
share of foreign-currency loans is minor. In the three Baltic countries, Bosnia and
Herzegovina and Montenegro (all are fixed exchange-rate countries) the amount of
credit outstanding began to fall immediately after the collapse of Lehman Brothers.
In Bulgaria and Macedonia (two fixers), Croatia (a quasi-fixer), and Slovenia (a euro
area member) credit grew at a much reduced pace, or stopped.
A key question is whether this evolution was the consequence of a credit crunch, or
of reduced demand, possibly as a consequence of a deteriorating economic outlook
and rising interest rates. Ghosh (2009) studied this question for three countries,
Hungary, Latvia and Poland, for the 2008Q3-2009Q2 period. He finds evidence of a
credit crunch in all three countries, though at different times: the crunch affected
Poland in 2008Q4 only, Latvia in 2008Q4 and 2009Q1, and Hungary from 2008Q4 to
2009Q2. Ghosh also concludes that ‘the initial credit crunch and credit supply prob-
lems is likely to have contributed to the decline in GDP and hence to the decline in
demand in credit subsequently’ (p43). This suggests that the credit crunch was an
important factor behind recession during the current crisis. Those CESEE countries
for which empirical analysis of this issue is not available are also likely to have faced
similar developments. 
For the future, the crucial issue is what will happen to the credit creation process
after economies bottom out. Some weaker banks may wish to decrease their expo-
sure to the region wherever it has reached significant levels. Deleveraging at group
level may be an incentive for decreasing exposure everywhere, including in the
CESEE. Some banks that face a large increase in dubious loans, such as in the Baltic
countries, may also wish to roll over these existing dubious loans in their regional
subsidiaries and branches instead of assuming the losses in full and cleaning up
their balance-sheet. Therefore, these banks may become ‘zombies’, thereby depress-
ing credit growth further. These factors will likely hold back credit supply, especially
in more indebted countries.95
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On the demand side, households and non-financial corporations may also wish to
deleverage in cases in which their indebtedness has risen to values that will not be
supported by downward revised economic outlooks and increased uncertainties
13.
What room for manoeuvre do CESEE policymakers have to assist in the resumption
of credit? With the exceptions mentioned above, most banks seem to be well capi-
talised and thus in no need of further support. Hence CESEE governments can do lit-
tle through financial regulation. Instead, governments can assist and support the
credit creation process in the following ways.
1. Credible macroeconomic policies(including public-finance consolidation and the
reduction in the level and volatility of inflation, where these are needed) so that
markets do not ask for excessive risk premia in lending to local businesses.
2. Macroeconomic adjustment in countries with overvalued exchange rates and
high private debt. In a few CESEE countries, most notably the three Baltic coun-
tries, the real exchange rate is highly overvalued and the adopted ‘internal deval-
uation’ strategy (cutting nominal wages and prices) is not advancing at a suffi-
cient pace. At the same time, the private sector is highly indebted in euros. An
adjustment in macro-economic policy, possibly including devaluation, would lead
to immediate heavy losses in the banking sector
14 and government intervention
would be needed. The government would need to design debt resolution schemes,
and the government may have to assume part of the bad loans (ie provide subsi-
dies to banks and/or the non-financial private sector). However, any subsidy will
likely raise serious moral hazard and distributional issues and most CESEE gov-
ernments have very limited resources for such an undertaking. In view of these
limited resources, devaluation would require home-country governments to sup-
port their banks. 
3. Fostering credit through public banks or through domestic development banks.
Governments or central banks may promote lending in this way. However, any
non-market solution may have serious distorting effects and should be consid-
ered only when markets are barely functioning. The use of this channel would be
limited by the scarce resources governments can muster to this end. 
4. Creating a public institution (‘bad bank’) to deal with dubious loans and encour-
13.Piatkowski (2009) presents data on non-financial corporate leverage in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland
and shows that it is lower in these countries than in other emerging economies before, during, and after the lat-
ter went through a balance-of-payments crisis. This ratio is also lower than in Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain.
14.Whether or not to devalue is a complex issue and its various aspects are discussed primarily in Chapter 3 of this
report. We just mention here that a key risk of devaluation to financial stability in a highly euro-ised country is
that foreign banks may decide to withdraw from these countries in the face of a large number of simultaneous
defaults, which would further undermine financial stability and economic recovery.96
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aging banks to sell their dubious loans to this institution. Some countries have
used such schemes successfully, eg Sweden in the early 1990s and Ireland,
which has set up such an institution in response to the current crisis. But clean-
ing up banks would not automatically raise their propensity to lend, and it is not
clear that such institutions could be set up at host-country level. 
The EU can support these actions by taking a lead in giving technical advice to CESEE
governments, and through the use of EU Structural and Cohesion funds to bolster
economic growth and crowd in commercial lending. 
4.4.2 Crisis resolution
Because CESEE financial markets are dominated by foreign groups, the home-coun-
try authorities must work very closely with host-country authorities should a case of
bank distress arise. 
It would be important for governors of the central banks (representing the main reg-
ulatory/supervisory bodies) in the region to keep in close contact and coordinate
their measures. To this end, it would be useful to set up a Financial Stability Initiative
(FSI), which should focus on the systemic problems of the non-euro area countries
and report back to the ESRB and the EFC of the Council. Such a body would have to
rely on close cooperation among supervisors and central banks in the region and
would broaden the concerns that have motivated the establishment of the Vienna
Initiative. In fact, the de Larosiere report (2009) recommends that unforeseen
events should prompt the ‘Authorities’ to create and lead groups of national supervi-
sors, which should tackle any issues arising. When arguing in favour of creating such
groups, the de Larosiere report refers, in particular, to ‘bankruptcy of a third country
systemic group’ (p54).
The proposals on levying a tax on banks and creating an Insurance Fund
15would help
deal with the case of distressed banks.
However, to the extent that the banks are ‘too big to save’
16, an EU wide debt-resolu-
tion authority would prove useful and could be set up in this time of financial crisis.
Liquidity challenges can be and have been addressed by the ECB, but there is a need
15.The setting up of an Insurance Fund is a German government idea.
16.As against the better known ‘too big to fail’, ‘too big to save’ is a term used by Gros and Micossi (2008) to describe
oversized financial institutions which endanger the viability of public finances.97
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for an institution to deal with solvency problems should they arise. It may prove dif-
ficult to do this because of the close connection between debt resolution and fiscal
costs and fiscal sharing constraints in the EU. An instrument to deal with debt resolu-
tion problems in the banking sector is badly needed. The aim would be to clean up the
banks’ balance-sheets in order to support the process of deleveraging and also
improve conditions for the resumption of credits.
In addition to the debt-resolution facility, the issue of systemic risks has to be
addressed (see the detailed proposal in Weder di Mauro, 2010). To the extent that
this is an externality which is larger the more leveraged the banks are, there is a case
for regulation that would condition the leverage requirements on the size of a bank.
In addition, added insurance on lending activities of big and multinational banks
could be considered. These instruments are different from the proposed tax on bank-
ing activities, which addresses the risk-taking behaviour of the banks, but not the
issue of systemic risk and of the pro-cyclical behaviour of the leverage ratio. 
4.4.3 Access to liquidity and solvency problems
There are several ways of improving access to liquidity and mitigating solvency
threats at a supra-national level. Remedies such as those listed below were imple-
mented during the crisis.
• Rules on convergence of deposit guarantees, which should prevent ‘beggar-thy-
neighbour’ policies;
• Medium-term financial facilities (IMF resources were tripled from US$ 250 billion
to US$ 750 billion, and the EU’s medium-term financial facility was also upgraded
from €12 billion to €50 billion);
• Other IFI credit lines and investments.
Two avenues to improve the EU’s support to CESEE deserve discussion:
• Swap-lines between the ECB and central banks of non-euro area countries;
• A broadening of the ECB range of accepted collateral to national currency-denom-
inated bonds issued by non-euro area CESEE countries. 
These two measures, which would have helped to ward off euro liquidity shortages,
were considered but not implemented
17at the height of the crisis. They should, if con-
ditions require them again, apply at least to EU members, but the ECB may also con-
sider EU candidate and potential candidate countries – with appropriate provisions to98
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risk considerations, of course
18.
Finally, although increased capital requirements are necessary, an immediate imple-
mentation of Basel III would be counterproductive at a time when economies are still
fighting to get out of recession and credit markets are functioning very precariously.
The phasing-in of Basel III should rather be gradual. 
4.4.4 Preventing future credit booms
The crisis has highlighted the necessity of limiting unhealthy credit booms. There are
various tools to mitigate such booms, and discussion about their efficiency and
effectiveness is part of the international agenda. The most frequently considered
instruments are:
• Counter-cyclical capital and reserve requirements;
• Dynamic provisioning against expected losses;
• Limits on leverage and maturity mismatches;
• Discretionary macro-prudential measures under the guidance of newly created
macro-prudential supervision bodies such as the European ESRB. 
The difficulty for CESEE countries is that this toolkit mostly applies to countries
where credit is in the hands of national banks or autonomous local subsidiaries of
foreign banks. It is not likely to be effective in countries where credit is mostly in the
hands of foreign bank branches, or lending can be outsourced to foreign entities of
the banking group (ie the parent bank or a subsidiary in another country). In such
cases it is illusory to try to limit credit creation by regulating parent banks, because
their behaviour may endanger financial stability in the host country without creating
problems for their own solvency. Coordination among supervisors can be a response,
but calling for coordination is no solution when participating institutions have differ-
ent, possibly conflicting, mandates and incentives.
Structural measures to improve the monitoring of financial stability in host countries
include:
17.Foreign exchange swaps should not be confused with the repo facility offered to Hungary and Poland. Under these
agreements the two CEE central banks could receive temporary euro liquidity in exchange for securities eligible
for ECB transactions, such as euro-denominated government bonds issued in the euro area.
18.The evolving ECB collateral and open-market operations policies in the wake of the Greek crisis might provide an
opportunity to extend ECB’s responsibility to the CESEE region too.99
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• Turning foreign bank branches into fully-fledged subsidiaries;
• ‘Foreign-owned subsidiaries should be subject to the same capital requirement
calculations, and hold that in domestic assets, as its own domestic banks’
19;
• Imposing restrictions on the setting-up of new bank subsidiaries in certain
areas
20.
The outsourcing of lending to foreign entities of a banking group diminishes the effec-
tiveness of regulation. Therefore, a range of additional means have to be considered
both at the national and EU levels.
At the national level: 
• Tax policy should be actively used (eg making interest payments non tax-
deductible and removing other tax incentives to the housing sector where they
exist; introducing or increasing property taxes). 
• Measures to encourage domestic saving should be put in place, such as schemes,
perhaps with tax incentives, to promote long-term saving. This would also
improve the loan/deposit ratio and thereby limit the potential for unhealthy cred-
it booms to develop.
At the EU level:
• Use the college of supervisors in order to arrive at  a common understanding with
the home country supervisors regarding the proper conduct of foreign banks’
external lending operations. This understanding should be made easier in view of
the common interest that both home- and host-country supervisors should have
in mitigating systemic risks (provided they perceive it similarly); 
• The home- and host-country supervisors should compare the exposure of various
banking groups towards a host country as it is illustrated by their consolidated
balance-sheets as against those of the subsidiaries in the host country; they
should also assess the attempts to optimise the use of liquidity on a regional
basis, which may harm local currencies; 
• The ESRB and the EFC should address this issue and ask the home-country super-
visor to ‘internalise’ in its policy requirements the host country’s risk judgment
and concerns regarding the expansion of credit and the ‘optimisation’ of the use
19.Brunnermeier et al (2009), p65.
20.‘The EU home country authorities should limit the acquisition of subsidiaries in other countries, where appropri-
ate’, EFC (2009) p14.100
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of excess liquidity; 
• Systemically important groups are to be monitored in the EU. In CESEE countries
the domination of local financial markets by foreign groups is so overwhelming
that the criteria that define what is ‘systemically important’ has to be judged
accordingly; interconnectedness should be judged not only on a global basis, but
also cross-nationally and regionally. Arguably, the ECB (ESRB), the EC and the
Council (through the EFC) should replicate a ‘list’ for the regionally systemically
important players including banks headquartered in most home countries listed
in Table 4.2.
For EU members, the risk of destabilising capital inflows leading to credit bubbles has
to be addressed through other means. These may include action to reduce the
BOX 4.1: CAPITAL CONTROLS
Capital controls are tools that can be used to moderate extensive credit growth.
Capital controls have been used more frequently since the Asian crisis and are
increasingly considered relevant. There are also studies (eg Ostry et al, 2010) that
show that capital controls, if used smartly, can help macroeconomic policy in
small open economies, as financial markets can be inherently unstable. Thus, con-
trary to the common perception that capital controls can be easily evaded, they do
affect the cross-market premium in a sustainable way (see Yeyati et al, 2008, and
Rodrik, 2009).
EU member CESEE countries cannot rely on capital controls because the single
market prohibits such measures. But in CESEE countries currently outside the EU,
capital controls could be considered, and are indeed used, though to a more limit-
ed extent in candidate and potential candidate countries because of the associa-
tion agreements that require phasing in of capital account liberalisation.
The capital controls that are now being proposed are more in the spirit of ‘macro-
prudential regulation, to be taken in response to capital flow surges that have the
potential to create bubbles in asset prices, including exchange rates’
(Subramanian, 2009). Such measures would therefore be taken during an
upswing in the cycle and not at all times. They may also be applied in coordination,
by several emerging economies, which may be flooded by short-term capital
inflows at the same time. Some CESEE countries may face such a situation in a few
years’ time and a coordinated response would be appropriate.101
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demand for credit. Regulatory and tax instruments can for example be used to tame
mortgage-credit demand when deemed excessive from a macro-prudential point of
view.
Finally, the issue of the denomination of lending, ie whether in domestic or foreign
currency, also deserves important consideration. Foreign-currency lending has
always been a key source of financial instability in emerging countries. It creates two
main risks:
1. Balance-sheet problems for un-hedged borrowers in the wake of a severe
exchange-rate depreciation and consequent losses for banks; 
2. Funding problems for banks: banks may borrow short-term in the wholesale mar-
ket and lend to borrowers long-term, and market dysfunction may complicate
banks’ liquidity management. 
The first risk is greater in countries with fixed exchange rates. Sharp devaluations
would lead to balance-sheet problems across the board, as in any balance of pay-
ments crisis. Debt restructuring may be needed. The more gradual introduction of
flexibility in the foreign-exchange market would lead to easier balance-sheet adjust-
ments together with an improvement in the current account. Most CESEE countries
have sufficient reserves to support gradual correction of the exchange rate. In the
process, risks could be diversified and hedged. That may lead to an increase in the
use of domestic currency and to a gradual reduction of currency substitution. 
However, the need to reduce currency substitution must be assessed considering
the specific features of CESEE countries, which differentiate them from, for example,
Asian and Latin American countries. First, since new EU member states are obliged to
introduce the euro, a very strict regulation or a ban a few years before joining the sin-
gle currency may not be sensible. This argument has lesser validity in EU aspirant
countries. Second, as we have argued in earlier chapters, a substantial real deprecia-
tion, such as that which followed, for example, the Asian and Latin American crises in
the late 1990s and early 2000s, is unlikely in CESEE countries. Hence, the currency
risk would be more related to exchange-rate fluctuations than to collapses, especial-
ly in floating exchange-rate countries. Exchange-rate fluctuations meanwhile primari-
ly impact monthly debt-service costs, while the revaluation of the loan is less of a con-
cern if and when the fluctuation is temporary and the loan/collateral ratio does not
breach the bank’s tolerance limit (which can be mitigated by properly limiting the initial
loan/collateral ratio). The key risk factor for a domestic borrower is unemployment,
which in any case reduces the ability to service any debt, not just foreign-currency102
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debts. Third, domestic-currency borrowing also carries an interest-rate risk. Fourth,
these countries have been catch-up countries and are also supposed to catch up in
the future (albeit at a slower rate). Catching up implies real exchange rate apprecia-
tion against the euro. Borrowing in euro allows domestic citizens and firms to reap
the benefit of real exchange rate appreciation. An overly strict regulation on euro bor-
rowing would prevent this.
The second risk could be handled by swap agreements between central banks (in
particular, between the ECB and regional central banks as discussed in section
4.4.3). Subsidiaries and branches of foreign banks are also likely to receive liquidity
from their parent banks.
Having said that, the conditions for fostering local currency denominated credits are
to be improved, and measures to contain inflation and to increase the credibility of
domestic policymaking – thereby reducing important elements of the risk premium
– are essential
21. Foreign-currency borrowing should be properly regulated, at least
in order to make sure that borrowers are conscious of the risk taken. It should be
actively discouraged whenever it reaches a level that represents a significant macro-
economic risk. 
4.5 Summary
The financial crisis has put financial stability at the centre of the public-policy agen-
da in Europe and the US. In most CESEE countries concern about stability has been
reinforced by the sudden stop of capital inflows, the consequent adjustment neces-
sitated by large, pre-crisis current-account imbalances, the dramatic fall in output in
the wake of the crisis, contagion effects and, not least, the speed at which these
effects occurred. Currency risk, liquidity and even solvency risks have become major
concerns for policymakers and, in some cases, substantial assistance from IFIs and
sui generis market coordination devices (such as the Vienna Initiative) have been
sought. The worst of the crisis has, quite likely, passed. But the road ahead looks
rocky because of the anticipated feeble economic recovery, quasi-stagnation of lend-
ing, the repairs that remain to be done to banks’ balance-sheets (including delever-
aging), and uncertainties surrounding the final shape of regulation and supervision
in the EU, though there are major differences between the economies in the spotlight.
21. The main motivation behind foreign-currency borrowing, from the side of borrowers, is higher domestic interest
rates that typically arise due to high and volatile inflation and related uncertainties, including country-risk pre-
mia resulting from low credibility.103
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This chapter attempted to map guidelines for policies to deal with financial markets
and to smooth the path towards stability.
Macroeconomic policy has a key role to play, as the track-record of some central
European economies shows. Solvency problems and access to liquidity can be eased
by a range of tools, which include extending the ECB's facilities in the region, credit
enhancement and a not-too-abrupt implementation of a revised Basel agreement on
capital requirements. The financial crisis has exposed the tense relationship between
home- and host-country regulators and supervisors in a Europe in which cross-border
operations are substantial. Crisis resolution and burden-sharing arrangements are
therefore essential. Informal and formal instruments for improving this relationship
need to be developed. The ESRB and the EFC of the EC can help in this regard.
Likewise, the idea of taxing banks as a way to diminish moral hazard and create
resources for dealing with distress cases is commendable. 
A serious short- and medium-run issue that several CESEE countries face is that
some banks may become ‘zombies’ and, by credit rationing, prevent economic recov-
ery. As most banks generally do not seem to need government support, domestic pol-
icymakers can do little to enhance credit resumption via regulatory means. They cer-
tainly should improve macro-economic policies to enhance credibility; could devalue
in fixed exchange-rate countries; could foster credit through public banks or through
domestic development banks; or could create public institutions to buy dis-
tressed/rescheduled loans from banks in order to help clean up their balance-sheets.
However, most of these options come with drawbacks.
In a few countries, limiting an unhealthy expansion of credit may again be a concern
once economies recover. This problem can be addressed using regulatory instru-
ments such as: counter-cyclical capital and reserve requirements, dynamic provi-
sioning against expected losses, stricter limits on leverage, maturity mismatches
and speed of lending, and proper regulations to limit foreign currency denominated
lending. When there is significant ‘outsourcing’ of lending it is essential that host-
countries cooperate with home-country regulators and supervisors so that excessive
indebtedness is avoided. EU-level colleges of supervisors can help in this respect, as
can the ESRC and the three new market authorities (which are to be set up in 2011),
and the EFC. While capital controls are prohibited in the EU, they represent an option
for candidate countries.
CESEE countries also stand to benefit from the badly needed radical reform of the reg-
ulation and supervision of financial markets, for which the Turner Report in the UK,104
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the de Larosiere report in the EU, reports of the EP, and the Volcker proposals in the
US, for example, provide a lot of analytical and prestige-based power. The reforms
should cover a broadening of regulation and supervision to all financial entities, lim-
its on leverage, standardisation and exchange-house trading of derivatives, avoid-
ance of pro-cyclicality via capital requirements, discouraging regulatory arbitrage,
dealing with the too-big-to-fail syndrome and systemically important institutions,
and the correcting of incentives and reduction of conflicts of interests.5. Budgetary policy and the
sustainability of public
finances
5.1 Introduction
In most of the countries this report focuses on, budgetary policy was not at the fore-
front of the policy debate until worries about sovereign debt started to develop in the
wake of the Greek crisis. There were certainly exceptions – notably Hungary – but pri-
vate-credit growth and exchange-rate issues examined elsewhere in this report were
considered more pressing, and rightly so. The policy landscape has however changed
as a consequence of the rise of public deficits and public-debt ratios and with the
widening of sovereign spreads since the collapse of Lehman Brothers. This only adds
to the need for a serious discussion of the public-finance constraints the CESEE coun-
tries are now facing.
What are the characteristics and constraints of fiscal policies in CESEE countries?
What, if anything, ought the EU to do? And what can it do? In the following, we start
by addressing the sustainability issue. We then take up the ability to tax and the sta-
bility of tax revenues. Finally, we discuss the policy space and the role of rules. The
overall argument we make is as follows.
Fiscal constraints can be lax in catch-up economies which are financially integrated
with advanced economies’ capital markets, but over the last decade most countries
considered here have not abused this situation. However, lasting effects of the crisis
on tax revenues are potentially significant and fiscal risks are significant also.
Sustainability and structural balances will not be threatened if the non-cyclical-non-
interest expenditure/GDP ratio is restored and the return to potential growth rates is
achieved in the medium run. But the budgetary challenge may become significant if
growth disappoints or restoration of the expenditure/GDP proves unsuccessful. Given the sustainability and risk arguments and the empirical evidence, three policy
recommendations can be drawn.
• First, fiscal rules for converging economies need to focus on sustainability, rather
than on the straightforward application of the Maastricht and the Stability and
Growth Pact criteria; 
• Second, counter-cyclical policy should be implemented around the debt-stabilis-
ing fiscal deficit with a view to reaching the target public-debt ratio (which may be
different for different countries);
• Third, the pricing of fiscal risks should be encouraged by the EU with a view to
making counter-cyclical fiscal policy possible.
5.2 The crisis and fiscal balances: some comparisons
At the peak of the financial crisis and again in spring 2010, some CESEE countries,
especially Hungary, faced problems with placing government bonds. Hungary and
some other countries had to turn to the IMF and the EU for financial and policy sup-
port. Acute fiscal problems have for the most part proved to be short lived but the
issue of sustainability has remained – in part because of the fall in public revenues
owing to a sharp fall in output in most countries, and in part because of a sharp
increase in fiscal risk as a result of exchange-rate movements and rising problems
with the financing of private debt. All of that has prompted a discussion of the
urgency of fiscal consolidation and of the need to reform the public sector and
improve the system of taxation. The argument for urgency depends in part on the
assessment of the sustainability of public finances. The other arguments for urgency
depend on the contribution of public-sector reforms and of the taxation system to the
sustainability of public finances.
In order to address some of these issues, it makes sense to look at the fiscal record
of the CESEE countries with a view to answering the following questions:
• Were they unsustainable prior to the crisis?
• How stable are the revenues or how strong is the ability to tax?
• What is the impact of the crisis on structural fiscal balances?
Before answering these questions, it may be useful to compare the fiscal problems of
transition countries with those that are emerging in some of the countries in the euro
area
1. This is necessary anyway in order to assess the internal consistency and via-
bility of the institutional and policy framework for monetary and fiscal governance in
106
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Greece, Bulgaria and Hungary are admittedly outliers prior to the crisis, though in dif-
ferent ways, but they illustrate the principles that need to be understood in order to
see what sustainability of fiscal balances means in the euro area or in the wider mon-
etary area closely integrated with the euro. 
In the case of Greece (Figure 5.1), it is easy to see the advantage of euro accession
2.
Nominal GDP growth remained relatively stable until the recent crisis, but the interest
rate on public debt (the so-called implicit interest rate, which is the actual interest
paid divided by public debt) declined in order to converge to the euro-area interest
rate. This changed the entire dynamics of public debt and led to a stabilisation of the
debt-to-GDP ratio, though Greece did continue to run significant fiscal deficits
3. The
public-finance benefits of joining the euro were entirely passed on to taxpayers, con-
sumers of public services, and public employees, instead of being used to reduce the
debt ratio. When the crisis hit, the debt ratio started to rise again.
Bulgaria was a very different case (Figure 5.2). After price stabilisation and the intro-
duction of the currency board based on the euro, the interest rate on public debt
declined to a level that was similar to that in Greece. However, Bulgaria adopted a pol-
icy of fiscal balance which led to a steady decline of its public debt to GDP ratio.
Indeed, in the years with exceptionally high growth rates of GDP, Bulgaria ran fiscal
surpluses.
The Hungarian case illustrates the temptation to misuse the relaxation of the budget
constraint. The country experienced some drop in the interest rate on public debt and
for several years the implicit interest rate remained at the level of the growth rate of
GDP. This created the temptation to run primary fiscal deficits (Figure 5.3). Poland at
times ran a similar policy.
The risks of such policies became apparent with the advent of shocks to the growth
rate and to the interest rate spreads. It is, however, not easy to determine what are
the prudent levels of public debt and fiscal deficit in view of possible growth and
financial shocks. This is because the appropriate level of debt and sovereign solven-
cy respectively depend on the creditors’ willingness to lend and on the citizens’ abil-
ity and willingness to pay – which determine the stability of public revenues
4. Indeed,
107
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1. For a useful treatment see European Commission (2009c) and CESifo (2010).
2. All data is from DG ECFIN, General Government Data, Spring 2010.
3. Forecasts are from DG ECFIN.1
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Figure 5.1: Public debt, nominal growth and nominal interest rates, Greece
Source for all figures: DGECFIN, General Government Data, Spring 2010.
Figure 5.2: Public debt, nominal growth and nominal interest rates, Bulgaria
Figure 5.3: Public debt, nominal growth and nominal interest rates, Hungarysome recent sovereign defaults occurred at reasonably low levels of debt. For exam-
ple, among recent cases of government default, the public debt-to-GDP ratio in the
year before the government default was 37 percent in Ukraine, 45 percent in
Argentina, 54 percent in the Russian Federation and 66 percent in Ecuador
(Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer, 2006).
5.3 Sustainability, level of public debt, and pro-cyclical policies
It is well-known that a country can stabilise its debt-to-GDP ratios at any level by not
running primary fiscal deficits as a percentage of GDP that are higher than the differ-
ence between the real interest rate and the growth rate, times the debt ratio.  This
relationship comes from the following elementary debt-dynamics equation:
(Dt/Yt)-(Dt-1/Yt-1) = (PDt/Yt))+{(Dt-1/Yt-1)*[(it-yt)/(1+yt)]}+SFt (1)
where Y is GDP at current prices, D is general government debt, PD is primary
deficit, iis the implicit nominal interest rate (actual interest paid divided by the stock
of debt), y is the nominal GDP growth rate, SF is the stock-flow adjustment and t
stands for time
5. Therefore, the change in the debt-to-GDP ratio depends on the pri-
mary deficit, PD, on the so-called snowball effect, the second term on the right-hand
side (Dt-1/Yt-1)*[(it-yt)/(1+yt)], and on the stock-flow adjustment, SF, which basi-
cally captures the various factors that influence changes in the valuation of the stock
of debt. These three factors contribute to the evolution of the public debt-to-GDP ratio
– a negative contribution meaning a contribution to a decline, and a positive one a
contribution to an increase
6.
If the stock-flow adjustment is put aside, the debt-to-GDP ratio does not change if the
primary deficit and snowball effects cancel out.
PDt/Yt = (Dt-1/Yt-1)*[(it-yt)/(1+yt.)] (2)
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4. On this issue it is still useful to consult Milesi-Ferretti and Razin (1996); see also Blanchard (1990) and Fedelino,
Ivanova and Horton (2009).
5. The stock-flow adjustment variable is added to the accounting equation to account for statistical discrepancies,
including those arising from the existence of government financial assets or from revaluation effects when some
of the debt is in foreign currency and the exchange-rate changes. An implicit assumption in equation (2) is that
they are nil. This variable also provides a consistency check that helps to spot creative accounting practices. For
some data see European Commission (2009c).
6. For more see wiiw and CEPS (2009), and also the European Economic Forecast Autumn 2009 and Baunsgaard
and Symansky (2009).If the interest rate on debt is lower than the growth rate of GDP, the country can run a
primary deficit while keeping its debt ratio constant. If the interest rate is higher than
the growth rate, a primary surplus will be needed to stabilise the debt-to-GDP ratio. 
Most of the CESEE countries have run budget deficits, but until 2007 their public
debt-to-GDP ratios were stable or declining (see Figure 5.4.). The reason is easy to
see: the cost of debt was more than offset by growth.
The onset of the crisis in 2008 and its twin effects on growth and budgetary deficits
changed the equation dramatically. All countries have experienced a rise in the debt
ratio, sometimes dramatically. 
Before drawing conclusions it is useful to compare developments in the CESEE region
to developments in other emerging market regions (Figure 5.5) in the euro area
(Figure 5.6). Other emerging countries had similar developments to CESEE: the inter-
est rate was well below the growth rate in most years. Among the euro-area countries,
in all the countries surveyed but Greece, Ireland and partly Spain, the interest rate
throughout the euro membership period has in fact been above the growth rate or at
a similar level, implying that primary surpluses were required to keep the debt ratio
constant or to allow it to decline.
Based on the record so far, within the wider euro area (consisting of countries that
are members of the euro and countries whose exchange rate is pegged to the euro)
the benchmark interest rate on sovereign debt (ignoring country-specific risk pre-
mia) can be expected to be above the growth rate in developed countries, but below
in the less-developed countries of the CESEE region - provided they continue to expe-
rience catching-up. This, of course, is potentially a condition for bubbles to develop
(the No-Ponzi Game condition in the usual sense is not binding)
7 and could induce
these countries to run high fiscal deficits. 
What do we find their fiscal policies have in fact been? Prior to the crisis most CESEE
countries experienced fiscal deficits, even when their growth rates were high and
most probably above potential, but those deficits were not high enough to result in
rising public debt. On the contrary debt ratios were at very low levels in all countries
but Hungary and to a certain extent Poland. Hungary especially was a clear outlier, as
it had an increasing public debt-to-GDP ratio until it had to embark on consolidation
after the parliamentary election of 2006, an attempt made even more important by
110
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7. For some generalisations, see Blanchard and Weil (2001).111
WHITHER GROWTH IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE?
Figure 5.4: Public debt, nominal growth and nominal interest rates (CESEE)
Source: Eurostat, European Commission, DG ECFIN, Spring 2010 and IMF World Economic Outlook April
2010 database. Note: implicit nominal interest rate and nominal GDP growth rate are shown on the left
scale; gross public debt/GDP is shown on the right scale.
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Figure 5.4, continued
Nominal interest rate Nominal GDP growth Gross debt to GDP
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Figure 5.5: Public debt, growth and interest rates (other emerging countries)
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook April 2010 database. Note: Latam-6 is the average of Latam-8 coun-
tries (see Box 1.1) except Peru and Uruguay. Note: implicit nominal interest rate and nominal GDP
growth rate are shown on the left scale; gross public debt/GDP is shown on the right scale. 
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Figure 5.6: Public debt, nominal growth and nominal interest rates (euro-area
countries)
Source: Eurostat, European Commission, DG: ECFIN, Spring 2010. Note: implicit nominal interest rate and
nominal GDP growth rate are shown on the left scale; gross public debt/GDP is shown on the right scale.
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Greeceits IMF/EU adjustment programme in late 2008.  
It may be concluded from the above that the fiscal experience of most of the coun-
tries in central, eastern and south-eastern Europe has been characterised by stable
or declining public debt-to-GDP ratios, but only in some cases by counter-cyclical poli-
cies in the usual sense, ie only few countries ran fiscal surpluses in the periods when
they experienced above-potential growth performance
8.
Summing up, most countries did not succumb to the temptation of fiscal irresponsi-
bility in spite of the laxity of the fiscal constraint they were facing.
5.4 Structural balance: revenues and expenditures
In order to be able to assess the possible impact of the crisis on structural balances,
it is worth taking a look at revenue and expenditure developments in relation to GDP
(Figures 5.7 and 5.8). In CESEE countries public expenditures are certainly high, on
average around 40 percent of GDP, but revenues are high too.  In Latam-6 the expen-
diture/GDP ratio is around 30 percent, while in Asia-6 it is only around 20 percent. The
CESEE expenditure ratios are therefore closer to the EU15 values which were, on
average, around 45 percent of GDP before the crisis.
While there is a differentiation across CESEE countries (Figure 5.8), most of them
have been able to collect around 40 percent (and not less than 30 percent) of GDP in
taxes and contributions
9. Therefore, public revenues have proved to be quite stable,
though tax systems can certainly be improved. 
There is an argument to be made from Wagner’s Law that current levels of public
expenditure are too high given these countries’ level of development. This, however,
needs to be controlled for the difference in demography. These countries have the
demographic characteristics of much more developed nations, so their social obliga-
tions and thus social-security systems inevitably differ from other countries at a sim-
ilar level of development but with much younger populations
10.
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8. The results of vector-autoregression estimates by Darvas (2010a) show that most CESEE countries followed pro-
cyclical fiscal policies before the crisis.
9. Other revenues tend to be small, except for transfers from EU funds.
10.This is an argument to explain the relatively high levels of social-security spending in CESEE economies. It is not
an argument in favour of high public-debt development as this requires an analysis of provision to be made to
deal with ageing patterns into the future. 115
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6Considering the impact of the crisis, we can observe increases in the expendi-
ture/GDP ratios in all regions: about two, three, four and six percentage points of GDP
in Asia-6, Latam-6, CESEE-17 and EU15, respectively (Figure 5.7). However, the
assessment of these increases needs to consider growth development and policies
implemented. The CESEE region is unique: it experienced the most dramatic output
fall and with a few exceptions countries in the region embarked on fiscal consolida-
tion. In the other three regions GDP developments were more favourable (smaller fall
in EU15, no fall in Asia-6 and Latam-6 in 2009) and almost all countries of these
three regions let automatic stabilisers operate and even implemented discretionary
fiscal stimulus. 
On the other hand, revenue/GDP ratios have not been impacted much by the crisis:
this ratio, on average, remained almost constant in CESEE countries (and also in the
other three regions). This is not surprising, since most revenues come from the taxa-
tion of income and consumption, which broadly move together with GDP develop-
ments (even though the elasticities of various revenue components to GDP growth
may be somewhat different). 
Unfortunately the pre-crisis period does not tell us what to expect after the current
crisis for two reasons. First, during the period shown there have not been severe
shocks to public revenues. It was only in Macedonia that real GDP fell (in 2001), but
none of the other countries experienced a recession during this period. There was a
growth deceleration in the early 2000s in Poland and the Czech Republic, but real
growth was still positive at two percent per year. When growth accelerated, fiscal
deficits were reversed. But in the current crisis most CESEE faced deep recession and
even nominal GDP has also declined in most countries. 
Second, the historical developments in the ratio to GDP of the main fiscal aggregates
also depended on the policy response. However, if fiscal policy played a role in adjust-
ments, it indicates that these countries have the ability to alter fiscal policy when
needed. The current crisis provides ample examples to support this point. Most
CESEE countries were able to implement significant fiscal consolidation at the time of
a deep recession. Table 5.1 shows that while expenditures increased by 19.2 percent
in CESEE-17 in 2008, in 2009 the nominal growth was just half of one percent, which
implied a 2.6 percent decline in the real value of expenditure. There were only five
CESEE countries in which real government expenditure grew in 2009: Czech Republic
(3.6 percent), Poland (5.2 percent), Slovenia (6.3 percent), Slovakia (6.5 percent)
and Albania (7.0 percent). In all other countries real, but also in general nominal,
expenditure has fallen. The most dramatic adjustment was implemented in Latvia,
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)where nominal expenditure fell by 17.0 percent in 2009 (19.6 percent fall in real
terms). Yet such a drastic fiscal adjustment could not prevent the expenditure/GDP
ratio from rising - from about 35 percent of GDP to 45 percent (Figure 5.8). In con-
trast to CESEE developments, in Asia-6 and Latam-8 the slowdown in real expendi-
ture growth was moderate and in the EU15 real expenditure growth even accelerated
in 2009 due to the work of automatic stabilisers and discretionary fiscal stimulus.
Looking forward, we can clearly conclude that the ability to tax has not been dimin-
ished, thus the elasticity of public revenue can be taken to remain unaffected. The
assessment of the increase in the expenditure/GDPratio as a consequence of the cri-
sis primarily depends on future development of GDP. There are three main cases.
• The recent economic downturn is purely cyclical and GDP will return to the pre-cri-
sis trendline; ie neither the long-run level nor the growth rate of potential output
is affected;
• Part of the recent economic downturn in permanent, but the potential growth rate
is unaffected; ie GDP will not return to the pre-crisis trendline but it will develop at
a permanently lower level, at the same speed as before;
• Part of the recent economic downturn in permanent and the potential growth rate
is also reduced.
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Table 5.1: Average annual changes in total general government expenditure
Nominal percentage change Real percentage change
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
CESEE-17 14.3 16.9 19.2 0.5 3.9 9 11.3 9.2 -2.6 1.8
EU15 4.2 5.1 6.3 5.4 1.8 1.9 2.9 2.8 4.8 0.6
Asia-6 10.1 11.2 14.2 6.9 4.7 4.6 8 7.3 5.3 1.4
Latam-8 15.6 16.6 20.8 13 10.1 9.9 11.1 12.7 8 5.2
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook Database, April 2010.In the first case no fiscal consolidation is needed: the rise in expenditures/GDP ratio
will be restored when GDP returns to the pre-crisis trendline; just the debt/GDP ratio
is increased. In the second case efforts may be needed, while in the third case efforts
are surely needed to restore the expenditures/GDP ratio. We shall elaborate upon
these issues later with the help of some stylised numerical simulations.
Against this background, the key policy questions are:
1. Which of the three possible paths described above GDP will follow;
2. If there is a risk that debt will reach alarming levels; and 
3. If the interest rate-growth rate nexus that contributed to making macroeconomic
conditions conducive to the sustainability of public finances is likely to be signif-
icantly altered in the medium run. 
The answer to the first question is uncertain for the CESEE countries, as it is for west-
ern European countries. CESEE countries (with a few exceptions) suffered from a
more severe shock and their recovery is also slower than in other emerging countries
worldwide (see chapter 1). We have noted in the previous chapters that the crisis
could have a lasting impact on growth models, especially among the less-developed
countries of the Baltics and the Balkans, where the adjustment of private-sector vul-
nerabilities will take a long time. This suggests that the third GDP scenario (reduced
level and growth rate) may apply for a significant group of CESEE countries.
The second question is easier to answer. As the recession hits, there is no doubt that
the crisis will result in a stepwise increase of the public debt-to-GDP ratios, but as ini-
tial levels are generally low, this shock effect should not by itself result in threats to
sustainability, though there is no easy way to ascertain whether the public debt-to-
GDP ratio is too high for fiscal policy to be sustainable. 
Much depends on private debt developments. For example, seven of the eight coun-
tries in the broader CESEE region that had to turn to the IMF for financial assistance
in 2008-2009 had very low levels of public debt. In 2007, ie the year before the cri-
sis, their debt/GDP ratios ranged from nine percent in Latvia to 34 percent in Serbia.
The eighth country, Hungary, had a ratio of 66 percent, which was also not too high.
The main reason why these countries were unable to secure financing of their budg-
et deficit was not the level of government debt but the risks inherent in their private
debt. We shall elaborate upon these issues in more detail in section 5.5.
The most difficult question is the third one. The need to adjust the primary sur-
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rate and in the success in bringing back the expenditure/GDP ratio to its pre-crisis
level. If the growth rate or the interest rate have changed permanently, or part of the
increase in the expenditure/GDP ratio is permanent because of the permanently
reduced output level, fiscal adjustment may be necessary
11.
Figure 5.9 provides an illustration of a variety of debt dynamics for an economy
whose debt ratio was initially stable at 40 percent of GDP. Three scenarios are depict-
ed where we assume – common to all three scenarios and relative to the pre-crisis
growth path – an initial output shock of 10 percent of GDP, which produces an output
gap of five percent in the year of the crisis (assuming that pre-crisis the output gap
was zero). In the crisis year we can see in all the three scenarios a deterioration of
the primary deficit (the underlying assumptions are an increase in cyclical expendi-
ture-to-GDP of 20 percent of the output gap and constant public revenues-to-GDP)
and consequently a jump in the debt-to-GDP ratio (as GDP falls and the primary
deficit increases).
The three scenarios illustrate the issue of debt sustainability. Scenario 1 depicts a
situation in which the pre-crisis (potential) growth rate-interest rate differential (of
two percentage points: five percent output growth, three percent interest rate) is re-
established after the crisis year and furthermore the output gap is eliminated over a
five-year period so that actual output growth exceeds potential output growth over
this period. Once recovery sets in non-interest-non-cyclical expenditure is frozen
until the non-interest-non-cyclical expenditure-to- GDP ratio reverts to the pre-crisis
level (the revenue-to-GDP ratio was assumed to remain constant throughout). We
can see that in this scenario the economy moves onto a higher debt-to-GDP growth
path which can persist for a long time, but sustainability is not in danger. If, however,
persistent changes in the structural deficit occurred during the crisis these would
have to be corrected. 
Scenarios 2a and 2b, on the other hand, show the situation in which the pre-crisis
growth-interest rate differential gets squeezed significantly (from two percentage
points to just 0.5 of a percentage point: 3.5 percent output growth, three percent
interest rate). In scenario 2a it is assumed that the economy reverts to pre-crisis
ratios of non-cyclical-non interest rate expenditure to GDP and – in line with scenario
1 – also keeps the revenue-to-GDP ratio constant. This amounts to maintaining the
same primary structural deficit ratio as before the crisis and it leads to non-sustain-
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11.See Barro (1979). For qualifications see Chari and Kehoe (1999).ability of the public-debt situation. In this case an adjustment in the non-cyclical pri-
mary deficit is required to achieve fiscal sustainability. In the illustrated case (see
scenario 2b) it requires an adjustment of the long-run primary deficit of 0.5 percent
of GDP.
The above scenarios demonstrate that the crucial issues regarding debt sustainabil-
ity are if:
• There has been a long-run squeeze in the growth rate-to-interest rate differential;
this is a case which we have argued in this report is likely to happen in Europe’s
catch-up economies due to somewhat reduced longer-term growth prospects
(see chapter 2)
12;
• The economies before the crisis had stable or declining debt-to-GDP ratios which
indicates whether fiscal policy fully exploited the growth-to-interest differential
and they built up some room for manoeuvre. This also determines whether there
is greater or lesser need for fiscal consolidation (ie adjustment in non-cyclical
expenditure or revenue-to-GDP ratios);
• The crisis-induced permanent changes in public spending to GDP
13. In this case,
fiscal adjustment might again be required even if the longer-run growth rate-inter-
est rate differential might not have declined.
What the above discussion and illustrations underline is that the major issue for the
CESEE countries is whether the crisis will permanently affect the output level and the
growth performance and how particularly public-spending patterns react to such a
situation. If there are no permanent changes the budgetary situation, while less
benign than pre-crisis, will remain tractable without major adjustments to spending
and taxation. If part of the output loss is permanent and the growth performance is
permanently affected, however, this would in a number of CESEE economies require
further adjustment in the structural deficit to avoid threats to the sustainability of
public finances.
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12.The growth rate-interest rate differential can also be squeezed through an increase in the rate of interest at which
fiscal authorities can borrow. Given the climate in the financial markets following the crisis and the jump in pub-
lic debt, this is also a likely scenario in Europe’s catch-up economies. However, we would still argue that the like-
ly longer-run scenario is one with a positive growth rate - interest rate differential in this group of economies as
in a financially integrated area catch-up economies will still be able to benefit from a ‘snowball effect’ as they did
in the past. This might of course not apply to all countries and over all periods, as growth might stall and gross
fiscal indiscipline might set in to which financial markets might react.  
13.In addition to the permanent downward shift in output, this could also be attributable to eg a longer-run need to
support a larger unemployed or inactive labour force resulting from hysteretic effects of the crisis on the labour
market.123
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Figure 5.9: Debt sustainability scenarios
Source: authors’ calculations.
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c).5.5 Private and public debt
A further key issue to consider before assessing the urgency of the need for fiscal
consolidation is the relationship between public and private debt developments
14.
Large increases in public debt are not just the consequence of deficits or of reces-
sions, but they are also connected to the refinancing of private debt. 
Before the crisis there was a stark difference in all countries in the region between
the stability or, often, the decline of public-debt ratios and the sharp rise of private-
debt ratios (Figure 5.10). There is no doubt that the private-debt overhang will prove
to be a problem and will be a drag on growth, and thus on public finances.
Let us discuss a few examples. Prior to the crisis the Czech Republic and Slovakia
exhibited declining public debt-to-GDP ratios and relatively low private debt-to-GDP
ratios. In all other countries, however, the private-debt ratio was on a fast increasing
path. Developments in these countries were in fact rather similar to those observed
in Spain, Portugal and Ireland, but not for example in Germany or Austria (Figure
5.11).
The relationship between public-debt developments and asset bubbles may be use-
ful to highlight. Fiscal sustainability can be defined via the valuation equation for
public debt, which is that the present value of future primary surpluses has to equal
the public debt. If the interest rate on public debt is below the growth rate, the valua-
tion equation may be violated and fiscal bubbles are possible. Similarly, private sec-
tor assets reflect a present value of future revenues. However, if interest rates are
low, the value of the assets may be above their fundamental value (that is, the value
determined by the valuation equation), which means that there will be a bubble in
the market for assets
15.
It is the collapse of private demand (investment and consumption) that has been
characteristic of this crisis. It has triggered a collapse of public revenue and the
widening of fiscal imbalances. From this it may be inferred that higher fiscal deficits
and growing public debt since 2008 are endogenous, ie they resulted only to a limit-
ed extent from a policy choice. To a large extent public debt has grown and is still
growing because the private sector needed to go through a process of deleveraging.
This process would not take place in a more orderly manner if public finances were to
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14.See also Gligorov and Landesmann (2010).
15.See Cochrane (2005) and Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003).125
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Figure 5.10: Public and private debt in % of GDP
Source: National statistics and Eurostat.
2000200120022003200420052006200720082009
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
Bulgaria
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 20052006 2007 2008 2009
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
Czech Republic
2000200120022003200420052006200720082009
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
Estonia
2000200120022003200420052006200720082009
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
200
Hungary
2000200120022003200420052006200720082009
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180 Latvia
2000200120022003200420052006200720082009
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100 Lithuania
Gross external debt Public debt Private debt (loans) Loans: non-financial corp.
Loans: households Private debt (securities other than shares) Loans: other private sectors126
WHITHER GROWTH IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE?
Figure 5.10, continued
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Figure 5.11: Public and private debt in % of GDP in some euro-area countries
Source: National statistics and Eurostat.
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16. Even with that, most of the
increases in public deficit come from automatic stabilisers and not from additional
fiscal stimuli
17.
These considerations are also important in view of the worries that public borrowing
will crowd out private borrowing. Crowding out of private loans happens if the
demand for credit exceeds supply at the prevailing interest rate due to growing pub-
lic financing needs. In most cases considered here, private demand for credit has
plummeted. This crowds in public borrowing
18. Once private credit demand recovers,
public revenue will recover too, which will prove conducive to the decline of fiscal
deficits.
The relationship between public and private debt can be seen as implying the exis-
tence of a significant fiscal risk. As a consequence, it is important to see how these
two debts, public and private, are connected. A look at the data reveals that the
growth of private debt has been particularly strong in countries that have had high
current-account deficits and have often not experienced an increase in public debt.
Thus, it is hard to argue that these countries have as a rule run twin deficits in the
sense that fiscal deficits were responsible for the current-account deficits
19. In any
case, the opposite is the case now. To see this, the relationship between savings,
investment and the current account is useful. If CA is the current account balance, Ps,
Pi, Gs, Gi are private savings and investment and public savings and investment
respectively, then:
CA = (Ps-Pi) + (Gs-Gi) (3)
If the current-account deficit is narrowing or has turned into a surplus, then:
• either private savings should grow/private investments should fall, 
• or government savings must improve compared to government investment,
or a combination of these two developments. But when the increase in the private
savings/investment balance exceeds the improvement of the current-account bal-
ance, then the fiscal deficit will increase, which has happened in all CESEE countries.
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16.See Fisher (1933). This is similar to what Keynes called ‘the paradox of thrift’.
17.See the recent discussion and evidence in CESifo (2010).
18.‘Crowding in’ is not altogether different from ‘crowding out’ if it goes together with a decline of interest rates on
public debt and an abrupt increase of interest rates on private debt.
19.On their relationship in the case of an open economy, see Mankiw and Elmendorf (1999).Such a development can be the consequence of private-debt deleveraging, which
was a likely phenomenon in most CESEE countries, and/or abrupt capital outflows,
which has developed only in a few CESEE countries, such as Latvia.
Private-debt deleveraging is also pushing up fiscal deficits both through lower rev-
enue and through increased expenditure. As a consequence, the key problem will be
the financial stability of households and corporations. If credit-flows to households
and corporations do not recover, growth will not be sustainable and thus public
finances will not be sustainable either. There is not much evidence that public-debt
deleveraging would help the consolidation of the private sector before financial flows
recover, though foreign-debt developments may be helped if the decline in public
expenditure or increase in taxes leads to improvements in the current account and
makes the financing of foreign obligations easier.
For policy purposes, it is useful to distinguish three types of countries.
• Balkan and Baltic economies, though otherwise different, did increase their pri-
vate debt even though their public debt, for the most part, either stagnated or
declined or was close to zero. This private debt, however, just mirrored current-
account deficits and thus overall foreign debt. This also supported the relatively
benign inflation record due to stable import prices and often fixed exchange rates.
The process of private-debt deleveraging is connected with the real exchange-rate
adjustment, and that may take some time. 
• In the case of central European economies, the debt levels (both public and pri-
vate) are not necessarily all that high and the deleveraging process may not
present the same challenges. It still remains the case that the resumption of
financial flows is the key to both private and public debt management. 
• Finally, in the case of countries further to the East (eg Ukraine), debt issues are
connected with weaknesses in the banking sector, in the revenue base, and in
declines in export revenue from either oil or metals. These countries present spe-
cific problems due to the fact that their financial and trade integration with the EU
is much more limited.
5.6 Fiscal reforms
There is no doubt that the fiscal sector could be improved and that reforms to the pub-
lic sector are needed. A detailed analysis of these issues is beyond the scope of this
chapter. Only a few general comments are in order.
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ences of the public about the type and level of intergenerational transfers
20. These
cannot be taken to be the same for every country. Thus, just looking at the level of
public debt is not very informative about either its sustainability or its vulnerability.
This is an issue that should be treated separately and has more to do with the choice
of social set-up that is to be sustained than with either the model of growth or with
fiscal sustainability.
When it comes to revenue, changes in the tax base are to be expected even if the
overall tax rate does not change. In some cases, eg in central European countries, a
noticeable decline in the openness of these economies (in terms of imports-to-GDP
ratios) should not be expected and therefore that tax base should not be permanent-
ly lost. There is a need, however, to improve the coverage of the informal economy
and to increase the contribution of direct taxes.
In the case of the Baltic and Balkan countries, tax reforms may have to be more
sweeping due to probable slower growth of imports in the medium run. In the case of
countries that rely on export taxes, everything will depend on the recovery in the
prices of natural resources and metals. 
Crucial reforms of public expenditures will have to be undertaken. The problems are
well known and have primarily to do with intergenerational justice. Here, as in other
cases for reforms, the issue is not so much sustainability but the principles on which
the reforms should be based. Indeed, some countries have low public debt-to-GDP
ratios and that may be due to the collapse of social and public institutions rather
than the reflection of the quality of public finances. In some cases, an increase of
public debt may be needed from the point of view of intergenerational and even intra-
generational justice, and thus the ability to run fiscal deficits provided by the process
of growth catch-up may be supportive of that.
Additionally, the institutional framework of fiscal policy needs to be strengthened.
The Budgetary Discipline Index complied by Darvas and Kostyleva (2010), which
translates qualitative information about the three main stages of budgeting (prepa-
ration, legislation, implementation) into a quantitative index, shows that CESEE
countries in general fall behind EU15. Their econometric results confirm that better
budgetary institutions produced better fiscal outcomes.
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20.One interesting recent study is by Birkeland and Prescott (2007).5.7 Summary
The argument can be summarised as follows:
• Fiscal sustainability in the usual sense, ie that the public debt-to-GDP ratio is
increasing without limit, was not the problem that CESEE countries were facing
prior to the crisis. This will remain the case if the output loss in response to the cri-
sis was purely cyclical, they can manage to grow at unchanged potential growth
rates and if they do not face financial risks in excess of those in benchmark EU or
euro-area countries;
• Ability to tax is not likely to be significantly affected, while whether the recent
increase in expenditure/GDP ratio will become a structural problem depends on
GDP developments; 
• In cases where there is a risk that sustainability will be under threat, prudent poli-
cies based on conservative growth and interest-rate assumptions are justified; 
• The key to public-debt consolidation is in some respects the consolidation of pri-
vate debt (with partial exceptions especially Hungary and Croatia).  
Therefore, the origins of the problems experienced in the CESEE countries were most-
ly in the banking and the corporate sectors, not in the public sector. But problems in
the private economy were transmitted to the public sector indirectly through a reduc-
tion in the level of output, and directly in the form of increased off balance-sheet pub-
lic obligations and, especially, of increased deficits as a result of the deleveraging
process in the private economy. Twelve of the seventeen CESEE countries embarked
upon significant budget consolidation in 2009 by freezing or even cutting expendi-
ture, yet expenditure/GDP ratios have expanded everywhere. 
Turning to the policy implications, there is a risk of exaggerating the urgency of fiscal
consolidation and of adding public deleveraging to the ongoing private deleveraging.
This could have significant negative consequences for economic recovery and may
not lead to improvements in either the public- or the private-debt positions. Indeed, if
growth remains depressed owing not only to low private but also public demand,
these countries may face problems similar to those that Latin American countries
went through in the 1990s. Then, interest rates shot up and growth remained
depressed for years as governments ran high primary surpluses in order to repay
their accumulated debt obligations.
But there is also a risk of basing budgetary strategy on overly optimistic assump-
tions and of endangering the sustainability of public finances. 
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to-GDP ratios will still be lower than in most advanced EU and euro countries (see
European Commission, 2009c). Consolidation in accordance with the Stability and
Growth Pact rules should be sufficient to stabilise them and in some cases to put
them on a declining path. 
The implication for the EU is that it should provide a framework that helps CESEE
countries to manage their budgetary challenges. Implementation of the Stability and
Growth Pact should take into account the specific macro-economic conditions of the
countries in the region and, where necessary, conditional lending should balance the
need for fiscal consolidation and the requirements of private-sector deleveraging.
Longer term, the EU should also support the adoption of national budgetary frame-
works that promote sustainability and are conducive to counter-cyclical policies.
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Over the last two decades, central, eastern and south-eastern European (CESEE)
countries have experimented with a unique model of growth and catching-up through
integration into the EU. Not all CESEE countries are at the same stage in terms of their
integration with the EU: some are full members of the euro area whereas others are
not yet members of the EU. But integration has been a driving force for all and they
have in many respects pursued a common growth model.
This model combines institutional anchoring to the EU, integration of product mar-
kets through trade in goods and services, unfettered capital mobility including
through large-scale foreign direct-investment flows, and eventually labour mobility.
At the time of its emergence, this model made considerable sense. Institutional
anchoring was a way of reducing trial and error in the process of building up econom-
ic institutions from scratch; trade provided markets for growth and a framework for
revealing comparative advantage; capital flows from rich to poorer countries were a
textbook response to the scarcity of modern equipment and infrastructure; FDI sub-
stituted the lack of management experience and helped address technological back-
wardness; finally, labour mobility helped to limit the social cost of transition.
However although these are non-original features, no other region in the world com-
bined all of them and to the same degree. Though integration through trade and FDI
is taking place in Asia, the magnitude of capital inflows is much less, the institution-
al anchoring is largely absent, financial integration is less intense and labour flows
remain much more restricted. Furthermore, in the last decade, Europe’s growth model
based on integration blossomed while Asia and Latin America became more cautious
as regards capital inflows. Whereas in most of the emerging world the lesson from the
Asian crisis of 1997-98 was that nations need to avoid large current-account deficits
and even need to run surpluses in order to accumulate foreign-exchange reserves
(for the sake of combating volatile financial flows), Europe experienced a dramatic
increase in 'downhill' capital flows from the old to the new member states.The crisis was undoubtedly a shock to this integration model. As documented in this
report, the region was hit much harder than other parts of the emerging world, and is
recovering more slowly. Crises are moments when policymakers and citizens learn
what works and what does not. In retrospect crises are often looked on as major turn-
ing points. Beyond Asia, the Latin-American debt crisis of the 1980s opened the way
to the liberalisation of the 1990s, and the Scandinavian crises of the early 1990s led
to a major reorientation of the growth models. So the question is, can - and should -
the integration growth model survive or are major changes needed? And if so, what
changes?
In this report we have not considered the CESEE countries in isolation but have used
comparisons extensively, both between European countries and with countries with
a similar level of development on other continents.
We have found that the development patterns of CESEE countries indeed shared
some common characteristics: most have integrated into the EU trade and invest-
ment web; most relied extensively in the last decade on foreign savings; most saw
the take-over of their banking sector by western European banks; most went through
private-credit booms in the 2000s and experienced difficulties in implementing prop-
er financial supervision; and in most cases, budgetary policy was not a major factor
in instability.
We have also found significant differences within the region. First and foremost,
CESEE countries embraced the same model, but to a different degree. Imbalances,
especially external deficits and the credit boom, were much more serious in the Baltic
and Balkan countries (which we call the BB and WB groups) than in central Europe
(the CE group). The same applies to the composition of capital flows: central Europe
relied primarily on FDI and in some cases portfolio investment, while bank credit pre-
dominated for the BB/WB groups. Going one step further, the allocation of foreign
direct investment was markedly different for the two groups, with a predominance of
manufacturing, infrastructure and trade in the CE group and a predominance of real
estate and finance in the BB/WB group. The BB/WB countries, after a disastrous early
period of ‘deindustrialisation’ have not been able to re-build a tradable sector of suffi-
cient size and quality to avoid serious deterioration in current-account positions.
These developments became unsustainable even before the crisis, and have led to a
debt overhang, which seriously undermines economic growth prospects.
Thus, under the umbrella of the same model, quite different developments took place,
some of which portended greater instability than others. We do not offer definitive
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highlighted. Initial conditions certainly played a role: it is not by accident that the
countries most affected by the credit boom-and-bust in the late 2000s were the
poorest. Differences in the policies pursued during the transition phases (such as
privatisation, policies towards FDI) as well as structural policies, for example in the
fields of competition and infrastructure investment, also contributed to shaping the
allocation of capital. We also emphasise the role of exchange-rate regimes: on aver-
age, countries with a floating exchange-rate regime – primarily four central European
countries of the CE group – were able to avoid excessive real appreciation before the
crisis and performed better in the crisis than those with a fixed exchange-rate regime.
We have found a relationship between vulnerabilities and the pre-crisis speed of
credit growth, and also between the pre-crisis speed of credit growth and the drop in
output during the crisis. This suggests that the quality of macroeconomic policies
aiming at low inflation, of regulatory frameworks and of bank supervisory policies
played a part.
An important issue is what role the EU framework has played. As mentioned, we con-
sider that EU integration has been a major success and a factor of paramount impor-
tance in the shaping of the economic catch up of the CESEE region. The single mar-
ket, EU transfers and the anchoring of policies to EU norms all played major roles in
the growth process before the crisis. The crisis-management initiatives taken in
2008-09, especially the Vienna initiative and financial assistance, contributed to
stabilising the situation.
However not everything is uniformly positive. Quite apart from the failure to provide
liquidity through swap agreements at the height of the crisis – a choice that might
well influence national governments’ own decisions in the years ahead - there were a
number of channels through which the EU failed to exercise a sufficiently stabilising
influence in the run-up to the crisis.
Broadly, it must be recognised that the benefits of EU integration for countries that
are catching up are not and cannot be unqualified, but are conditional on the quality
of national policies and the EU framework itself. So the responsibility of national pol-
icymakers in making the best of the EU must be emphasised. By the same token, the
EU’s responsibility is to incentivise policymaking that is consistent with integration,
and to help focus policymakers’ attention on the main priorities.
From this point of view EU integration has been problematic in five respects for CESEE
countries:
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growth. Quite apart from the debate on its effectiveness it was not designed for
catching-up economies and was in some respects ill-suited to their needs. Targets
such as the share of R&D spending in GDP were hardly meaningful. Powerful
instruments the EU had at its disposal to foster economic development, such as
the structural funds, were not made part of a comprehensive growth strategy.
• The focus of macroeconomic surveillance on budgetary variables conveyed the
wrong impression that, providing the fiscal house was in order, there was no
macroeconomic imbalance to be worried about. Although the Commission warned
about large-scale external imbalances both inside and outside the euro area, the
overall policy climate was one of benign neglect (not least due to the logic of the
EU single market), and thus action was not taken to correct misalignments before
they got out of hand.
• There was a much too benign view of the benefits of capital-market integration.
The EU persisted with the belief that implementing the ‘four freedoms’ could only
be beneficial, and it was far from being alone in holding such a view. The microeco-
nomic costs of a misallocation of capital, and the macroeconomic costs of mas-
sive capital inflows and/or borrowing in foreign currencies, were seriously under-
estimated.
• There was what can be termed a fatal attraction to monetary union as four of the
ten CESEE EU member state governments thought that the continuation of the
hard pegs introduced in the 1990s, could be a short cut to the holy grail of early
euro-area membership. Although the EU’s official policy has been to discourage
euro-isation, and not to encourage early application for euro-area membership
(reflected in the denial of Bulgaria’s ambition to join the ERM2), it has not dis-
couraged the continuation of the hard pegs within the ERM2 for the three Baltic
countries. Not enough attention was given to the appropriateness of exchange-
rate strategies from the point of view of national economic development.
• Finally, the crisis has shown basic weaknesses in EU-level arrangements for
short-run crisis management. These arrangements have now come under close
scrutiny for the euro area and EU as a whole, but the issue is also very relevant for
the economies that are closely integrated with the EU while not yet being mem-
bers. At the height of the crisis there was for a short period evidence of negative
spillovers from ad-hoc stabilisation attempts within the EU or euro area. More
importantly, mechanisms to support fiscally and financially sound countries in
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be insufficient.
The question now is how to reform the integration model of growth. Our view is that in
spite of its shortcomings it should be preserved, because it still holds the promise of
development. But we also think that shortcomings need to be addressed and that
instead of assuming that the whole of the EU framework is essentially and instanta-
neously suited to the needs of countries at all levels of development, there should be
an effort to determine how it can best serve the goal of economic catch up and sta-
bility through mobilising existing instruments. Such instruments include structural
funds, improving coordination arrangements (for example in the field of supervision),
exercising surveillance (notably over fiscal and financial policies) and, in the case of
monetary union, making use of transition periods. This requires a more economic and
less legalistic approach to integration, and innovation in the use of existing provi-
sions rather than a procedure-driven approach. Procedures cannot dictate strategies.
Turning to actual policies, a first priority is to improve supply-side conditions. Strong
and competitive traded-goods sectors contribute to sustainable external balances,
which came to the fore in the crisis as the focal point for overall macro-stability. This
applies to euro-area countries as well as non-euro area new EU member states, can-
didate and prospective candidate countries. This suggests that EU policy instru-
ments such as the structural funds and European Investment Bank financing should
be used to buttress productivity and sustainable growth. The same applies to regula-
tory frameworks. Supply-side adjustment also requires appropriate real exchange
rates with a strong drive towards better fulfilment of OCA criteria (in advance of, but
also after, EMU entry).
A second priority is to help create conditions for successful financial integration. In
the short run the deleveraging under way in a large part of the CESEE region limits
some risks at the cost of slowing down economic recovery. Some banks may become
‘zombies’ and credit-rationing may hinder economic recovery in handful of CESEE
countries. In the short run, appropriate monetary and supervisory policies must
accompany the process of deleveraging and support the debt-restructuring process
in the banking and the private sectors. But capital inflows might resume soon, espe-
cially into the less indebted CE countries. The focus should be on creating a robust
framework for supervision, including through improving the division of responsibility
between home and host country, and to agree on ways to limit excessive credit
booms and excessive exposure to exchange-rate risk. On the crisis-management
front, a range of tools can be used to ease the access-to-liquidity problem.
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ditions differ, there cannot be a one-size-fits-all strategy but there is certainly a case
for a dual-track approach. Countries in a floating exchange-rate regime with credible
policy frameworks should not hurry to peg to the euro. However, this strategy may
not work well in countries that are already pegged to the euro. For these countries,
neither having the euro nor an independent monetary policy is often the worst of both
worlds. Therefore, the EU should offer to all potential applicants better terms for euro
membership, on the condition that (a) their current exchange rate is not overvalued,
(b) they have put in place supervisory arrangements that are conducive to financial
stability and (c) they are flexible enough to thrive within the euro area. Assessment
of the sustainability of current-account positions, which is also required by the
Treaty, should be strongly emphasised. Provided these conditions are met, a more
economically sensible interpretation of the inflation criterion should be adopted and,
by the same token, surveillance within the euro area should be strengthened, as
already envisaged by the Van Rompuy group (see Task Force, 2010). When this is not
the case, the EU should initiate discussions with domestic policymakers on altering
the exchange-rate regime.
A fourth priority is fiscal policy. The reformulation of fiscal rules is necessary to
ensure that monetary union is underpinned by an unequivocal commitment to fiscal
discipline. But targets should take account of differences in growth trajectories, and
should preserve incentives and possibilities for counter cyclical fiscal policy. As the
crisis has shown, fiscal vulnerability often arises from implicit liabilities towards the
financial sector and for this reason sustainability assessments should also consider
private-sector fragility. These issues do not apply only to EU member states, but also
to candidate and prospective candidate countries. Therefore the EU should find ways
to support sound fiscal and financial policies in the new member states and the can-
didate countries. To this end, a powerful tool could be the strengthening of the EU’s
current macro-finance assistance arrangements for this group of economies.
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Two-digit country codes used in Figures 1.5 and 1.9:
CE5
CZ Czech Republic
HU Hungary
PL Poland
SK Slovakia
SI Slovenia
BB5
BG Bulgaria
EE Estonia
LV Latvia
LT Lithuania
RO Romania
WB6
AL Albania
BA Bosnia and Herzegovina
HR Croatia
MK Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
ME Montenegro
SQ Serbia
CIS1
UA Ukraine
Asia-6
ID Indonesia
KR Korea
MY MalaysiaPH Philippines
SG Singapore
TW Taiwan Province of China
Latam-8
AR Argentina
BR Brazil
CL Chile
CO Colombia
EC Ecuador
MX Mexico
PE Peru
UY Uruguay
EU15
AT Austria
BE Belgium
DK Denmark
FI Finland
FR France
DE Germany
GR Greece
IE Ireland
IT Italy
LU Luxembourg
NL Netherlands
PT Portugal
ES Spain
SE Sweden
GB United Kingdom
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